Paul R. Sweeny

The applicant sought to vary a spousal support order, arguing a material change due to the respondent's significantly increased income.

The respondent resisted, denying a material change or seeking a reduction.

The court found a material change in circumstances but dismissed the applicant's request for a substantial increase in fixed spousal support, upholding the original formula-based order.

The court also interpreted the definition of 'incentive employment income' for bonus calculations, finding only one minor item qualified.

This is a costs ruling following a successful application by Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 627 to enforce an arbitration agreement and award against the Grandview respondents, and to set aside a solicitors' charging order claimed by Blaney McMurtry LLP.

The applicant sought costs on various scales against both sets of respondents.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the Grandview respondents for their failure to comply with the arbitration agreement and award, and partial indemnity costs against Blaney McMurtry LLP as the unsuccessful party regarding the charging order.

The applicant condominium corporation sought to enforce an arbitration agreement and award, which required the transfer of property from the developer respondents free of encumbrances.

The respondent law firm, Blaney McMurtry LLP, opposed this, asserting a valid solicitors' charging order over the same property for unpaid legal fees.

The court considered whether to set aside or vary the charging orders and whether to enforce the arbitration award.

The court found that the charging orders improperly covered property not "recovered or preserved" through the solicitors' work and set them aside as against the transfers to the condominium.

Consequently, the arbitration agreement and award were enforced and incorporated into a judgment.

This motion, initiated by a request from the defendant's lawyers and referred by the Registrar under Rule 2.1.01(7), concerned the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The action had been previously stayed pending notice to the plaintiff regarding a potential dismissal under Rule 2.1.

Despite responding, the plaintiff failed to address the claim's similarity to prior dismissed actions.

The court found the claim frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, dismissing it under Rule 2.1 and awarding costs to the defendant.

This costs endorsement followed a ruling on a status hearing where the plaintiffs' proposed timetable for the action was accepted, and the defendants' request for dismissal was denied.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $10,668.15.

The physician defendants argued for no costs, while the hospital defendants accepted the quantum but requested apportionment.

The court found the plaintiffs were the successful party on the status hearing and were entitled to costs.

The court deemed the claimed costs reasonable and apportioned them, with the hospital defendants paying $2,668.15 and the physician defendants paying $8,000.00.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to prevent the dismissal of their medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the two-fold test from *Kara v. Arnold*, requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing the complexity of medical malpractice actions, financial difficulties of the lead plaintiff, and some lack of cooperation from defendants in scheduling discoveries.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as documents were exchanged and witnesses were available.

The motion was granted, and a timetable was set for the action to proceed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Sloan J., which fixed costs at $11,190.82 payable personally by the applicant.

The original costs order arose from a motion for directions in an estate matter.

The court applied the strict two-part test for granting leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4), considering whether there was a conflicting decision on principle or if there was doubt about the order's correctness involving matters of general importance.

The court found no conflicting decision and determined that the costs award, while significant to the applicant, did not raise issues of public importance or access to justice.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was awarded damages of $28,503.25.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $57,131.45, while the defendants argued for no costs due to the plaintiff's failure to use the simplified procedure under Rule 76, despite the judgment being under $100,000.

The court found it was not reasonable for the action to proceed under ordinary procedure but declined to deny all costs.

Applying the discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, and considering factors like proportionality, the modest damages, and inefficiencies, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $15,000, all inclusive, for the plaintiff.

Following a request from the defendants, the court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 to consider dismissing the plaintiff's claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting its similarity to a previously dismissed action.

The court ordered that notice be given to the plaintiff regarding the potential dismissal, stayed the action pursuant to section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and restricted further filings from the plaintiff pending a written hearing.

The applicants, charged with violence and neglect, sought to vacate their election for a judge-alone trial and re-elect for a judge and jury trial.

They argued their initial waiver of a jury trial was not validly informed and that the Crown's refusal to consent to re-election constituted an abuse of process.

The court found the initial election was voluntary and unequivocal, and that the applicants were sufficiently informed, having received some legal advice.

The court also determined that the Crown's refusal to consent did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process, as there was no prosecutorial misconduct that would shock the conscience of the community.

The application to re-elect was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better list of documents from the Crown in an action alleging wrongful arrest, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from protests in Caledonia.

The court first ruled that a police complaint report was inadmissible on the motion under the Police Services Act.

Applying principles of proportionality and relevance based on the pleadings, the court ordered the Crown to produce documents related to specific prior demonstrations relied upon in its defence and documents concerning a specific court attendance where harassment was alleged.

The court dismissed requests for broad categories of documents, including all communications from senior OPP officers referencing the plaintiff, finding them overbroad, speculative, and not proportional to the issues in dispute.

This motion concerned the defendants' entitlement to costs after the plaintiffs' action was dismissed on consent, as the right of action was removed by s. 28 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (WSIA).

The defendants sought costs for defending the action and for a related hearing before the Workplace Safety Insurance and Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT).

The court determined that costs related to the WSIAT hearing were not recoverable in the action, consistent with the WSIAT's no-costs regime.

Furthermore, the court significantly reduced the defendants' claimed costs for the action itself, finding that certain steps like examinations for discovery and pretrial attendance were unnecessarily incurred due to the defendants' delay in bringing the WSIAT application and their initial denial of the employment relationship.

The court fixed the party and party costs of the action, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants, at $3,000.00 all inclusive.

The plaintiff, Lorilee Ali, challenged the validity of Florence Louisa Blackburn's 2003 and 2000 Wills, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence.

The court found no suspicious circumstances regarding the preparation of the 2003 Will or undue influence.

While concerns about Florence's capacity were raised, the court determined that her belief that money was stolen by the plaintiff was a rational conclusion given the circumstances and her memory loss, not a delusion affecting testamentary capacity.

The court was satisfied that Florence possessed the requisite capacity and knowledge and approval for the 2003 Will.

The moving parties brought four motions in the context of three actions arising from a corporate reorganization of family-owned companies.

Three motions sought to remove Sorbara, Schumacher, McCann LLP as counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest, and the fourth motion sought an order for consolidation, case management, and/or trial together of the three actions.

The court dismissed the motions to remove counsel, finding no risk of misuse of confidential information or impaired representation, and that disqualification was not necessary to maintain the repute of justice given the history of separate representation during contentious negotiations.

The court granted the motion for the actions to be tried together and for the appointment of a case management judge.

The applicant brought a motion to vary child support based on a material change in circumstances (loss of employment and starting a new business).

The respondent sought payment of arrears and imputation of income to the applicant.

The court determined the applicant's income by imputing personal expenses improperly deducted from his solely-owned corporation.

The court also assessed the "child of the marriage" status for each of the three children, finding that two had ceased to be children of the marriage due to self-sufficiency or withdrawal from parental charge.

Child support was retroactively and prospectively varied, and annual income disclosure was ordered.

This motion addressed whether the mother of an unborn child, whose father died due to negligence, could pursue a claim for pecuniary losses under section 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA) as a 'spouse.' The defendant sought summary judgment to dismiss the mother's claim, arguing that the definition of 'child' and 'spouse' in the FLA did not extend to an unborn child for the mother's benefit.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the mother was entitled to pursue her claim under section 61 of the FLA, consistent with the Act's remedial nature and the legal fiction of a child *en ventre sa mère*.

The plaintiff, Muskoka Minerals & Mining Inc., supplied sand for indoor volleyball courts and was not paid in full.

It registered a lien and sued the property owner, Gorge Holdings Inc., and the operators.

The court found Gorge Holdings Inc. contractually liable because its employee signed the supply agreement as a purchaser, actively supporting the venture.

Gorge Holdings Inc. was also deemed a "statutory owner" under the Construction Lien Act due to its interest in the premises, request for improvement, and consent/credit provided.

Judgment was granted against Gorge Holdings Inc. for the outstanding amount plus interest, and the lien was upheld.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an interim motion where the respondent was successful on all issues, including spousal support, child support for an adult child, and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on an offer to settle.

The court found the respondent entitled to full recovery costs after the offer to settle, but adjusted the claimed hourly rate from $400.00 to $350.00, disallowed travel time, and reduced claimed disbursements due to lack of specific receipts.

The court fixed costs at $8,486.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the applicant within 30 days.