Pierre Champagne

The applicant, a former director and minority shareholder, brought a motion seeking an order for the respondent corporation BCE Realty Ltd. to produce an audited financial statement for 2022, alleging financial impropriety and oppression.

The court found the applicant had standing as a former director under the Ontario Business Corporations Act's oppression remedy provisions, despite not being a direct shareholder.

The court granted the order for the audited financial statement but required the applicant to pay the cost in advance, with the right to seek reimbursement at the end of the litigation.

This ruling addresses two mid-trial motions: one by the defendant, Ashcroft Homes – Eastboro Inc., for leave to introduce information related to late-delivered undertakings, and another by the plaintiffs for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The court granted Ashcroft's motion, finding a reasonable explanation for the delay and that any prejudice to the plaintiffs could be compensated by an adjournment and costs.

The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their statement of claim, including a proposed amendment regarding non-compliance with Schedule "A" of the agreements, determining it did not introduce a new cause of action and thus no non-compensable prejudice due to limitation periods.

This decision concerns the costs arising from a dispute between the estate of Laurette Larivière and her son, Conrad Larivière.

The original applications involved claims by the estate regarding funds, accounting, and a life insurance policy, and counter-claims by Conrad for compensation for care and reimbursement of funeral expenses.

The court found that Conrad had substantial success in the underlying applications, particularly in retaining life insurance proceeds and securing reimbursement for funeral expenses, while the estate's claims for accounting and compensation against Conrad were largely rejected.

Consequently, the court awarded Conrad partial indemnity costs.

The appellants sought an interpretation of their retainer agreement with the respondent law firms, arguing it was a contingency fee agreement capped at one-third of any favourable result.

The respondents contended it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement based on hourly rates, with a potential premium.

The application judge found it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement with a reduced hourly rate and a premium, where only the premium was capped, not the hourly fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation.

The Court affirmed that the application judge correctly applied principles of contract interpretation, including considering surrounding circumstances while ensuring they did not overwhelm the clear wording of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendants were largely successful, the parties settled the action and submitted a joint costs brief.

The defendants sought $32,014.17 in partial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for $15,000, noting the defendants spent twice as much time and charged three times as much as the plaintiff.

The court found the defendants' time investment was generally reasonable given what was at stake, but acknowledged some overkill, ultimately fixing costs at $27,500 all-inclusive.

The moving party, a residential property owner, brought a motion under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act to discharge two construction liens registered against her property by a subcontractor and an equipment rental company.

The moving party argued the liens were out of time under the 45-day preservation deadline of the old Construction Lien Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding triable issues regarding whether the old Act or the new Construction Act (with a 60-day deadline) applied, and when the lien claimants last supplied services and materials to the improvement.

Miramare Investment Inc. brought a motion to find AOD Corporation and Alain Mercier in contempt of court for violating a prior order that designated Miramare as the sole entity authorized to deal with a specific patent.

The court had previously ruled that Miramare was the sole entity authorized to deal with the patent, a decision upheld on appeal.

The court found AOD and Alain Mercier guilty of contempt, concluding that the sale of the patent was a clear violation of the court's order.

The judge found Alain Mercier's testimony not credible and confirmed that all elements of contempt were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, AOD Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration that a patent agreement was invalid.

The appellant argued that the agreement required shareholder approval under s. 189(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act and that the indoor management rule did not apply because the respondent, Miramare Investment Incorporated, had knowledge of internal irregularities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 189(3) argument was a new issue raised for the first time on appeal without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court also upheld the application judge's finding that Miramare had no knowledge of any irregularities, thereby affirming the application of the indoor management rule under common law and s. 18(1) of the CBCA.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims for oppression.

The plaintiffs, former minority shareholders, alleged that the defendants misappropriated corporate assets and sold shares below true value.

The court struck the claims against the Murison Family Trust with leave to amend, as a trust is not a legal entity.

The claims against 2123388 Ontario Inc. and Exia Biomedical Inc. were struck without leave to amend, as 212 lacked the capacity to oppress and the claims against Exia belonged to the corporation and required a derivative action.

The claim against Obotics Inc. was struck with leave to amend, as no material facts of wrongful conduct were pleaded.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1988 agreement between a school board and a municipality for snow and garbage removal services provided in exchange for the sale of a school property for $1.

