Peter J. Osborne

The appellant was convicted at trial of defrauding the public of over $5,000 after running Ponzi-like schemes that raised approximately $12 million from 41 investors between 2007 and 2009, causing losses of over $10 million.

On appeal, the appellant argued for the first time that the fraud did not constitute a fraud "on the public" because the victims were specifically identified individuals rather than members of the public solicited indiscriminately.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the hallmark of fraud on the public is simply that the victims can rationally be grouped as a whole, which was satisfied by the interconnected nature of the Ponzi scheme victims.

The court also rejected the appellant's challenges to the trial judge's treatment of the Crown's forensic accounting expert report and the defence expert's evidence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's analysis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault arising from an incident during an Uber ride and appealed on the basis of alleged errors of fact and law, primarily contending that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The appellant argued that an Uber receipt, which showed a direct route from pick-up to drop-off, was exonerating and had been given insufficient weight.

The Court of Appeal found no error, deferring to the trial judge's credibility and fact-finding, which included cogent reasons for concluding that the receipt did not accurately reflect the route taken.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a real estate developer and related corporate entities, appealed a judgment granting the respondent lender $12.9 million plus interest on a defaulted commercial loan.

The appellants argued the application judge erred by failing to convert the application to an action, by conducting a credibility analysis on a paper record, and by foreclosing a defence of equitable set-off and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge's reasons were clear and sufficient, the documentary record amply supported the finding that no binding second amending agreement was ever reached, and credibility assessments were not necessary given the strength of the documentary evidence.

The court declined to resolve whether the enhanced fact-finding powers available under r. 20 apply to applications under r. 14, leaving that question for another day.

The appeal was dismissed and full indemnity costs of $55,000 were awarded to the respondent pursuant to the contractual costs clause in the loan agreement.

The appellant pled guilty to defrauding her employer of over $210,000 through fraudulent schemes and forgeries over several years.

She appealed her sentence of two years less a day, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's emphasis on the appellant's significant criminal record for similar offences and the need for specific and general deterrence, despite her guilty plea and full restitution.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application seeking to set aside employment agreements between the respondent corporation and an employee, alleging the agreements were oppressive and breached a family law undertaking.

They also appealed the refusal to remove the respondent as a trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings that the undertaking had expired, the negotiations were not secretive, and the agreements were beneficial to the corporation.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision not to remove the trustee.

In a defamation appeal arising from newspaper and social media publications targeting the respondent, the appellants challenged liability, damages, costs, and the scope of a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal held that statute-barred earlier publications were admitted only for background and context, that the proceeding properly continued under the ordinary procedure after the defence objected to Rule 76, and that damages in defamation were presumed once the elements of the tort were established.

However, the court found the permanent injunction impermissibly broad, disproportionate, and insufficiently precise for enforcement.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part only to set aside and remit the injunctive term for properly defined wording, with appeal costs awarded to the appellants.

The appellant brokerage brought an action against the respondent brokerage, a salesperson, and the listing brokerage over entitlement to a real estate commission.

The appellant claimed it was the co-operating brokerage because the salesperson who purchased the home was its employee at the time.

The TRREB arbitration panel dismissed the claim, finding the salesperson purchased in his personal capacity through the respondent brokerage.

The motion judge dismissed the court action on jurisdictional grounds and abuse of process, finding the matter had been fully adjudicated through TRREB arbitration and issue estoppel applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the motion judge correctly applied the Danyluk test and the TRREB Arbitration Guidelines conferred exclusive jurisdiction over commission disputes.

The appellants appealed the application judge's finding of a prescriptive easement over portions of their property in favour of the respondents' neighbouring property.

The appellants argued that the application judge misapprehended evidence regarding whether the gravel driveway remained unchanged over the relevant period and reversed the onus of proof.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the application judge's reliance on aerial photographs and witness testimony was open to her and that she did not reverse the burden of proof on the prescriptive easement claim.

Appeal dismissed with costs of $10,000 to the respondents.

The appellant landlord appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for prospective rent after terminating a commercial lease for the tenant's default.

The motion judge interpreted the lease as limiting the landlord's recovery upon termination to arrears and a fixed penalty, finding that the lease's reference to "any other remedies available at law or in equity" did not preserve a right to prospective damages that was explicitly precluded later in the same provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error, and dismissed the appellant's additional claims for pool removal costs, maintenance expenses, and costs on the motion below.

The appellant appealed a Family Court order compelling compliance with prior security-for-costs and costs orders in ongoing family proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction because the order was a final Family Court order made only under provincial legislation, engaging s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court emphasized that such appeals lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

It also noted procedural options to avoid delay where jurisdictional transfer issues arise, including consent transfer orders or motions to quash.

