Peter Istvan Waldmann

Following earlier reasons for judgment determining entitlement to funds held in trust, the successful respondents sought a costs award against the applicant.

The court applied the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including indemnification of successful litigants, encouragement of settlement, and deterrence of inappropriate litigation conduct.

The court also considered proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the parties, as articulated in appellate jurisprudence.

Although the respondents largely succeeded at trial, they prevailed on only six of nine claim categories, and proportionality concerns warranted some reduction.

The court reduced the fee component of the partial indemnity claim but allowed disbursements, ultimately fixing costs payable by the applicant to the respondents.

The court-appointed Receiver for the properties of a local branch of The Polish Alliance of Canada moved for directions regarding its administration.

The plaintiff national association criticized the Receiver's neutrality, objecting to the presence of former branch executives on the property and disputing the membership list for an upcoming executive election.

The court approved the Receiver's conduct as prudent and neutral, rejected the plaintiff's attempt to unilaterally dictate branch membership, and directed the Receiver to hold an election among the 19 recognized remaining branch members.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking directions regarding implementation of a prior order determining that certain lands were held in trust for members of a branch of a national organization and that the defendants were not proper representatives after resigning from the parent organization.

The court found that the defendants had no authority to admit new members or call a meeting to elect a new executive.

To prevent confusion and protect the property pending proper reconstitution of the branch membership, the court appointed a receiver and manager to take control of the branch assets and supervise the reconstitution process.

The court also prohibited the defendants and associated individuals from holding a purported members’ meeting or conducting an election of the branch executive.

The plaintiff, a national not-for-profit umbrella organization, sought a declaration that it owned the real property of one of its local branches after the branch's leadership purported to secede.

The defendants, representing the seceding branch, argued the branch was autonomous and owned the property beneficially.

The court found that the corporate holding vehicle held legal title to the property in trust for the members of the branch from time to time.

The court also held that the branch's purported secession was invalid because it lacked the unanimous consent of its members, meaning the branch and its beneficial property interests remained within the parent organization.

In a proposed class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the moving party brought an omnibus motion seeking multiple procedural and evidentiary orders affecting the record for a certification motion.

Most of the relief sought was either abandoned or dismissed, with only minor unopposed amendments granted.

The court held that the respondents were entitled to costs because the moving party was largely unsuccessful.

Although the respondents sought over $30,000 including substantial indemnity costs for abandoned claims, the court rejected punitive costs and applied the partial indemnity scale.

A proportionate costs award of $20,000 all-inclusive was ordered.

The plaintiff appealed a master's order dismissing its motion for a court‑imposed discovery plan under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant argued that a discovery plan was necessary to prevent delays and costs arising from refusals and undertakings during examinations for discovery.

The court held that the master applied the correct legal principles and exercised her discretion appropriately, noting that the pleadings were not finalized and that the appellant had made insufficient efforts to reach agreement on a discovery plan with the opposing parties.

The court also confirmed that jurisprudence does not require a master to impose a discovery plan whenever parties cannot agree, but instead grants discretion based on the circumstances.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle, the appeal was dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion resolved by agreement, the applicant sought costs against the respondent Figueira.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to full indemnity costs based on the clear wording of a promissory note signed by the respondent, which provided for 'all costs of the collection'.

The court apportioned the total costs claimed among the three respondents and awarded the applicant $39,500 in full indemnity costs against Figueira.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation and awarding damages to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and damages in favour of one respondent, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the law of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and malice.

The Court also upheld the liability and damages against one appellant in favour of the second respondent regarding untrue statements made to a reporter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the appellant's wife, finding she was not jointly liable for her husband's defamatory statements as she did not participate in making them to the reporter.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for defaming the respondent in a series of newspaper articles.

The jury awarded $150,000 in general damages and $100,000 in aggravated damages against the publisher.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on the defence of fair comment and that the aggravated damages award was inconsistent with the jury's finding of no malice at the liability stage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to prove the underlying facts required for the fair comment defence, and that a finding of malice for aggravated damages can be based on post-publication conduct even if no malice existed at the time of publication.

In an addendum on costs following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful appellants.

The majority held that the appellants' deliberate violation of a confidentiality agreement signed at mediation, combined with the novelty of the legal issues raised regarding mediation, justified a departure from the general rule that a successful party is entitled to costs.

A dissenting judge would have awarded costs, arguing the issues were not sufficiently novel and the appellants were entitled to costs after successfully defending against a serious contempt allegation.

The appellant, a defendant in a libel action and publisher of a newspaper, published an article about a mandatory mediation session that failed to reach a settlement.

He later published another article about his experience being examined for discovery.

The plaintiff successfully moved to have the appellant found in contempt of court for breaching the confidentiality of the mediation process.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that neither Rule 24.1.14 nor the mediation confidentiality agreement constituted a court order enforceable by contempt under Rule 60.

Furthermore, the publications did not constitute contempt under the court's inherent jurisdiction as they did not pose a serious risk to the administration of justice.

The court also confirmed that the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1) restricts the discovering party, not the discovered party, and thus was not breached by the appellant.

The appellant in a libel action challenged the refusal to strike a statement of defence that denied the pleaded defamatory meaning and asserted a different defamatory meaning said to be true.

The Court of Appeal adopted the Divisional Court's reasoning that, under the modern rule, a defendant in a libel action may plead any defamatory meaning the words are capable of bearing and may justify that meaning or plead fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Finding no basis for appellate intervention, the court dismissed the appeal and fixed costs in favour of the respondents.

The complainant alleged racial discrimination in employment against the East York Board of Education and individual respondents.

During the hearing, the complainant engaged in disruptive conduct and refused to provide an undertaking to the Board of Inquiry that he would answer questions directly and cease making derogatory comments.

Consequently, the Board ruled that the hearing could not proceed in an orderly manner and dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.

The respondents then sought costs under s. 40(6) of the Human Rights Code.

The Board found that the respondents suffered undue hardship and ordered the Ontario Human Rights Commission to pay solicitor-client costs of $108,230.42, plus $10,027.60 for time spent by one of the respondents preparing for the hearing.

The applicant union alleged that the respondent employer sold a part of its business to the intervener when it contracted out the cleaning services for its office building.

The union sought a declaration under section 63 of the Labour Relations Act that the intervener was bound by the existing collective agreement.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that the respondent was primarily in the insurance business and that the contracting out of cleaning services was a bona fide arrangement based on economic considerations.

The Board concluded that there was no transfer of assets or employees, and thus no sale of a business within the meaning of the Act.

The application was dismissed.