Peter A. Daley

The Moving Defendants brought a motion to compel a non-party insurer, Co-Operators General Insurance Company, to produce the complete insurance policy and investigative materials related to a bankrupt co-defendant, Dino & Chris Electric LTD (DCE).

The court dismissed the motion for the insurance policy, finding it not relevant to the material issues in the main action and that fairness considerations favored the non-party.

However, the court granted the motion for investigative materials, ordering Co-Operators to produce a list of documents and copies for judicial inspection to determine their relevance and fairness for disclosure to the Moving Defendants.

The respondent, in his personal capacity and as estate trustee, moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims by his siblings (the applicants) regarding nine Arizona properties.

The respondent argued the claims were statute-barred, subject to res judicata, or did not raise a genuine issue for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that res judicata did not apply as the issues were not determined in a prior passing of accounts, and the limitation periods under the Trustee Act or Limitations Act, 2002 did not apply to notices of objection in a passing of accounts application.

The court also found that the respondent failed to account for inter vivos gifts of property, raising factual and legal questions requiring a trial.

The defendants brought a motion to strike certain paragraphs from the plaintiff's statement of claim, alleging they referred to without-prejudice communications.

The motion was brought after the defendants had already filed their statement of defence and counterclaim, and after an approximately four-month delay.

The court dismissed the motion, applying Rule 2.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (the "fresh step" rule).

The court found that the defendants had taken a further step in the proceeding after knowing of the alleged irregularity and had not sought leave to bring the motion or provided a reason for the delay.

The applicant sought a declaration that three school board trustees breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on a 'Sanctity of Life' motion.

The applicant alleged the trustees had an indirect pecuniary interest because they received $400 campaign contributions and endorsements from a teachers' union that opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of any agreement with the union, no indirect pecuniary interest under section 2 of the Act, and that any hypothetical interest was too remote and insignificant to influence the trustees.

The Corporation of the Town of Caledon brought a motion for directions regarding an appeal by Joseph Michael Bozzelli and Amanda Bozzelli under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The motion sought clarification on the proper procedural rule (Rule 61, 38, or 62 of the Rules of Civil Procedure) and whether the appeal would be a de novo hearing allowing viva voce evidence.

The court determined that Rule 62 was the appropriate procedural rule, supplemented by Rule 38 by analogy, and that the appeal would proceed as a hearing de novo.

However, the court ruled that the hearing would be on a paper record, without viva voce evidence, limiting additional evidence to affidavits concerning compliance time for the underlying property standards order.

The plaintiff sought to deny costs to the successful defendants following a dismissed motion regarding civil jury challenges for cause.

The plaintiff argued the motion was a test case, raised novel issues, and involved public interest litigation.

The court rejected the public interest and test case arguments, noting the plaintiff had a direct pecuniary interest in the personal injury action.

However, recognizing the technical novelty of the motion, the court applied a 15% reduction to the defendants' partial indemnity costs, awarding $19,918.36 to two defendants and $7,853.24 to another.

The defendants requested case management under Rule 77 of the Rules of Civil Procedure due to the plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with a prior order, including the payment of costs.

The court found Rule 77 inapplicable to civil cases in the Central West Region.

Considering the request under Rule 37.15, which allows case management for complicated issues or multiple similar proceedings, the court declined the request.

The court found no information indicating complicated issues or multiple proceedings, only alleged procedural non-compliance.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for leave to introduce a supplementary affidavit in response to the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The affidavit addressed two issues: a conversation regarding legal representation and the plaintiffs' financial losses, including an accounting opinion.

Applying Rule 39.02(2) and Rule 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court granted leave for both aspects of the supplementary affidavit, finding the evidence relevant and necessary for a just determination on the merits, particularly given the complexity and potential value of the case, and that the defendants were not surprised by the accounting opinion.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, had commenced the action against the defendant, a YMCA employee, based on an internal incident report disclosed during a related Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiff issued the claim to manipulate and threaten the defendant into retracting evidence.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and violating pleading rules.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction to stay the election of the Board of Directors of the defendant religious temple pending the adjudication of a broader motion.

The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' standing, arguing they were not members of the temple.

The court found that at least one plaintiff had standing based on uncontradicted evidence of her long-standing devotion and the denial of membership application forms.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm from the potential loss of the right to vote, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

This is a costs ruling following the dismissal of recusal motions brought by the Moving Parties (Sam Cosentino, Concetta Cosentino, and Cesare Cosentino).

The court rejected the Moving Parties' request to refer costs to an assessment officer, affirming that judges typically fix costs to avoid delay.

It found that the Moving Parties should have reasonably anticipated the responding defendants' participation and associated legal costs.

While the recusal motion was ill-conceived and involved a substantial record, the court determined that the Moving Parties' conduct was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted some cost claims for duplication of counsel and excluded time spent on non-party witnesses, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants.

The applicants, having lost their initial application to quash a by-law prohibiting water pipe smoking, sought no costs.

The respondent, The Regional Municipality of Peel, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the applicants' submission for no costs, finding their application was not one of first impression and they knew the risks given prior similar cases.

While acknowledging some merit to the respondent's arguments for substantial indemnity due to re-arguing settled matters and one applicant opening a new lounge, the court found the applicants' conduct not egregious enough to warrant elevated costs.

Applying principles of reasonableness under Rule 57.01(1), the court awarded partial indemnity costs, but reduced the amount by $10,000 due to junior counsel's attendance at the hearing not being deemed necessary for the proper presentation of the respondent's case.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to exclude potential jurors who pay auto insurance premiums, arguing they have an inherent conflict of interest.

The plaintiff sought to introduce survey evidence suggesting residents would limit damages to lower their premiums.

The court excluded the survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay that failed the threshold test for expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no statutory basis in the Juries Act to exclude such jurors or permit a broad challenge for cause, and no evidence of widespread bias to justify striking the jury notice.

The moving parties (Sam, Concetta, and Cesare Cosentino) sought the recusal of the case management judge, Daley RSJ, in seven related high-conflict family litigation actions, alleging bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

They also sought a transfer of the actions from Brampton to Toronto.

The court dismissed both the recusal motions and the transfer request, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The judge emphasized the higher threshold for recusal in a case management context, where close interaction and familiarity with the case are expected.

The applicants sought a declaration that a by-law banning waterpipes was invalid.

At the outset of submissions, the applicants moved for leave to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The respondents opposed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the document attached to the affidavit was not a "public document" under common law or the Evidence Act, and the applicants failed to meet the high threshold under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The evidence was not responsive to matters raised on cross-examination, and no reasonable explanation for the late filing was provided.

The applicants, owners of several waterpipe lounges, sought to quash provisions of a Regional Municipality of Peel by-law prohibiting waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places.

They argued the by-law conflicted with provincial legislation, was enacted in bad faith, and was ultra vires as it effectively prohibited their businesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Region had the statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001 to enact the by-law for the protection of public health and safety.

The court also found no conflict with the Occupational Health and Safety Act and no evidence of bad faith.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to adjourn the trial of a motor vehicle accident claim, alleging serious misconduct and fraud by the defendant's medical expert and defence counsel.

The plaintiffs sought time to investigate these claims and introduce prior tribunal and judicial findings against the expert.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidentiary basis for the allegations and noting that prior tribunal decisions and judicial comments on the expert's credibility are inadmissible in the civil trial.

The court held that an adjournment would cause undue delay and prejudice the administration of justice.

The defendant brought a motion for the production of numerous documents following a further examination for discovery of the plaintiff's representative.

The defendant sought documents that were not considered by the plaintiff's damages expert in preparing his report, arguing they were relevant to the calculation of damages and mitigation.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that documents not forming the foundational information used by the expert cannot be ordered produced under Rule 31.06(3).

Furthermore, the court found the requested disclosure to be entirely disproportionate under Rule 29.2.03 given the late stage of the proceeding and the volume of irrelevant documentation sought.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore two motor vehicle accident actions to the trial list after they were dismissed by the trial judge for failure to comply with trial management orders.

The Court of Appeal had referred the matters back for reconsideration on a more fulsome record.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion and both actions, finding that the plaintiff remained in intentional breach of previous trial management orders, failed to provide new medical evidence, offered no acceptable explanation for the extraordinary delay (over 15 years for the first action), and failed to demonstrate that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application, the respondents sought costs.

One respondent settled their costs claim, while the other, represented by pro bono counsel, sought substantial indemnity costs due to the applicants' conduct.

The court held that pro bono representation does not preclude a costs award and that ordinary costs rules apply.

The court found the applicants' conduct expanded the litigation but did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the pro bono respondent in the amount of $84,836.79.