WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
45(7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
45(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
45(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A.F., 2016 ONCA 267
DATE: 20160411
DOCKET: C61577
Sharpe, Juriansz and Roberts JJ.A.
IN THE MATTER OF the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, as amended and The Evidence Act, R.S.O. 199, c. E-23, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL FROM THE ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE Under the said Child and Family Services Act as related to:
S.F.
J.F.
J.F.
BETWEEN
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto
Applicant (Applicant in the Ontario Court of Justice)
Respondent
and
A.F. (Mother)
Respondent (in the Ontario Court of Justice)
Appellant
Ghina Al Sewaidi, for the appellant
Justine Sherman, for the respondent
Lauren Israel, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
Heard and released orally: April 8, 2016
On appeal from the order of Justice Craig Perkins of the Superior Court of Justice, dated December 15, 2015.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This is an appeal from the dismissal of the appellant’s appeal from a Crown wardship order in relation to three of the appellant’s children. The appellant’s position is that an order should be made placing her children with her mother. In lengthy and detailed reasons, the trial judge rejected that position and provided fully considered reasons explaining why she concluded that a placement with the maternal grandmother would be inappropriate. The appeal judge found no error in the trial judge’s reasons and upheld her decision.
[2] In her factum for this appeal, the appellant argues that she was inadequately represented by her trial counsel. We were advised at the opening of the appeal that trial counsel had not been served with notice of the hearing of this appeal. As this is a second-level appeal involving child protection, it is in the interests of justice that it proceed and we therefore declined to adjourn the appeal so that the appellant’s trial counsel could be served. We have reviewed the appellant’s written argument on the inadequacy of assistance point and the affidavit filed by the appellant’s trial counsel in answer to this allegation. We agree with the appeal judge that there is no merit to this ground of appeal.
[3] The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in relation to her use of past parenting evidence regarding the children’s maternal grandmother. The appellant further submits that the respondent Children’s Aid Society failed in its duty to investigate the possibility of placing the children with the maternal grandmother.
[4] We are unable to accept these submissions. There was considerable evidence before the trial judge as to the lengthy and concerning history of the maternal grandmother with child protection agencies. Indeed, at the time of trial, she was involved in ongoing child protection proceedings with another Children’s Aid Society in relation to her own children. The maternal grandmother had shown limited interest in the children, and she had been uncooperative with the respondent society leading up to the trial.
[5] In her very thorough reasons, the trial judge expressed serious concerns about the suitability of the maternal grandmother as a caregiver for these children given her own child protection history, her limited relationship with the children and the poor judgment she demonstrated in relation to the children in her care.
[6] We do not agree with the submission that the respondent society failed in its statutory duty to investigate the possibility of a placement with the maternal grandmother. Moreover, we are satisfied on the record before us that any investigation would not have altered the outcome in this proceeding.
[7] In our view, the trial judge did not make inappropriate use of the maternal grandmother’s prior parenting history. While the grandmother’s own child protection file was closed following the trial, that fact alone did not alter the troubling evidence demonstrating the grandmother’s lack of suitability for a custodial placement.
[8] Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”
“R.G. Juriansz J.A.”
“L.B. Roberts J.A.”