Pierre Champagne

The defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (TPSGC), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for additional costs, arguing that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff, Amor Construction, contended that the novation of the contract did not trigger the limitation period and that TPSGC acted in bad faith by refusing to engage in the contractual dispute resolution process.

The court found that the limitation period began when TPSGC explicitly rejected the claim on November 3, 2015, not upon contract novation in November 2012, given prior assurances and the nature of information requested.

The court also concluded that TPSGC's conduct constituted bad faith in the performance of its contractual obligations.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a subrogated claim against W.O. Stinson & Son Ltd. for negligence following an oil tank leak in their basement.

The claim alleged Stinson was negligent in repositioning the tank and during annual maintenance, specifically regarding water dip tests, warnings about corrosion, and recognizing signs of damage.

The court found that Stinson met the standard of care required of a fuel oil service contractor and supplier, complying with TSSA regulations and industry standards.

The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as it could not be proven that "but for" Stinson's actions or omissions, the leak would not have occurred.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed.

Damages were also assessed for completeness, with some criticisms of the remediation costs.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision that dismissed their Rule 21 motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs, including a former RCMP member, claimed damages for harassment, assault, and sexual assault.

The defendants argued the claims were barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the plaintiff received a pension for PTSD.

The court refused leave to appeal, finding no conflicting case law on the principles for striking pleadings and no good reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that it was not plain and obvious the entire claim was barred.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the successful applicants following a motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The award was based on the respondents' unreasonable, reprehensible, and bad faith conduct, which involved a conspiracy to circumvent a unanimous shareholders' agreement through a sham default and share seizure.

This conduct, including high-handed actions such as changing locks and involving police, justified the higher scale of costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000, to be shared jointly and severally by the respondent shareholders and secured creditors.

The plaintiff, Devon Hakvoort, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking costs, enhanced pre-judgment interest, and professional fees in a fire loss insurance claim, despite the principal amount owed by the defendant insurer, North Waterloo Farmer’s Mutual Insurance, having been paid.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant had discharged all its contractual obligations and that the plaintiff was not entitled to further compensation.

The action was dismissed without costs, with the plaintiff ordered to pay a previously awarded $1,000.00 in costs.

The court noted that the litigation could have been avoided through a tolling agreement or earlier use of the statutory appraisal process under the Insurance Act, and criticized the plaintiff's initial pleading and abandoned bad faith claim.

The defendant's motion for leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim and requiring the defendant to answer discovery refusals was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $7,672.26 on a partial indemnity basis for the written motion.

The court found the plaintiffs' docketed hours excessive and noted the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendant, W.O. Stinson & Son Limited, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim and required the defendant to answer questions refused at discovery.

The underlying action involved an oil leak from a tank installed by the defendant.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision regarding the amendment of pleadings or the discovery refusals.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general importance, as the issues were specific to the facts and pleadings of the case.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to amend their statement of claim and to compel answers to certain refused questions arising from examinations for discovery in an action alleging negligence and breach of contract relating to an oil tank leak at their residential property.

The proposed amendments included pleading that the defendant sold the oil tank and breached obligations under the Sale of Goods Act.

The court held that the amendments did not introduce a new cause of action but rather advanced alternative legal bases and particulars arising from the same factual matrix already pleaded.

Accordingly, the amendments were permitted despite limitation period arguments.

The court also ruled on several discovery refusals, ordering answers to questions relevant to the defendant’s knowledge of corrosion risks and similar tank issues, subject to proportionality considerations.

The plaintiff, having been wholly successful at trial and awarded damages including punitive damages, sought costs.

The plaintiff had served two Rule 49 offers to settle, both of which were beaten at trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the first offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, noting that the 2005 Costs Subcommittee guidelines for counsel fees are outdated.

Total costs of $140,360.11 were awarded.

A municipality sought a costs award of approximately $93,000 in relation to an application concerning enforcement orders under the Building Code Act, 1992 tied to the conversion of a former school into a retirement residence.

The application had not been finally adjudicated and most issues appeared to have been resolved without substantive judicial determination after the eventual issuance of a building permit.

The court held that entitlement to costs requires findings regarding success and the parties’ conduct, which were absent due to the lack of adjudication on the merits and limited judicial involvement.

Given the possibility that the matter resolved through compromise and the absence of clear success by either party, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award costs.

The municipality’s motion for costs was therefore dismissed.

The court reviewed documents listed in a supplementary affidavit of documents to determine the validity of claims for solicitor-client privilege.

The documents consisted of communications between a principal of the plaintiff corporation and U.S. counsel.

The court held that most of the communications remained privileged; however, certain documents either were not privileged or had privilege waived due to the plaintiffs’ pleadings placing the receipt of legal advice in issue.

Where the pleadings raised the question of whether the plaintiffs had legal representation or transactional advice during the relevant period, privilege was found to be waived for specific communications.

The court ordered production of certain documents while maintaining privilege over the remainder.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to amend their statement of claim to discontinue certain plaintiffs, add a municipal lawyer as a defendant, and deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim alleging malicious prosecution and related torts.

The court held that the proposed addition of the new defendant was barred by the applicable limitation period under the discoverability principle, as the plaintiff had knowledge of the individual’s alleged involvement more than two years before the motion was argued.

The court found that merely delivering a motion before the limitation period expired did not suspend the running of time; the motion must be successfully argued within the limitation period.

As a result, the request to add the proposed defendant and amend the claim to seek damages against him was refused, although leave to discontinue certain plaintiffs was granted.

Costs were awarded against the moving party.

Following earlier interlocutory proceedings involving an injunction and Anton Piller order in a dispute concerning confidential engineering information and alleged misuse of intellectual property, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The responding party sought costs for obtaining the ex parte injunction and Anton Piller order and for successfully resisting a motion to set them aside.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, complexity, proportionality, and reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court found the hourly rates and claimed time generally reasonable.

Although the moving parties achieved limited success in varying certain terms of the Anton Piller order, the injunction and order were maintained.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the responding party for the initial ex parte motion and the motion to set aside, with costs of a later motion left in the cause.

Former employees and a competing corporation moved to set aside or vary an interim injunction and Anton Piller order obtained ex parte by their former employer.

The employer alleged the employees copied large volumes of confidential engineering files relating to proprietary sonar technology before leaving to establish a competing business.

The court found strong prima facie evidence of copying confidential files in breach of confidentiality agreements, a risk of serious commercial harm, and a real possibility that electronic evidence could be destroyed.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the injunction and preservation measures.

The injunction remained in effect and the Anton Piller order was varied largely on consent while preserving seized materials under the supervision of an independent supervising solicitor.