Robert J. Nightingale

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder following the stabbing death of his roommate, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but argued for detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the proposed sureties could adequately supervise the applicant, mitigating the risk to public safety.

The court also held that a reasonable member of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released on strict conditions amounting to virtual house arrest.

The application for bail was granted.

The moving party brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, including retroactive support.

The parties had a shared custody arrangement for one child, while another child resided primarily with the responding party.

The court ordered the responding party to pay interim child support based on his employment income, with adjustments for the changing custody arrangements over time.

The court also found the moving party had established a prima facie case for interim spousal support due to her medical condition and financial dependency, ordering support in the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a $1,000 costs order made by a Deputy Judge after her two Small Claims Court actions were consolidated and dismissed for exceeding the monetary jurisdiction due to claim splitting.

The appellant argued she was not given an opportunity to make submissions on costs.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant had made submissions regarding her inability to pay, and that the Deputy Judge made no error in principle.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought child support for a 15‑year‑old child after no support had been ordered previously due to the respondent’s inability to pay.

The respondent later received income through the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) and acknowledged he had provided little support historically.

The court determined that the respondent’s income for the purposes of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines was his ODSP income of $25,139 annually.

The respondent did not plead or prove undue hardship under s. 10 of the Child Support Guidelines and provided insufficient evidence regarding his household standard of living.

The court ordered ongoing guideline child support commencing from the first court date.

The defendants moved for an order requiring the corporate plaintiff to post security for costs under Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants relied primarily on Rule 56.01(1)(c), arguing that the plaintiff had outstanding unpaid costs awards from prior litigation involving the same parties.

The court found that the defendants established entitlement to security for costs given the unpaid costs orders and the absence of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff’s claim had a good chance of success.

The plaintiff, which conceded it was not impecunious, failed to provide supporting evidence for serious allegations of improvident power-of-sale transactions and misconduct by the defendants.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $25,000 in security for costs within 30 days, failing which the action would be stayed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking security for costs against corporate plaintiffs who had commenced a $25 million breach of contract action relating to an option agreement concerning several properties.

The defendant demonstrated that the plaintiffs had outstanding unpaid costs orders totalling more than $61,000 from earlier litigation involving substantially similar issues and the same defendant.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not established impecuniosity or demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, noting potential res judicata concerns and a possible limitations defence.

Delay in bringing the motion did not bar relief because the litigation had largely been inactive and the delay was partly attributable to the plaintiffs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to post $25,000 as security for costs covering documentary discovery and examinations for discovery, failing which the action would be stayed.

Following a family law proceeding involving support claims, the court addressed costs.

The respondent in the underlying application was generally successful, though not to the full extent of the relief sought.

No settlement offers justified a substantial indemnity award.

Considering the reasonable hours and hourly rate of counsel, as well as the expectations of the parties and the absence of a costs order at the case conference, the court ordered the unsuccessful applicant to pay partial indemnity costs.

Following the setting aside of an ex parte Mareva injunction previously granted in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant sought costs.

The court considered whether substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to alleged nondisclosure in obtaining the injunction.

While the court acknowledged concerns about incomplete disclosure, it concluded the conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible or egregious behaviour required to justify substantial indemnity costs.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant jurisprudence, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant.

Costs were fixed at $28,000 plus HST and disbursements, payable in any event of the cause following trial or other disposition.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident but had been dismissed after no statement of defence was delivered and service issues arose due to a misnomer in the defendant’s name.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the error was inadvertent, the motion was brought reasonably promptly, and the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was set aside, the statement of claim was amended to correct the defendant’s name, and the time for service was extended.

The registered owner of a motor vehicle brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against him arising from a pedestrian collision caused by his son while driving the vehicle.

The owner argued that his son operated the vehicle without his consent because the son only held a G1 licence and had been expressly prohibited from driving unaccompanied.

The court considered s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act and the jurisprudence confirming that owner liability turns on consent to possession, not consent to operation.

Evidence showed the son had his own set of keys, unrestricted access to the vehicle on the family property, and that the vehicle had been purchased for his eventual ownership and use.

The court held that the owner failed to establish that the vehicle was in the son’s possession without consent and that there was at least a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The tenant applied for a declaration that it had validly exercised an option to purchase commercial property under a lease agreement and sought specific performance compelling the landlord to sell the property at an appraised value.

The landlord opposed and brought a cross‑application alleging the tenant breached the lease by failing to reimburse property taxes and arguing the appraisal used to determine the purchase price was unfair and obtained without proper input.