The municipality unilaterally terminated the services in 2017, arguing the contract was terminable on reasonable notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the agreement as a personal services contract and in his analysis of surrounding circumstances.

The Court concluded that the agreement was perpetual in nature, given the upfront transfer of an enduring capital asset by the school board and the public nature of the parties' mutually beneficial arrangement, which was not primarily commercial.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application to invalidate a patent agreement and the granting of the respondent's counter-application, the successful respondent sought costs.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the actual fees claimed to be excessive for a simple application.

The court declined to order costs jointly and severally, instead ordering the applicant and the co-respondent (who aligned with the applicant) to pay discrete amounts reflecting their respective contributions to the costs incurred.

The applicant corporation sought a declaration that a patent agreement executed by its former president with the respondent was invalid, arguing the president lacked authority without a two-thirds majority shareholder approval.

The respondent brought a counter-application to enforce the agreement, arguing it was a valid licensing and option agreement.

The court dismissed the application and allowed the counter-application, finding no evidence of a unanimous shareholder agreement restricting the president's authority.

The court applied the indoor management rule and section 18 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, holding that the respondent was entitled to rely on the president's apparent authority to bind the corporation.

The defendant brought a motion in writing on consent for leave to amend its statement of defence and crossclaim.

The court found multiple deficiencies in the motion record, including the failure to attach the proposed amended pleading, lack of supporting affidavit evidence, and an improperly drafted consent and draft order.

Despite the motion being on consent, the court adjourned the motion and ordered the moving party to deliver a fresh, corrected motion record.

The appellants, Ontario farmers, purchased agricultural machinery from the respondents, whose business is located in Quebec near the Ontario border.

The appellants sued the respondents in Ontario and served the statement of claim outside Ontario.

The motion judge set aside the service and stayed the proceeding, finding that the respondents did not carry on business in Ontario and therefore Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence showed the respondents solicited sales in Ontario, derived 40% of their sales revenue from Ontario, operated a mobile repair service in Ontario, and maintained a GPS system in Ontario to support the machinery sold there.

Therefore, the respondents carried on business in Ontario, establishing a real and substantial connection, and Ontario courts have jurisdiction.

The defendant, Michel Bergeron, sought costs following the approval of an accounting, where only one of 56 items objected to by the plaintiff, Monique Talbot, was not accepted.

Talbot opposed Bergeron's cost request, arguing that the objections were reasonable and the monetary outcome was split, and sought costs for having to respond to Bergeron's request.

The court, applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found that Bergeron was not entitled to costs, as it is customary for a trustee to provide detailed accounts, and Talbot's objections were reasonable given the nature of the dispute and the split monetary result (approximately $22,000 approved, $23,000 refused).

The court dismissed Bergeron's cost request and ordered him to pay Talbot $500 for the costs incurred in responding to his unreasonable cost application. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision highlights the application of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in determining costs, emphasizing that it is not a mechanical exercise but aims for a just and reasonable outcome.

It reiterates the principle from Boucher c.

Conseil des experts-comptables de la province de l’Ontario that costs are not merely a reimbursement of actual expenses.

The court underscores that a trustee's obligation to provide detailed accounts justifies reasonable scrutiny, and a split outcome on objections can warrant each party bearing their own costs.

The ruling also demonstrates that an unreasonable cost application can lead to an adverse cost award against the moving party. final_judgement: > Michel Bergeron's request for costs was refused.

Michel Bergeron was ordered to pay Monique Talbot $500 for costs, including taxes and disbursements, for her representations regarding costs.

Michel Bergeron retained the right to costs of $1,000 for the modification of his pleading. winning_degree_applicant: 2 winning_degree_respondent: 4 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2020 decision_number: 2502 file_number: "18-75967" source: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onsc/doc/2020/2020oncs2502/2020oncs2502.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Règles de procédure civile, R.R.O., 1990, Règl. 194" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/900194" case_law: - title: "Boucher c.

Conseil des experts-comptables de la province de l’Ontario" url: "https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii14579/2004canlii14579.html" keywords: - Dépens - Reddition de compte - Règles de procédure civile - Fiduciaire - Succession - Frais juridiques - Ontario areas_of_law: - Droit des successions - Procédure civile --- # Court File and Parties **RÉFÉRENCE :** Talbot c.

