R.G. Juriansz

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention with privileges.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat and that there was an impasse in finding community housing due to his substance use.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's factual misapprehension regarding recent charges was immaterial and upheld the finding that he remained a significant threat.

The Court dismissed the appeal but amended the disposition to include the Board's direction from its reasons that the hospital look at housing that does not require abstinence.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

Prior to the resolution of the appeal, the appellant died.

Counsel for the appellant filed a Notice of Abatement, and the Court of Appeal ordered the file closed as abated.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons.

The trial judge had stated she was confident of the appellant's guilt but reserved her reasons to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

However, no written or oral reasons for conviction were ever delivered.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the lack of reasons prevented appellate review.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as her sentence of 12 months in custody.

The appellant had stabbed one individual and cut another during a physical altercation, claiming she acted in defence of her romantic partner.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the self-defence factors under s. 34 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded her use of a knife was disproportionate.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply the sentencing principles applicable to youthful first-time offenders.

The sentence was varied to a suspended sentence with probation.

The appellant was convicted of child luring and making sexually explicit images available to a child following an undercover police sting.

The trial judge relied on the evidentiary presumption of belief in age under s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Following the convictions, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morrison struck down this presumption as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying the pre-Morrison framework and relying on the presumption to establish the appellant's belief in the interlocutor's age.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The respondent on appeal was awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount of $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant, a party under disability with the Public Guardian and Trustee appointed as his litigation guardian, filed a Notice of Appeal challenging a case management judge's order that stayed his action as frivolous, vexatious, or abusive.

The respondents requested an order under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found the Notice of Appeal to be largely unintelligible and seeking relief the court could not grant, demonstrating the appellant's incapacity to represent himself.

The appeal was dismissed as frivolous on its face.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents over $2 million in damages arising from a motor vehicle accident where a pedestrian was struck.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by discharging the jury mid-trial, refusing a mistrial, mishandling evidence of CPP disability benefits, and excluding surveillance videos.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had ample basis to discharge the jury due to scheduling issues and late disclosure of an umbrella insurance policy.

While the surveillance videos should have been admitted, their exclusion did not cause a miscarriage of justice given their minimal probative value.

The appellant law firm appealed the quantum of legal fees approved by the application judge in a settlement for a plaintiff under a disability.

The application judge had reduced the firm's contingency fee from approximately $180,000 to $60,000, noting the lack of complexity, the absence of risk, and the disparity between the docketed time and the requested fee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's articulation or application of the relevant factors for fixing costs for a party under a disability.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding prospective and retroactive spousal and child support, as well as the trial costs award.

The trial judge had imputed income to the respondent due to income fluctuations and denied retroactive support because the appellant's bankruptcy had relieved her of the tax debt that caused her financial hardship.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review, finding no material error or serious misapprehension of the evidence by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding the respondent 24 months' notice and bonus entitlements for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the employment contract, resignation, and release in the context of a commercial share sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable errors of law in the motion judge's contractual interpretation, upholding the finding that the release of ESA rights was void, and affirming the 24-month notice period and bonus entitlement.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The charges arose from an undercover police operation where pre-marked buy money was used, and a subsequent search warrant executed at the appellant's residence yielded cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could return guilty verdicts based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing opium into Canada.

At trial, the Crown's expert witness testified that in his experience, it was 'one hundred percent true' that the person bringing the shipment had knowledge of the illicit substance.

The Crown conceded on appeal that this anecdotal evidence was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, running afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Sekhon.

Because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision refusing to amend its declaration under s. 109(3) of the Condominium Act.

The dispute centered on who should bear the cost of replacing deteriorated chimney flues that exclusively serviced 22 residential units.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was no inconsistency between sections 22 and 23 of the declaration.

The Court held that the sections failed to clearly delineate the responsibilities for repairing exclusive use common elements after normal wear and tear, creating an unworkable mutual obligation.

The appeal was allowed and an order was granted to amend the declaration to clarify that unit owners are responsible for maintaining and repairing exclusive use common elements at their own expense.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appellants and respondent, owners of adjoining properties, disputed the use of a mutual driveway.

The application judge found that a 1975 right-of-way agreement bound successor owners despite lacking a formal enurement clause, as the agreement's wording showed a manifest intention to create an easement running with the land.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings on rectification and factual issues regarding vehicular access and substantial interference.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence for sexual offences and drug trafficking, and applied for release pending appeal, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and his health conditions.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the application for release.

The judge found the appeal had little merit and would likely be determined before the sentence expired.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to show his detention was not necessary in the public interest, given his history of breaching recognizances, lack of insight into his offences, and the serious nature of the crimes against children.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the bench for the reasons of the motion judge, and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $20,000.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision declaring that the limitation period for putative class members remained suspended under s. 28(1) of the Class Proceedings Act following the denial of class certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 28(1) provides an exhaustive list of circumstances that resume a limitation period, and denial of certification is not among them.

Consequently, the limitation period remains suspended indefinitely following a denial of certification, a result the court noted must be addressed by the Legislature.