Conviction and sentence appeals for historical sexual offences against step-daughter dismissed.
The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and gross indecency against his step-daughter for historical offences.
He appealed his convictions on grounds including improper cross-examination regarding his character, failure to give a propensity warning regarding his lifestyle, failure to give a warning regarding the lapse of time before charges were laid, and failure to stay a conviction under the Kienapple principle.
He also appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly emphasized general deterrence and denunciation.
No appeal lies from a single judge's denial of summary conviction leave.
The appellant sought to challenge a single judge's denial of leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal.
The court held that no statutory right of appeal or review exists from a decision granting or denying leave under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.
It further held that neither the Criminal Appeal Rules nor the Rules of Civil Procedure can create such a substantive right by incorporation, and that s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act does not apply because s. 7(3) expressly excludes motions for leave to appeal from the category of motions reviewable under that provision.
The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Appeal from arson convictions dismissed; no Charter exclusion warranted and ineffective assistance claim failed.
The appellant appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for four arson-related charges.
He argued that his section 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained fire marshal samples without a warrant, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach occurred, the trial judge's comments did not reverse the burden of proof, and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from trial counsel's performance.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed.