Peter Scrutton

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The summary conviction appeal judge had held there was insufficient evidence that the approved instrument analyzed the breath samples, rendering the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly relied on circumstantial evidence—specifically the instrument's readings—to infer that an analysis had occurred.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply the applicable statutory presumption and by exceeding the permitted standard of appellate review.

The appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, aggravated assault, break and enter, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

He appealed his nine-year sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceedings.

The Court of Appeal assumed without deciding that representation was ineffective, thereby reviewing the sentence without deference.

The Court found the nine-year sentence entirely fit, noting it already reflected significant mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and rehabilitation efforts, which reduced what would otherwise be a double-digit penitentiary term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of an audio tape and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, inadequate interpretation services breaching his s. 14 Charter rights, insufficient reasons, and errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test, trial counsel's performance did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge made no errors in assessing credibility or providing reasons.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the lifetime weapons prohibitions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, striking the lifetime ban under s. 109 of the Criminal Code and varying the lifetime ban under s. 110 to a ten-year prohibition, finding it appropriate given the serious circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code.

Based on fresh evidence, the Crown conceded the conviction could not stand, but the appellant agreed he was guilty of the lesser included offence of unauthorized possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for the lesser included offence and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence remained fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his continued detention after a lawful traffic stop was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, and that the breathalyzer technician's observations of his impairment should have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial detention was lawful under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and the continued detention was justified to investigate his dangerous driving.

The court held that the technician's observations were not conscriptive evidence and did not arise from a Charter violation.

The appellant was convicted of abducting his two daughters in contravention of a custody order.

On appeal, he argued that he mistakenly believed the order was not a custody order, that the order was not actually a custody order, and that the trial judge failed to consider the defence of necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant did not testify to the mistaken belief, the order clearly governed the lawful care of the children, and the evidence did not support a defence of necessity.

The appellant sought leave to appeal, arguing that 'unreasonable verdict' and 'insufficiency of reasons' constituted questions of law.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the appeal was essentially an attempt to re-argue factual issues already rejected by the lower courts.

The court held that even if questions of law were raised, they did not bear on the general administration of criminal justice as required for leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to find he had a colour of right defence.

The trial judge found the appellant forged time sheets to obtain payments from a company, despite the appellant's honest belief that the company was liable to him in damages for breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the mens rea test for fraud from R. v. Théroux.

The Court held that the appellant's personal belief of entitlement to damages did not negative the mens rea, as he intentionally committed a deceitful act knowing it could cause deprivation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence and in refusing to re-open the trial to consider a booking photo as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of eyewitness testimony and made no error in refusing to re-open the trial, noting the booking photo was not materially dissimilar to the witness's description and trial counsel likely made a tactical decision not to use it.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately convey his position and the pertinent evidence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the charge was adequate when read fairly as a whole, noting that defence counsel had raised no objection at trial.

The Crown appealed a 7-year sentence imposed on the respondent.

The trial judge had felt constrained by the principle of parity to impose the same sentence as a co-participant, despite the co-participant having cooperated, pleaded guilty early, being younger, and having a lesser criminal record.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by ignoring these distinguishing features.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to 10 years, less credit for time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft over $5,000.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, primarily expert cell phone tracking data showing the appellant's phone was in frequent contact with his accomplice's phone and near the locations of the thefts.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by using evidence from each count as similar fact evidence for the other, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not use similar fact reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that the appellant was the accomplice.

The appellant appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible to the Court of Appeal.

The Court quashed the appeal, holding that because it was a summary conviction matter, the appeal must be directed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court under section 813 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant declined an offer to have the appeal heard by a panel member sitting as a Superior Court justice.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for extortion, kidnapping, and related offences, arguing it offended the parity principle when compared to the eight-month conditional sentence received by the ringleader of the enterprise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge committed no error in principle.

The disparity was justified by the ringleader's lack of prior record, guilty plea, and rehabilitation, contrasted with the appellant's extensive criminal record and ongoing danger to society.

The appellant was convicted ex parte of driving while his licence was suspended and sentenced to 10 days in jail and a $7,500 fine.

He appealed, arguing that the ex parte trial provisions of the Provincial Offences Act violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 11(d).

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the ex parte trial provisions, finding that they merely provide a mechanism for proceeding when a defendant fails to appear.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the appellant offered no valid explanation for his non-attendance.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the fine was reduced to the statutory minimum of $5,000 because the trial judge provided no reasons for exceeding the minimum requested by the prosecutor.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant by relying on irrelevant factors and drawing inferences unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided a detailed and fair explanation for her findings and that it was not the appellate court's role to retry the case.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a fist fight at a football game.

He argued the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment to obtain a transcript for a section 11(b) Charter application, and in failing to apply the principles of R. v. W.(D.) when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the denial of the adjournment.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's reasons suggested she believed the Crown witnesses simply because she disbelieved the defence witnesses, contrary to the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant appealed a seven-year penitentiary sentence for manslaughter arising from a serious driving incident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the seven-year starting point but found the trial judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for 550 days of pre-trial custody following a bail breach.

Given the appellant's youth, prospects for rehabilitation, and lack of evidence that he caused the delay, the Court granted credit at 1.5:1 and reduced the net sentence from five years and three months to four years and three months.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge gave improper advice prior to his re-election of mode of trial as a self-represented accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly explained that a jury trial would be more complicated and make it more difficult for the judge to provide necessary guidance compared to a judge-alone trial.