The court held that the lease clearly required the purchase price to be determined by a specific named appraiser and that the resulting appraisal was valid and unbiased.

The court also interpreted the lease to place responsibility for realty taxes on the landlord, rejecting the landlord’s claim for reimbursement.

The tenant had properly exercised the option to purchase and was entitled to specific performance of the sale at the appraised value.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action concerning statements posted on websites operated by the defendant.

They alleged the publications contained defamatory statements relating to family events surrounding the death of a child and sought damages and injunctive relief.

The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues requiring trial, including publication of the statements, whether the statements were defamatory, and the extent of damages.

However, the court struck portions of the defendant’s statement of defence that disclosed no reasonable defence, including certain claims of responsible communication, fair comment, and volenti non fit injuria.

The court also made a declaration establishing the facts of a prior violent incident involving the parties’ family as not subject to dispute in the action.

A motion to change child support under the Divorce Act sought retroactive adjustment of child support and contribution toward section 7 extraordinary expenses including orthodontic treatment, driver’s education, and post-secondary education.

The responding parent cross‑moved for a retroactive reduction in support based on alleged reduced income and business losses.

The court rejected the claimed self‑employment losses due to insufficient evidence and calculated income based on employment earnings.

The court ordered proportional contributions to section 7 expenses and recalculated guideline support, resulting in arrears payable and prospective support adjustments including university costs for a child attending post-secondary education.

The defendant moved to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction that had frozen his assets pending trial.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts when obtaining the injunction, including the existence of a prior written settlement agreement that could be dispositive of the claim and other misleading statements regarding the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Applying the principles governing Mareva injunctions and Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the nondisclosure sufficient to rescind the order.

The court also declined to grant a fresh injunction, finding the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or a genuine risk of dissipation of assets.

The defendant’s motion was granted and the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction was dismissed.

The moving party sought to vary a prior spousal support order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing that newly proven lower income in 2009 and 2010 constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the earlier order had imputed income of $50,000 based on evidence of the payor’s earning capacity, work history, and failure to provide full financial disclosure.

The evidence presented on the motion did not demonstrate a material change since the original order, particularly where the payor later earned more than the imputed income and failed to provide persuasive medical evidence of incapacity to work.

The court reaffirmed that variation proceedings cannot be used to relitigate the correctness of the original order absent a qualifying change in circumstances.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for default on a mortgage, a line of credit, and a credit card.

The default arose after the defendants failed to pay property tax arrears, prompting the bank to pay the arrears and demand repayment.

The defendants argued they believed the bank was paying the property taxes from their mortgage payments, but provided no evidence to support this claim.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the mortgage documents clearly did not include property taxes, and granted summary judgment in favour of the bank.

The defendant bank brought a motion for security for costs against a corporate plaintiff claiming over $1.8 million in damages arising from an alleged breach of duty after the bank took possession of the plaintiff’s premises pursuant to a bankruptcy application.

Evidence established that the plaintiff had no significant assets and an unpaid prior judgment owed to the defendant.

The court held that once a prima facie case for security for costs under Rule 56.01(d) was established, the plaintiff bore the onus of proving both impecuniosity and that it could not raise funds from shareholders or associates.

The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the financial circumstances of its shareholders or its inability to raise funds.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $10,000 as security for costs, failing which the action would be stayed.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing her motion to be added as a party to child protection proceedings involving six children who had been made Crown wards.

The appellant sought participation in order to propose a kinship placement plan, arguing that the motion judge improperly relied on conflict with the Children’s Aid Society and failed to properly consider her suitability and the feasibility of a home study.

The court applied the deferential appellate standard for factual and discretionary decisions in family and child protection matters, emphasizing that appellate intervention requires a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence supported the motion judge’s concerns about the appellant’s lack of cooperation with the Society, incomplete background checks, and the likelihood that adding her as a party would unduly delay proceedings affecting the children’s stability.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the court dismissed the appeal.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding it negligent under the Occupiers’ Liability Act after a customer entered an open service bay and was injured when a trailer moved as he attempted to steady himself while feeling ill.

The appeal argued the trial judge erred in law in concluding the occupier breached its duty of care.

The court held that findings regarding the standard of care and breach involved questions of mixed fact and law entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

The trial judge’s inference that the occupier knew of the danger posed by the easily moveable trailer positioned near an open garage entrance was reasonably supported by the evidence.

No legal error or misapplication of the statutory duty of care was established.