Pierre Champagne

The applicant brought a motion seeking consolidation of two oppression remedy applications (2019 and 2023), an order compelling respondents to comply with court orders for audited financial statements, reimbursement of his deposit, a timetable for remaining steps, and written submissions on oppression and receiver appointment.

The court ordered the applications be heard together rather than consolidated, to preserve the respondents' limitation period defences.

The court compelled the respondents to provide answers to the applicant's queries regarding anomalies in the draft financial statements within 30 days and ordered completion of audited financial statements within specified timeframes.

The applicant was ordered to confirm his shareholder loan account within 30 days to allow completion of the audit.

The appellants challenged the validity of a clause in the will of Jeanne Dagenais Gravelle that granted her daughter Jocelyne Gravelle an option to purchase the family home for the amount of the remaining mortgage.

The appellants argued the clause was unenforceable because the mortgage had been fully paid at the time of the testator's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding the option clause valid and enforceable.

The court determined that the testator's intention was to allow Jocelyne to purchase the home even if the mortgage balance was zero, and that Jocelyne would be responsible for mortgage discharge fees as consideration for the purchase.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of their mother's will and the interpretation of a clause granting one of the respondents the option to purchase the family home for the remaining mortgage amount.

The court found the will valid, as the testator had acknowledged her signature in the presence of two witnesses, satisfying the strict compliance requirements of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court also applied the armchair rule to interpret the purchase option, concluding the testator intended for the respondent to have the option to acquire the home even though the mortgage balance was zero at the time of death.

The estate trustee was ordered to pass accounts.

The applicant, Lise Cassan, sought dependent's relief from the estate of Jean-Guy Villeneuve, claiming they lived in a conjugal relationship from 2006 until his death in 2022 and that he financially supported her.

The estate disputed the cohabitation and support, arguing she maintained a separate apartment and he had other relationships.

Applying the Molodowich factors, the court found that the applicant was a dependent spouse who had cohabited continuously with the deceased for over three years and received ongoing, systematic financial support.

The court granted interim support of $2,000 per month to the applicant, pending final disposition.

The applicant mother sought the sale and equal division of a co-owned property with her son, the respondent.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking a declaration that the applicant's interest was held in trust for him and a transfer of title without consideration, arguing unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for sale, finding her conduct malicious, oppressive, and vexatious, and that a sale would result in unjust enrichment for her.

The court declared the applicant's 50% interest in the property to be held in constructive trust for the respondent and ordered its transfer to him.

The respondent's claim for damages related to the applicant's refusal to refinance was dismissed due to his delay in seeking relief.

The Municipalité de Casselman sought a declaratory order confirming its exclusive ownership of the Martin-Filion laneway and an order for the respondents to remove personal property and structures from it.

Two respondents, Louis Godard and Sylvie Cléroux, contested the application, asserting that a verbal agreement with the former mayor in 1986 had transferred ownership of portions of the laneway to them.

The court found no objective evidence of a binding oral contract, citing the absence of essential terms such as a clear transfer date, agreed price, and definitively identified parties.

The court also determined that the doctrine of part performance did not apply, as the respondents' actions on the laneway predated or were independent of the alleged agreement and did not constitute detrimental reliance.

Consequently, the Municipality's application was granted, confirming its ownership and ordering the removal of encroachments.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant in 2022 but later discovered an error in the defendant's corporate number.

After successfully amending the title of proceedings, the plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary the 2022 default judgment to reflect the correct corporate number.

The court found the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence and the defendant suffered no prejudice.

The motion was granted and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This is a costs endorsement following successful motions by the State of California and the Attorney General of Quebec to dismiss claims brought against them by W.O. Stinson & Son Limited.

The court had previously dismissed Stinson's claim against California based on state immunity under the State Immunity Act and against Quebec due to Crown immunity.

Stinson argued for no costs, citing unfair treatment due to the cancellation of Ontario's cap-and-trade program and alleged profit by California and Quebec from Stinson's losses.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no reason to deny costs to the successful parties.

The court then assessed the reasonableness of the requested partial indemnity costs, reducing the amounts sought by both California and Quebec, and specifically reducing Quebec's expert witness disbursement.

The plaintiffs brought an action seeking declarations that the defendant, Ashcroft Homes – Eastboro Inc., was not entitled to terminate their agreements of purchase and sale for residential homes.

The plaintiffs argued that the early termination condition (Condition 2 of Schedule U) was contrary to the Tarion Addendum, was invoked untimely, or that Ashcroft breached its obligation to take commercially reasonable steps to satisfy the condition.

