Ronald F. Caza

The City of Ottawa sought costs of a motion brought by the appellants to set aside an order refusing leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision.

The appellants argued they should be excused from paying costs as public interest litigants.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the motion to set aside was totally without merit and effectively sought to reargue the leave motion, which did not constitute public interest litigation.

Costs were awarded to the City of Ottawa fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability for professional negligence in failing to advise them of the 21-year deemed disposition rule under the Income Tax Act regarding a family trust.

The defendants admitted breach of the standard of care but disputed causation, arguing the third-party accountants were responsible, and brought a cross-motion to have causation and damages heard together with the third-party claim.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding no genuine issue for trial on liability as the 'but for' test for causation was met against the defendants.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, holding that the third-party action could proceed independently and should not delay the plaintiffs' main action.

The appellant guaranteed a loan made by the respondent bank to a corporation.

After the corporation defaulted on its obligations, the bank demanded payment and successfully moved for summary judgment against the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge misinterpreted the guarantee, failed to consider whether the corporation was given a reasonable time to pay, and erred in rejecting his claim for an equitable discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the guarantee and concluding that the appellant failed to establish that the bank's conduct caused the corporation's default.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision regarding a development on lands with significance to indigenous persons, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court declined to award costs against the appellants, finding they met the criteria for public interest litigants as they raised issues of public importance regarding indigenous religious sites and had no pecuniary interest in the outcome.

Additionally, the court awarded costs to the appellants' counsel personally against one of the respondents for an abandoned claim for personal costs under Rule 57.07(1).

The plaintiffs appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request for a Mareva injunction.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding the motion judge applied the correct legal test requiring a strong prima facie case and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden or the balance of convenience test.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This decision addresses costs following two motions where the Bank of Montreal and Surgeson Carson Associates, Inc. (the Receiver) successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing claims by Jean-Luc Cardinal, Linda Cardinal, The Estate of Raymond Cardinal, and Ferme Lanidrac (the Borrowers), and successfully defended the Borrowers' motion to set aside a consent judgment.

The Bank and Receiver sought substantial indemnity costs, citing the complexity, importance, and unfounded allegations of fraud and abuse of process made by the Borrowers.

The Borrowers argued for partial indemnity costs, claiming shared success on a legal test and that the defendants' evidence was excessive.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Bank ($110,000) and the Receiver ($50,000), finding the Borrowers' conduct in re-litigating settled claims and making serious, unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty warranted higher costs, despite acknowledging minor success on a legal argument.

The court rendered a decision on costs following a six-week jury trial.

The plaintiff, Frank D’Addario, was wholly unsuccessful in his claim for malicious prosecution against Betty Smith and Chris Napior.

Betty Smith's counterclaim for sexual assault was dismissed, while Chris Napior was awarded $25,000 in damages for defamation against Frank and Ferne D’Addario.

The court considered the results obtained at trial, abandoned claims, and Rule 49 offers to settle.

It awarded Betty Smith and Chris Napior $75,000 plus HST for defending abandoned claims, $5,000 plus HST for a pre-trial motion, and Chris Napior an additional $55,000 plus HST and $4,000 in disbursements for his successful defamation claim, after finding elements of over-lawyering and excessive billing in the initial costs submission.

The appellant purchased a new truck that unexpectedly auto-accelerated to 150 km/h, causing a terrifying incident.

Inspections found no mechanical explanation for the malfunction.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim for the cost of a replacement vehicle, finding no evidence of a defect.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to infer a defect from the unexplained failure of the vehicle during ordinary use.

The appeal was allowed and damages were awarded for the replacement cost.

The appellants sought leave to appeal two Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decisions that dismissed their appeals against a City of Ottawa official plan amendment and zoning by-law facilitating the redevelopment of Chaudiere and Albert Islands.

The appellants argued the OMB erred in quashing their Notice of Constitutional Question and in finding that the City and developer adequately consulted with the Algonquin First Nation.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, holding that the OMB correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant declarations of Aboriginal title and that the OMB's findings regarding the adequacy of the consultation process were reasonable and did not raise a question of law.

