R.G. Juriansz

The appellant, the sole director of a Canadian company that contracted to supply armoured vehicles to the United States government, appealed his committal for extradition to the US on fraud charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that a civil relator action based on the same allegations had been dismissed in the US, arguing this created an issue estoppel and rendered the extradition an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, holding that the fresh evidence was irrelevant to the extradition hearing judge's limited statutory role and that the Minister reasonably concluded that issue estoppel was a defence to be raised at trial in the requesting state.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a taxicab driver.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the use of his police statements and post-offence conduct, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

He also alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to lead evidence of a 'family conspiracy' by his co-accuseds' family to frame him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination, and concluding that trial counsel's tactical decisions were sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant previously declared a vexatious litigant in three separate orders, sought leave to bring a motion to reinstate his appeals after they were dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the moving party failed to perfect the appeals despite being capable of filing voluminous materials.

The court further held that the underlying appeals were entirely devoid of merit and that the interests of justice would not be served by permitting the matter to proceed.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to dismiss a small claims action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while it would have been procedurally preferable for the respondent to move to transfer the action to the Superior Court, the motion judge was entitled to refuse to dismiss the action.

The Court found that dismissing the claim would be disproportionate to the procedural irregularity that occurred, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure following an alleyway beating outside a nightclub.

At trial, the judge admitted a security guard's written statement identifying the appellant as a participant under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the statement lacked threshold reliability and that phone call evidence was mishandled.

He also appealed his three-and-a-half year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the hearsay evidence met the traditional exception's conditions, the jury was properly instructed, and the sentence was proportionate to the gravity of the vigilante attack.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract and inducing breach of contract regarding a commercial restaurant lease.

The trial judge found the appellants unreasonably refused consent to a sublease and maliciously induced a tenant to breach her contract to punish the respondent for unrelated litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, or the damages award.

The appellant appealed rulings made by the trial judge regarding the valuation of the matrimonial home and a post-judgment adjustment for line of credit interest.

The trial judge had averaged the real estate estimates provided by the self-represented parties to value the home at $652,000, and credited the respondent for post-separation interest payments.

The Court of Appeal found the valuation fell within a reasonable range and the interest credit was appropriate given the retroactive support ordered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order was interlocutory and therefore not within its jurisdiction.

The court noted that the motion judge's remarks regarding the statement of defence and counterclaim being nullities, and about spoliation, were obiter dicta explaining his refusal to exercise discretion to allow the matter to proceed despite a defendant's bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision finding that the parties had entered into a settlement agreement, which the appellant subsequently breached and frustrated.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review, finding ample support in the record, including the appellant's own testimony and email exchanges, for the trial judge's conclusions.

The court also upheld the trial judge's remedy, which aimed to put the parties in the position they would have been in had the agreement been performed, noting that the properties had since been sold.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her professional negligence action against her former lawyers.

Her action was dismissed under Rule 57.03(2) after she failed to pay a $10,400 costs award from an unsuccessful summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly balanced the competing interests, noting the appellant provided no evidence of her alleged impecuniosity or the merits of her claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it had the exclusive right to terminate a real estate agreement.

The agreement contained a clause allowing either party to terminate if severance approval was not obtained by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the final executed offer contained a mutual termination clause, rejecting the appellant's argument that uninitialed handwritten portions should be disregarded.

The court also rejected the appellant's promissory estoppel argument, finding the relationship was governed by contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision granting an undischarged bankrupt credit for the reduction in the principal amount of his mortgage based on promissory estoppel.

The Trustee had represented it would disclaim the property, leading the bankrupt to continue making mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the surplus income provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

As an undischarged bankrupt, the respondent was not entitled to build equity or be reimbursed for mortgage payments claimed as reasonable living expenses, and all after-acquired equity vested in the Trustee.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed the firearm convictions, arguing that Crown counsel impermissibly relied on a confidential informant's hearsay statement for the truth of its contents during the closing address, despite the statement not being in evidence.

The trial judge compounded the error by repeating the Crown's submission.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the uncorrected improper closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the firearm convictions were vacated, and a new trial was ordered for those charges.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and other firearms offences arising from a home invasion.

He was sentenced to 8 years, less 1:1 credit for pre-disposition custody.

On appeal, the appellant sought enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-disposition custody.

The Crown conceded that under the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the appellant was entitled to the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to reflect the enhanced credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and gross indecency involving an underage neighbour, arguing that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of four other sexual offences, including rape.

He contended that the jury must have reached an impermissible credibility compromise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The jury was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, and it was open to them to distinguish between the offences involving intercourse and those that did not.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her appeal from a Crown wardship order regarding three of her children.

She argued the children should be placed with their maternal grandmother, that she received inadequate representation at trial, and that the respondent society failed to investigate the grandmother as a placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the inadequate representation claim and agreeing with the trial judge's concerns about the grandmother's suitability given her own child protection history.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's dismissal of their motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's claims as statute-barred.

The motion judge had found that the respondent lacked standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim prior to the appointment of a receiver, and that the appellants had concealed facts necessary to support the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's findings on discoverability and concealment were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action for catastrophic injury Statutory Accident Benefits as statute-barred under s. 281.1(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge had distinguished the Divisional Court's decision in Do v. Guarantee Insurance Co., finding that the insurer's denial of catastrophic status included language denying increased benefits, thereby triggering the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer's language merely indicated a lack of status to claim increased benefits and did not constitute a denial of specific benefits.

The motion judge's order was set aside.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement regarding the respondent's claim for amounts owed upon termination of employment.

The appellants argued the settlement should not be enforced due to the respondent's alleged post-termination breach of a non-compete clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged breach was not part of the settlement and that a boilerplate preamble could not reasonably be interpreted to include it.

The appellants retained the respondent lawyer to represent them in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The respondent issued the statement of claim more than two years after the accident.

The appellants subsequently sued the respondent for professional negligence.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the professional negligence action was statute-barred.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the appellants did not discover their claim against the respondent until the defendants in the underlying motor vehicle action amended their statement of defence to plead a limitations defence.