The court found that Condition 2 was consistent with the Tarion Addendum, Ashcroft terminated the agreements in a timely manner, and Ashcroft did take all commercially reasonable steps to satisfy the condition.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Service de Pneus Lavoie Outaouais Inc., sought to amend the title of proceeding and vary a default judgment obtained against '2189224 Ontario Inc. o/a Tiremag' due to a clerical error in the defendant's corporate number, which should have been '2184224 Ontario Inc.'.

The court granted leave to amend the title of proceeding under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding no prejudice to the defendant given the history of dealings and the defendant's failure to correct the error or defend the original action.

However, the request to vary the default judgment under Rule 59.06(1) was adjourned to allow the defendant an opportunity to respond, emphasizing the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1) and the potential for prejudice if the defendant had relied on the incorrect numbering.

The defendant moved to stay a defamation action, arguing it was based on evidence obtained in violation of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01.

The evidence in question was a surreptitious recording voluntarily attached as an exhibit to an affidavit in a separate family litigation proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the deemed undertaking rule applies only to evidence obtained through compulsory discovery mechanisms, not to evidence voluntarily put forward in an affidavit.

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to destroy copies of two allegedly privileged emails produced in the defendant's affidavit of documents.

The emails contained legal advice regarding a property dispute.

The court found that the defendant had waived solicitor-client privilege by producing the documents, allowing them to be used during examinations for discovery without objection, and relying on them in communications with a co-defendant.

The motion was dismissed.

Melynda Layton sought to amend her statement of claim against the Canadian Dental Hygienists Association and the City of Ottawa.

The motion was granted in part.

The court allowed amendments for moral damages against the City and some amendments against the Association, provided references to a third-party property (11 Rosemount Street/Avenue) and multiple rights-of-way were removed.

The court denied amendments that relied on unspecified by-laws, legislation, or regulatory frameworks against the City, deeming them impermissibly vague.

The court also granted the City additional discovery time, finding that the three-hour limit under Rule 76.04(2) could be extended for just cause.

The applicant, a former director and minority shareholder, brought a motion seeking an order for the respondent corporation BCE Realty Ltd. to produce an audited financial statement for 2022, alleging financial impropriety and oppression.

The court found the applicant had standing as a former director under the Ontario Business Corporations Act's oppression remedy provisions, despite not being a direct shareholder.

The court granted the order for the audited financial statement but required the applicant to pay the cost in advance, with the right to seek reimbursement at the end of the litigation.

This ruling addresses two mid-trial motions: one by the defendant, Ashcroft Homes – Eastboro Inc., for leave to introduce information related to late-delivered undertakings, and another by the plaintiffs for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The court granted Ashcroft's motion, finding a reasonable explanation for the delay and that any prejudice to the plaintiffs could be compensated by an adjournment and costs.

The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their statement of claim, including a proposed amendment regarding non-compliance with Schedule "A" of the agreements, determining it did not introduce a new cause of action and thus no non-compensable prejudice due to limitation periods.

This decision concerns the costs arising from a dispute between the estate of Laurette Larivière and her son, Conrad Larivière.

The original applications involved claims by the estate regarding funds, accounting, and a life insurance policy, and counter-claims by Conrad for compensation for care and reimbursement of funeral expenses.

The court found that Conrad had substantial success in the underlying applications, particularly in retaining life insurance proceeds and securing reimbursement for funeral expenses, while the estate's claims for accounting and compensation against Conrad were largely rejected.

Consequently, the court awarded Conrad partial indemnity costs.

The appellants sought an interpretation of their retainer agreement with the respondent law firms, arguing it was a contingency fee agreement capped at one-third of any favourable result.

The respondents contended it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement based on hourly rates, with a potential premium.

The application judge found it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement with a reduced hourly rate and a premium, where only the premium was capped, not the hourly fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation.

The Court affirmed that the application judge correctly applied principles of contract interpretation, including considering surrounding circumstances while ensuring they did not overwhelm the clear wording of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendants were largely successful, the parties settled the action and submitted a joint costs brief.

The defendants sought $32,014.17 in partial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for $15,000, noting the defendants spent twice as much time and charged three times as much as the plaintiff.

The court found the defendants' time investment was generally reasonable given what was at stake, but acknowledged some overkill, ultimately fixing costs at $27,500 all-inclusive.

The moving party, a residential property owner, brought a motion under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act to discharge two construction liens registered against her property by a subcontractor and an equipment rental company.

The moving party argued the liens were out of time under the 45-day preservation deadline of the old Construction Lien Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding triable issues regarding whether the old Act or the new Construction Act (with a 60-day deadline) applied, and when the lien claimants last supplied services and materials to the improvement.