Robert Michael Ben

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle personal injury action, the plaintiffs moved for an order staying the determination of costs pending satisfaction of the judgment or resolution of a separate insurance coverage dispute involving the liable defendant and his insurer.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be deferred because the verdict was under appeal and because the defendant’s ability to pay costs was uncertain pending determination of coverage, particularly given their intention to seek a Sanderson costs order.

The court held that the existence of an appeal or unresolved insurance coverage litigation does not justify departing from the usual practice of fixing costs after trial.

The ability to pay costs is only one factor in determining whether a Sanderson order is appropriate and does not require postponement of the costs determination.

The motion for a stay of the costs determination was dismissed.

Following a 21‑day personal injury trial concerning municipal liability for road conditions and signage, the successful plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $1,045,000.

The court considered the complexity of the litigation, the extensive expert evidence, and the reasonableness of the fees and disbursements claimed.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay rather than fully reflective of the successful party’s expenditures, the court concluded that the amounts claimed exceeded reasonable expectations.

Significant reductions were made to both fees and disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $406,000 in fees and $200,000 in disbursements, plus applicable taxes.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against a municipality arising from a single‑vehicle collision on a rural road curve that caused catastrophic injuries to a young driver.

The court considered whether the municipality breached its duty under s. 44 of the Municipal Act to keep the roadway in a reasonable state of repair, focusing primarily on inadequate warning signage and the absence of an advisory speed sign for a sharp curve.

Expert evidence established that proper signage, including a 40 km/h advisory speed tab and additional warning devices required by the Ontario Traffic Manual, should have been installed.

The municipality had not conducted any evaluation of the signage following amalgamation and allowed substandard signage to remain in place for years.

The court found the municipality liable for failing to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair, but also held the driver contributorily negligent for failing to sufficiently reduce speed in snowy conditions.

During a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the court ruled on the permissible scope of testimony from an accident reconstruction expert.

The plaintiffs sought to elicit opinion evidence concerning alleged deficiencies in the defendant vehicle’s braking system and on driver perception and reaction times.

The court held that Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires expert reports to clearly state the opinions being advanced and their factual bases, and an expert cannot introduce a new field of opinion not articulated in the report.

Because the expert’s reports did not opine that the brake condition contributed to the collision, such testimony would improperly expand the report.

The court also barred additional human factors opinion evidence as duplicative of testimony already provided by a qualified human factors expert.

The defendant moved to exclude examination for discovery transcripts on the basis that he did not have an interpreter during the first discovery and that some answers during the second discovery were given in broken English.

The moving party argued the transcripts were unreliable and unfair to use at trial.

The court held that the obligation to arrange for an interpreter rests with the party being examined and noted the defendant had an opportunity during the second discovery to correct earlier answers.

The court found that although the defendant would testify at trial through an interpreter, the discovery transcripts should not be struck.

Instead, the court directed that proposed read‑ins be reviewed to ensure fairness in light of the language issues.

The plaintiffs in a motor vehicle personal injury action involving a child with an alleged brain injury sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial.

The court considered factors governing leave to call additional experts, including necessity, duplication of evidence, fairness between parties, and proportionality.

While acknowledging the complexity of the medical issues and future care claims, the court emphasized the trial judge’s gatekeeping role and the need to avoid unnecessary or repetitive expert testimony.

Leave was granted for several experts with distinct specialties but denied for others whose proposed evidence lacked a compliant Rule 53 report or would duplicate testimony from other experts.

The court limited the number of occupational therapists who could testify and refused permission for certain proposed witnesses whose opinions were unnecessary or procedurally deficient.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the defendants moved for a mistrial following the plaintiffs’ opening address.

The court had previously ruled that a police mechanic could not provide expert opinion evidence regarding the condition or effect of the vehicle’s brakes.

In the opening address, plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the defendant driver’s brakes were in an unsatisfactory condition and invited the jury to infer that this contributed to the accident, despite the absence of expert evidence supporting such a theory.

The court held that the opening address improperly contained argument, inaccurate statements about the police investigation, and suggestions that the jury act as enforcers of societal rules.