Bergeron, 2020 ONCS 2502 **NUMÉRO DE DOSSIER DU GREFFE :** 18-75967 **DATE :** 2020/04/22 **COUR SUPÉRIEURE DE JUSTICE – ONTARIO** **RENVOI :** Monique Talbot, la demanderesse **ET** Michel Bergeron et Doyle Salewski Inc., en sa qualité de fiduciaire pour la durée des procédures concernant la validité du testament de Jean-Guy Bergeron, les défendeurs **DEVANT :** Le juge Marc R. Labrosse **AVOCATS :** Pierre Champagne, pour la demanderesse Patricia Lawson, pour le défendeur Michel Bergeron **ENTENDU LE :** Par écrit --- # INSCRIPTION SUR LES DÉPENS [1] Les parties ont comparu devant le Tribunal pour faire approuver une reddition de compte.

Dans mon inscription datée du 11 novembre, 2019, j’ai approuvé la reddition de compte, assujettie à certaines rectifications.

Michel Bergeron présente maintenant une demande pour le paiement de ses dépens.

La demanderesse demande que chaque partie paie ses propres dépens.

Toutefois, puisqu’elle a été obligée de répondre à la demande de dépens, la demanderesse demande des dépens de 1 000$ pour avoir été obligée de préparer des représentations quant aux dépens. ## La position des parties [2] Le défendeur demande le paiement de ses dépens en conformité avec le « Cost Outline » déposé.

Il demande 21 071,96$ sur une base d’indemnité partielle et de 30 927,53$ sur une base d’indemnité substantielle.

M. Bergeron souligne que Mme Talbot a initialement soulevé 56 items dans la Reddition de compte et que seulement un item n’a pas été accepté.

De plus, il allègue que Mme Talbot a injustement suggéré que le défendeur avait volé de son père et qu’elle devrait subir des conséquences par le biais des dépens.

Finalement, le défendeur allègue que le temps passé pour des comptes de 70 200,77$ est démesuré et que Mme Talbot a fait preuve de mauvaise foi. [3] La demanderesse suggère que chaque partie devrait assumer ses propres dépens.

Elle reconnaît que le résultat des objections est divisé.

De plus, elle soulève que les sommes demandées pour les frais juridiques ont évolué durant la requête.

En somme, elle réclame que ses objections étaient bien fondées.

Elle réclame 1 000,00$ en dépens pour avoir été obligée de répondre à une demande de dépens qui n’aurait pas dû être faite. ## Analyse [4] L’analyse débute avec la r. 57 des [Règles de procédure civile, R.R.O., 1990, Règl. 194](https://www.ontario.ca/fr/lois/reglement/900194) (« Règles »), et que le Tribunal doit prendre en considération non seulement le fait qu’une partie ait obtenu gain de cause, mais également une série de facteurs, notamment : (1) le montant demandé dans l’instance et le montant obtenu; (2) le degré de complexité de l’instance; (3) l’important des questions en litige; (4) la conduite de toute partie qui a eu pour effet d’abréger ou de prolonger inutilement la durée de l’instance; (5) l’expérience de l’avocat de la partie; (6) les heures consacrées, les taux demandés, et (7) les offres de transaction. [5] La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a souligné que la détermination des dépens ne se veut pas un simple exercice mécanique.

L’objectif général est de déterminer une somme qui est juste et raisonnable que la partie perdante devra verser dans cette instance précise, plutôt qu’un montant découlant des frais réellement engagés par la partie ayant eu gain de cause : voir [Boucher c.

Conseil des experts-comptables de la province de l’Ontario (2004)](https://www.canlii.org/fr/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii14579/2004canlii14579.html). [6] L’analyse dans la présente affaire se limite à la question du droit du défendeur au remboursement de ses dépens ou une partie de ses dépens.

Je suis d’avis que le défendeur n’a aucunement le droit à une ordonnance de dépens.

Je suis d’avis qu’il est habituel qu’un fiduciaire doive présenter plus d’information pour faire preuve de ses comptes.

De plus, étant la nature de la dispute dans cette succession, il est raisonnable que Mme Talbot exige à M. Bergeron de faire preuve de ses dépenses. [7] J’adopte aussi l’argument de la demanderesse que le résultat monétaire est clairement partagé.

J’ai approuvé des dépenses de M. Bergeron attribuables à la succession d’une somme d’environ 22 000,00$ et refusé des dépenses d’environ 23 000,00$. [8] Enfin, j’estime que la position de la demanderesse est très raisonnable.

Elle constate clairement qu’elle n’a pas eu succès sur toutes ses objections et qu’elle a possiblement causé au processus d’être plus long que d’habitude par ses nombreuses enquêtes.

Elle ne demande pas d’être remboursée pour ses frais juridiques.

De plus, Mme Talbot a eu gain de cause sur des dépenses d’une valeur d’au plus de 22 000$ et je trouve qu’il était raisonnable qu’elle poursuive ses objections.

Je suis aussi d’avis qu’elle a visé ses plaintes à un nombre défini d’items et ceci était raisonnable.

La suggestion que chaque partie doit assumer ses propres dépens de cette requête est la réponse évidente. [9] En dernier lieu, il est approprié de considérer la question des dépens pour les représentations quant aux dépens.

Je confirme encore qu’il était apparent que le résultat fût partagé et que la réponse sur la question des dépens était évidente.

Je comprends qu’il y a des frustrations entre les parties, mais il n’était pas raisonnable pour M. Bergeron d’avoir avancé une demande pour ses dépens.

Mme Talbot a eu gain de cause sur cette question et je suis d’avis que M. Bergeron doit lui rembourser une partie de ses frais juridiques.

Je conclus que cette somme payable est 500,00$. ## Conclusion [10] Pour les motifs énoncés dans cette Inscription, la demande de dépens de M. Bergeron est refusée et M. Bergeron doit payer des dépens à Mme Talbot fixés à 500,00$ incluant les taxes et déboursés.

M. Bergeron a encore droit au paiement de dépens pour la modification de sa plaidoirie du montant de 1 000,00$. --- Monsieur le Juge Marc R. Labrosse Date : 2020/04/22

The appellant lawyer appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him liable for professional negligence and breach of contract across three separate retainers.

The Deputy Judge had awarded the respondent former client $17,476 in damages and $9,818 in costs, while dismissing the appellant's counterclaim for unpaid fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error of law in the Deputy Judge's assessment of damages, loss of opportunity, or the discretionary costs award.

Heritage brought a motion seeking an order to strike the Leroux's response to its request for admissions and to compel more adequate responses under Rule 51.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Heritage alleged that the Leroux's refusals to admit 39 statements did not comply with Rule 51.03(3)(b) by failing to provide proper reasons.

The Leroux contended their responses were compliant, providing specific reasons for each refusal.

The court found that the Leroux's responses were neutral and specific, not a "blanket denial" and that the jurisprudence cited by Heritage was distinguishable.

The court concluded that the relevance and sufficiency of the responses, where Rule 51 was respected, were matters for the application or trial judge to determine on the merits, not for an interlocutory motion.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving party and responding party are siblings and the sole heirs to their father's estate.

The moving party, acting as the estate trustee, submitted a passing of accounts for the period he acted in that capacity.

The responding party objected to several specific expenses claimed by the moving party, including legal fees, property taxes, and surveying costs.

The court reviewed ten contested items, approving some as legitimate estate expenses while reducing or rejecting others, particularly legal fees related to the litigation between the siblings and an unnecessary surveying cost.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's subrogated claim for delay under Rule 24.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as more than five years had passed since the action was commenced.

The plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, which included failing to answer undertakings for over three years.

Furthermore, the court found the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice because the oil tank, which was central to determining the cause of the leak, had been destroyed.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the Director's decisions to amend the terms and conditions of its licence to operate a youth residence and to subsequently suspend the licence.

The Tribunal found that the standard of review for the Director's decisions under the CYFSA is correctness, with no deference owed.

The Tribunal upheld the amended conditions, finding them appropriate given the serious concerns regarding staffing shortages, medication errors, and the inability of staff to manage high-risk youth.

The Tribunal also confirmed the suspension of the licence, concluding that the cumulative circumstances, culminating in an incident where two youths required hospitalization after absconding and consuming alcohol, constituted an immediate threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the residents.