Jeffrey Scott Maidment

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for certification of a proposed class proceeding against the manufacturers of the anti-coagulant drug Pradaxa.

The appellants alleged the respondents breached a duty to warn that there was no antidote for the drug.

The motions judge found that the duty to warn was not a common issue, concluding there was no basis in fact that the failure to warn was a source of harm common across the class.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the motions judge did not err in principle or impermissibly weigh competing expert evidence, but correctly applied the 'some basis in fact' test using undisputed evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

In an addendum to a previous decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario modified its endorsement on consent of the parties to remit the quantification of damages to a different judge of the Superior Court of Justice, rather than the original motion judge.

The landlord appealed a summary judgment decision regarding its termination of a commercial lease.

The parties had orally agreed to extend the commencement date of the lease for at least one year.

The landlord later attempted to terminate the lease under a clause allowing termination if it could not deliver possession within six months of the commencement date.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination notice provided in December 2011 was out of time, as the commencement date remained April 1, 2011, and the landlord failed to exercise its termination right within the six-month window.

Judgment was granted in favour of the tenant for breach of contract.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent tenant for breach of a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the lease commencement date and that the appellants terminated the lease in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the oral agreement were not supported by the evidence, and that he erred by relying on the unpleaded doctrine of part performance.

The Court deferred deciding whether to remit the matter or determine the issues itself, requesting further written submissions from the parties.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to approve the discontinuance of the respondents' national class action and dismiss the appellant's claim for an anti-suit injunction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the interests of absent class members would not be prejudiced by the discontinuance under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Terex Corporation, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs sued for injuries sustained in a forklift accident, alleging that Terex assumed the product liabilities of the original manufacturer through an asset contribution agreement and a share purchase agreement.

Terex argued that the doctrine of privity of contract prevented the plaintiffs from relying on the agreements and that successor liability did not apply.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding successor liability, particularly under the express assumption theory.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee, who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome.

The trial judge awarded 15 months' notice, a 9-month Wallace extension, $500,000 in punitive damages, and a costs premium.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of wrongful dismissal, the notice period, and the Wallace extension, finding the employer's order to meet with its doctor unreasonable and its conduct in termination high-handed.

However, the Court reduced the punitive damages to $100,000, finding the trial judge made palpable errors of fact regarding the duration and scope of the employer's misconduct, and reduced the costs premium.

The appellant challenged the authority of the City of Toronto to enact a by-law regulating the use of pesticides within the city under s. 130 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The motion judge upheld the by-law.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the broad and purposive approach to interpreting municipal powers applies to s. 130.

The court found that the by-law was enacted for purposes related to the health, safety, and well-being of inhabitants, and did not conflict with federal or provincial pesticide legislation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant Terex Corporation sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its appeal of a Master's order.

The Master had granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim to add Terex as a defendant after the presumptive limitation period had expired, leaving the issue of discoverability for trial.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the order below and dismissed the application for leave to appeal, awarding agreed costs of $3,500 to the plaintiffs.

The appellant challenged an order striking its amended statement of claim alleging that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and a related generic seller marketed pseudo-generic drugs through misleading origin representations and anti-competitive pricing practices.

The Court of Appeal held that the pleading could support a claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act, as well as related tort claims for unlawful interference with economic relations and conspiracy, because the alleged false statement of origin could have been made to promote a business interest and in a material respect.

The court agreed, however, that the double ticketing claim under s. 54 of the Competition Act and the Business Practices Act allegations were not viable on the pleaded facts.

The court also held that it was not plain and obvious that the Food and Drugs Act claim against the generic seller must fail.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs to the appellant.