The appellant, Coliseum Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that overturned an arbitrator's award in its favour regarding a commercial lease dispute with the City of Ottawa.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of Minutes of Settlement concerning the provision of an alternative site following the termination of Coliseum's lease at Frank Clair Stadium.

The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction to review the application judge's decision to grant leave to appeal the arbitral award.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by substituting her own interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement, as the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable and owed deference.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award of $2,240,000 in damages was reinstated.

In an addendum to a previous decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario modified its endorsement on consent of the parties to remit the quantification of damages to a different judge of the Superior Court of Justice, rather than the original motion judge.

The borrowers brought a motion to set aside a consent order terminating a receivership, alleging that the Bank and the court-appointed Receiver made misrepresentations during settlement negotiations.

The Bank and the Receiver brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the borrowers' subsequent action for damages.

The court found no evidence of misrepresentation, noting that the borrowers had independent legal advice, received full disclosure, and signed multiple full and final releases.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the consent order, denied retroactive leave to sue the Receiver, and granted summary judgment dismissing the borrowers' action on the basis of res judicata.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant guarantor for over $1 million owed by a corporate debtor.

The guarantor argued the demand for payment was invalid because the bank did not provide reasonable time to pay, and that the bank's conduct caused the debtor's default, entitling him to a discharge.

The court applied the Hryniak framework and granted summary judgment, finding the guarantee's language clear, the right to payment crystallized upon default, and no bad faith by the bank.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order that permitted cross-examination on an affidavit and required production of the applicant's law firm's litigation file.

The motion judge had ruled that litigation privilege did not protect the file and had issued a supplementary endorsement without a hearing.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's interpretation of litigation privilege under Blank v. Canada and holding that the proposed appeal involved a matter of fundamental importance regarding the right to a hearing on a motion under Rule 59.06(2).

The landlord appealed a summary judgment decision regarding its termination of a commercial lease.

The parties had orally agreed to extend the commencement date of the lease for at least one year.

The landlord later attempted to terminate the lease under a clause allowing termination if it could not deliver possession within six months of the commencement date.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination notice provided in December 2011 was out of time, as the commencement date remained April 1, 2011, and the landlord failed to exercise its termination right within the six-month window.

Judgment was granted in favour of the tenant for breach of contract.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding a defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the motion for non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion in laying sexual assault charges.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs by counterclaim to a priest did not occur on a recognized occasion of qualified privilege, as there was no reciprocal duty or interest.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding the plaintiff's defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs to a priest were not made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

Les demandeurs sollicitent l’autorisation d’interjeter appel du refus d’une injonction Mareva visant les biens de la défenderesse.

Ils soutiennent que le juge de motion a appliqué le critère erroné de la « forte apparence de droit » plutôt que celui d’une « simple apparence de droit ».

Le tribunal conclut qu’il existe des décisions incompatibles concernant le critère applicable aux injonctions Mareva et que la question revêt une importance suffisante pour justifier l’autorisation d’appel.

Le tribunal accorde donc l’autorisation d’interjeter appel et rend une ordonnance provisoire restreignant certains transferts d’actifs afin de préserver l’objet de l’appel.

La demande de sursis est toutefois refusée puisque l’injonction Mareva initiale avait été refusée.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent tenant for breach of a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the lease commencement date and that the appellants terminated the lease in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the oral agreement were not supported by the evidence, and that he erred by relying on the unpleaded doctrine of part performance.

The Court deferred deciding whether to remit the matter or determine the issues itself, requesting further written submissions from the parties.

The plaintiffs sought continuation of an ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendant’s assets in a civil action alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment arising from more than $1.6 million paid over thirteen years for alternative therapy.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favoured continuation of the injunction.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case, noting that the payments were voluntarily made for services provided by an astrologist and medium whose credentials were not misrepresented.

The court accepted an undertaking that the net proceeds from the defendant’s Quebec residence would be held in trust pending further order.

The Mareva injunction was therefore not continued except for the confidentiality provisions.