Because the comments invited the jury to draw conclusions unsupported by admissible evidence and could not be cured by a corrective instruction, a mistrial was declared.

During a civil jury trial arising from a pedestrian motor vehicle accident involving a child, the defendants moved for a mistrial after the plaintiffs’ counsel delivered an opening address containing alleged misstatements of law and improper argument.

The court found that counsel repeatedly misstated the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act by suggesting that all defendants bore the burden of disproving negligence, improperly argued factual conclusions regarding vehicle brake defects without supporting expert evidence, and displayed discovery transcript excerpts suggesting an admission of negligence by one defendant.

The court held that the discovery excerpt was misleading, potentially inadmissible, and taken out of context, particularly given language barriers during the examination for discovery.

Considering the cumulative prejudicial impact of the opening remarks, the court concluded that corrective instructions would not sufficiently remedy the prejudice to the jury.

A mistrial was therefore declared.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the other driver.

In that tort action, she received a copy of an independent medical examination (IME) and a surveillance video from the tort defendant.

The plaintiff subsequently sued her own insurer for disability benefits.

During discoveries in the benefits action, the plaintiff refused to produce the IME and surveillance video, citing the deemed undertaking rule.

The Court of Appeal held that the deemed undertaking rule applies to the recipient of documents obtained in discovery.

Therefore, the plaintiff was bound by the deemed undertaking not to use the IME or the video in another proceeding, and could not disclose them in the benefits action without the consent of the tort defendant or a court order under rule 30.1.01(8).

The appellants brought a derivative claim under the Family Law Act.

The principal claim was statute-barred, but no claim had been brought by the Estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that if the principal claim is statute-barred, the derivative claim is also barred, regardless of whether the Estate brought a claim.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Master Dash on the issue of costs only.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in exercising his discretion with respect to costs against the plaintiffs.

The court noted that a relevant precedent with virtually identical facts had not been brought to the Master's attention.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision granting summary judgment in favour of the co-defendants in an action arising from a 2001 motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review from Housen v. Nikolaisen, finding that the Master made no palpable and overriding error of fact and was correct in his application of the law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding co-defendants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The court reviewed the parties' written submissions and largely agreed with the appellant's position, finding it fair and reasonable.

The court slightly increased the award to the main respondent to reflect its greater participation.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $30,000.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to indemnify the respondent insured under a commercial general liability policy for damages arising from defective concrete.

The insurer relied on the 'Your Work' and 'Rip and Tear' exclusions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'Your Work' exclusion was ousted by the 'subcontractor' exception because the entity that supplied the defective concrete was properly characterized as a subcontractor.

The Court also found the 'Rip and Tear' exclusion incomprehensible and therefore inapplicable.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring her to disclose a defence medical report and surveillance video obtained in a prior tort action to the respondent in her current accident benefits claim.

The motion judge had held that Rule 30.1.01 constrained the use of such evidence but not its disclosure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the deemed undertaking rule prohibits collateral disclosure as well as collateral use to protect the privacy interests of litigants.

The court directed that any request for relief from the deemed undertaking must be brought before a motions judge under subrule 30.1.01(8).

The respondent was securing the engine cover of his pleasure craft with a bungee cord in preparation for highway transport when the cord slipped and struck the appellant in the eye.

The appellant brought a personal injury action, and the respondent sought to limit his liability under the federal Canada Shipping Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the allegedly negligent acts were not governed by federal maritime law, as securing a boat for highway transport is not integrally connected to navigation.

Therefore, provincial law applied, and the respondent could not claim the benefit of the federal limitation of liability.

The appellants, representing the estate of a party under disability, sought to enforce a $3.1 million settlement of an accident benefits claim.

The settlement was reached prior to the party's unexpected death but had not yet received court approval as required by Rule 7.08(1).

The application judge ruled the settlement unenforceable, finding court approval was a true condition precedent.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the settlement was a binding agreement suspended pending approval.

Upon the party's death, the protective need for court approval ceased, and the contractual right to the settlement devolved to her estate, making the agreement enforceable.