On a motion concerning appellate jurisdiction, the court held that paragraph one of an order dated June 20, 2025 was interlocutory and did not prevent the respondents from relying on prior findings made in related proceedings.

Because the order was interlocutory, the appeal could not proceed and was quashed.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants, holders of 2025 series senior secured notes, appealed the final order approving a CBCA plan of arrangement that restructured $270 million in pari passu senior secured notes issued in three series.

The arrangement extended the maturity dates of all notes and was approved by 75 percent of senior noteholders voting as one class, though only 20 percent of 2025 noteholders voted in favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was moot because the plan had been implemented without a stay, and that it constituted a collateral attack on the interim order establishing the single-class voting classification, from which leave to appeal had already been denied.

The court further held that the application judge applied the correct test under s. 192 of the CBCA, made factual findings entitled to deference, and committed no reviewable error in finding the arrangement fair and reasonable or in dismissing the oppression remedy application.

The appellant appealed from an order striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action against a federally regulated company for alleged discrimination during a 2015 job interview.

The motions judge found no viable cause of action because there is no common law tort of discrimination and the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Superior Court was the appropriate forum and that the limitation period was suspended due to incapacity.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention, noting the appellant had commenced several other lawsuits during the relevant period, undermining his incapacity claim.

The motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as it failed to meet the test for admission.

In CCAA proceedings, the moving parties sought approval of a transaction for sale of the Royal Charter conditional on immediate and irrevocable donation to designated public custodians, together with approval of monitor reports and an extension of the stay of proceedings.

The court held it had jurisdiction under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and applied the s. 36 sale-approval framework, including overlap with the Soundair principles.

The court found the auction and consultation process reasonable, well-publicized, and appropriately structured to preserve Canadian public access while maximizing creditor recovery.

The consideration was found fair and materially above appraised value, and the monitor’s recommendation was accepted.

The stay extension under s. 11.02 and approval of the monitor’s activities were also granted.

In WURA proceedings concerning the wind-up of a foreign bank’s Canadian business, the court considered an unopposed motion by the court-appointed liquidator for approval of reports, fees, discharge of employee representative counsel, termination of proceedings, and related releases.

The court held the remaining tasks were administrative and that the affairs in Canada had been fully wound up subject to completion of those tasks.

The court approved the reports, activities, fees, and proposed releases, finding the releases appropriately limited and consistent with analogous third-party release principles developed under federal insolvency jurisprudence.

The court accepted that CCAA release principles could be applied by analogy in WURA proceedings.

The motion was granted and a discharge and termination order issued with immediate effect.

The court-appointed Monitor in CCAA proceedings brought a motion to approve a CSA Plan disclaiming 314 of 329 existing condominium sale agreements for an 85-storey tower at 1 Bloor Street West, Toronto, to approve a Deposit Return Protocol for refunding approximately $105 million in insured deposits, and to approve a reconfiguration reducing total residential units to 411.

The Monitor demonstrated that disclaimers would generate incremental proceeds exceeding $200 million by enabling resale at higher market prices under a luxury hotel brand.

The court applied the established three-part test for disclaiming pre-construction sale agreements under s. 32 of the CCAA, finding that the senior secured lenders held first-ranking priority, that failure to disclaim would amount to a preference for purchasers, and that the equities did not support maintaining the existing agreements.

The motion was granted, the Deposit Return Protocol and Monitor's reports were approved, and a sealing order was granted over confidential market analysis appendices.

In a landmark CCAA proceeding involving Hudson's Bay Company, the court declined to approve the assignment of 25 major retail department store leases across Canada to a new tenant, Ruby Liu Commercial Investment Corp., despite the transaction representing the highest bid and generating approximately $50 million in net proceeds for creditors.

The court found that the proposed assignee failed to meet the reasonableness standard under section 11.3(3) of the CCAA, particularly regarding its ability to perform the substantial and ongoing obligations under the leases.

The decision emphasizes that section 11.3 is an extraordinary power that must be exercised sparingly, and that the court must balance the interests of all stakeholders, including the contractual counterparties (landlords) who would be compelled into a long-term relationship with an untested and undercapitalized purchaser.

The court also rejected the applicants' arguments that certain lease provisions constituted ipso facto clauses violating the anti-deprivation rule and section 34 of the CCAA.

The Administrative Agent for the Syndicate Lenders moved for an order tolling limitation periods relating to claims against the debtor entities, additional stay parties, and related individuals and trusts that may expire during the stay period or within 60 days following its termination.

The motion was unopposed and supported by the Monitor and the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

The court granted the tolling order, finding jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA and that the relief advanced the policy and remedial objectives of the Act.

The court acknowledged the respondents' reservation of rights to seek variation or termination of the tolling provisions in the future.