R.G. Juriansz

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its action for delay.

The motion judge found the appellant's delay of over nine years was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the presumption of prejudice to the respondents was not rebutted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles and holding that her discretionary decision was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash a municipal bylaw establishing an administrative penalty system for parking infractions.

He argued the bylaw was ultra vires, conflicted with provincial statutes, violated the Charter, and was enacted in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bylaw was explicitly authorized by statute, did not conflict with provincial legislation, and did not engage sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter as it involved no penal consequences.

The appellant, a 27-year-old first-time offender, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for his role in a home invasion involving robbery, unlawful confinement, and discharging a firearm.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly weigh his youth and lack of a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge gave careful reasons, considered all mitigating and aggravating factors, and imposed a sentence that was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellants, holding foreign arbitral awards against the Kyrgyz Republic, sought declarations that the Republic owned shares in Centerra Gold Inc. registered to Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, a state-owned corporation.

The applications judge dismissed the applications, finding no evidence of a transfer of rights, express trust, or resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the governing agreement unambiguously established Kyrgyzaltyn as the beneficial owner of the shares and that the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by the evidence of intention.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking the victim with his truck during an altercation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and the fault element for murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the errors compromised the jury's ability to determine the fault element.

The Court dismissed the appeal from conviction but substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of time served, as jointly proposed by the parties.

The appellant, who was previously found NCRMD, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the outset of his review hearing, the appellant objected to being addressed by his legal name and to the constitution of the Board.

The Chair gave the appellant a five-second ultimatum before cutting off his audio and video feed, proceeding with the hearing in his absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Chair acted precipitously and failed to exercise the judicial patience and restraint required under section 672.5(10)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code before excluding an accused from a hearing.

The appellant homeowner appealed an order confirming a master's report that allowed the respondent contractor's action for unpaid renovation work and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant argued the master failed to address allegations of post-contractual misrepresentations and breach of the duty of honest performance, and that the motion judge erred in finding the entire agreement clause excluded these claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the entire agreement clause could not exclude the duty of honesty, but dismissed the appeal because the master's factual findings—that the parties had agreed to the charges for extra work—disposed of the factual underpinnings of the appellant's claims.

The appellants, the biological parents of a child, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making the child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or palpable and overriding error in the lower courts' decisions.

The Court emphasized the child's need for permanency and stability after being in the care of the respondent for over five years, concluding that the child should be placed for adoption without further delay.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The appellants, the City of Ottawa and a city bus driver, appealed a trial judgment finding them 20% liable for a fatal intersection collision.

The bus driver, travelling on a green light, collided with a vehicle that entered the intersection on a red light.

The trial judge found the bus driver negligent for speeding and momentary inattention, concluding the accident could have been avoided had he driven at the speed limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the standard of care or her causation analysis.

The appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The bankrupt brought a motion to quash the trustee's appeal from the dismissal of a contempt motion, arguing the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, an appeal from an order of a bankruptcy judge lies to the Court of Appeal regardless of whether it is final or interlocutory.

The Court also granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e) if required, given the serious allegations and issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for an order to allow the late filing of his statement of claim regarding the sale of allegedly defective dairy cows.

The appellant failed to file the statement of claim within the 30-day deadline after issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellant's explanation for the delay lacked necessary detail and that the respondent suffered prejudice due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, brought a motion to vary an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had declined to direct the issuance of a notice of appeal, grant a declaration regarding a previous order, and consolidate appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to vary, finding that the moving party failed to identify any sustainable legal basis to interfere with the order and had brought the motion without leave, contrary to a previous order.

The appellant emergency room physician appealed a trial judgment finding him liable in negligence for the death of a patient from bacterial meningitis.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by failing to consider meningitis, perform a lumbar puncture, or administer standard treatment when the patient presented with confusion, fever, and a history of decreased consciousness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the patient's mental status, her reliance on an infectious disease specialist's standard of care evidence, or her causation analysis applying the 'but for' test.

A Sanderson costs order against the appellant was also upheld.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action in negligence and breach of contract against the respondent regarding a slip and fall on restaurant stairs.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim regarding hazards on the stairs but allowed the appellants to amend their claim to plead a breach of the Consumer Protection Act for failing to advise of a main floor washroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly dismissed the first branch of the claim due to a lack of evidence of stair hazards, and properly preserved the second branch regarding the failure to advise.

The appellant moved for a stay of a motion judge's order regarding reintegration reconciliation counselling and the adjournment of her summary judgment motion.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal, arguing the underlying order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondent, finding that the issue of access remained to be determined at a future summary judgment motion.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and was sentenced to nine months in jail.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for the disparity between his sentence and the 90-day intermittent sentence imposed on his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle, noting material differences between the offenders such as the co-accused making full restitution.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from a judgment implementing a consent to judgment.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, noting that under section 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a consent order requires leave.

The appellants had improperly sought leave within their Notice of Appeal rather than bringing a motion in writing as required by Rule 61.03.1.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants bringing a proper motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant, a physiotherapy assistant, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by considering the complainant's demure dress in court and her apparent religious beliefs as factors bolstering her credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by treating the complainant's manner of dress and religious beliefs as relevant to her credibility, these factors were given minimal weight and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault and sexual assault against his former wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of extrinsic misconduct, specifically allegations of child abuse, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence was improperly admitted and that the trial judge's instructions failed to shield the jury from impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed.