Paul M. Michell

The applicant sought judicial review of an HRTO interim decision that disqualified his counsel, a former Associate Chair of the HRTO.

The HRTO adjudicator had raised concerns about conflict of interest and reasonable apprehension of bias because the applicant's file was opened during the counsel's tenure as Associate Chair, and the counsel had been involved in the adjudicator's hiring process.

The Divisional Court allowed the application for judicial review, finding the interim decision unreasonable.

The court held that the adjudicator improperly conflated conflict of interest with bias, and that the appropriate remedy for a bias concern was for the adjudicator to recuse herself, not to deprive the applicant of his counsel of choice.

The moving party tribunal brought a motion to strike an application for judicial review of an interim decision that removed the responding party's counsel due to an alleged appearance of a conflict of interest.

The tribunal argued the judicial review was premature.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the application would fail, as there was a reasonable argument that exceptional circumstances existed to justify reviewing the interim decision.

The appellant, David E. Wires, appealed a Superior Court judgment that recognized and enforced an arbitration award obtained by the respondent, La Française IC 2.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal due to alleged bias, lack of standing of the respondent, and errors in the arbitrator's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly determined that relitigating the bias issue was an abuse of process, that the respondent had standing, and that the costs award was properly recognized and enforced without double-counting.

The applicant sought a court order to appoint an arbitrator under a dispute resolution clause in a shared ownership agreement for an antique double bass.

The respondent, who resides in the Netherlands, failed to engage in the selection of a mediator or arbitrator.

The court found that the Arbitration Act, 1991 applied, as the agreement was not commercial in nature.

The court granted the application and appointed the applicant's proposed arbitrator, awarding costs to the applicant.

The appellants sought dismissal of a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, arising from an email sent by the appellant lawyer to a professional listserv alleging that the respondent physician had improperly altered medical assessors' reports and changed a doctor's impairment classification in the context of statutory accident benefits disputes.

The motion judge allowed the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the defamation proceeding; the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and remitted the defamation claim to the Superior Court.

A five-justice majority of this Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the respondent had discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4) by demonstrating grounds to believe his defamation claim had substantial merit, that the appellants had no valid defence of justification or qualified privilege, and that the public interest in permitting the defamation action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The majority also partially admitted fresh evidence tendered by the respondent, including a letter from the assessed specialist and letters from counsel for the magazine that republished the email.

Four justices dissented, concluding that the appellant lawyer had a valid defence of qualified privilege that gave her expression a real prospect of success at trial, and that the public interest in protecting her communication to fellow plaintiff-side personal injury lawyers outweighed the harm to the respondent's reputation.

The appellants appealed a judgment allowing an oppression application that granted the respondents sole authority to conduct a civil action.

The respondents had sold their shares in a company to the appellants but retained the financial benefit and cost obligations of an ongoing lawsuit.

The relationship deteriorated, and the appellants ceased pursuing the lawsuit and withheld information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellants' conduct violated the respondents' reasonable expectations, nor any error in the remedy granting the respondents control of the litigation.

The applicant, a self-represented family lawyer, brought a motion to remove Epstein Cole LLP as solicitors of record for his ex-wife in their family law dispute.

He argued that lawyers from the firm would be called as witnesses regarding their alleged interference with his livelihood and application for judicial appointment, and that they harboured animus toward him creating a conflict of interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no real likelihood that the lawyers would be called as witnesses, no evidence of untoward animus, and that removing the respondent's counsel of choice would cause her significant prejudice.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a personal oppression order against a corporate director under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

It reaffirmed a two-pronged framework requiring that oppressive conduct be attributable to the director and that personal liability be fit in all the circumstances.

The Court identified fairness, narrow tailoring to rectify oppression, vindication of reasonable stakeholder expectations, and consistency with the broader corporate law context as guiding principles.

On the facts, the director’s lead role in the non-conversion decision and personal benefit through increased corporate control supported personal liability, and the pleadings were sufficient to ground that remedy.

The plaintiffs moved to add Chevron Canada Capital Company (CCCC) as a party defendant to their action seeking to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was not legally tenable and disclosed no cause of action against CCCC, as the court had previously ruled that Chevron Canada's corporate veil could not be pierced.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction over CCCC, a Nova Scotia company with no assets or operations in Ontario, and noted that Rule 17.02(o) regarding necessary parties had been repealed.

The Applicant sought to disqualify the Respondent's counsel, Harold Niman and Niman Gelgoot & Associates, citing a conflict of interest due to Niman's prior representation against the Applicant and her family in other family law disputes, and alleging Niman possessed confidential information.

The Applicant also argued the Respondent's retention of Niman was tactical and intended to intimidate her.

Niman brought a cross-motion to strike certain evidence from the Applicant's affidavits, including settlement-privileged communications and documents related to a complaint against Dr. Douglas Weir to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion to disqualify, finding no "sufficient relationship" between the prior retainers and the current proceeding, and no evidence that Niman actually possessed relevant confidential information.

The court granted Niman's motion to strike, upholding settlement privilege and the statutory prohibition against admitting professional regulatory proceedings in civil matters.

Following the dismissal of a motion to remove the respondent's counsel in a family law proceeding, the respondent sought costs of $88,729.26 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving parties argued the quantum was unreasonable and sought to have costs fixed at $30,000 payable in the cause.

The court found the respondent's counsel's hours and rates to be somewhat excessive compared to the moving parties' counsel, but acknowledged the importance of the motion.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable forthwith, rejecting the moving parties' argument that payment should be deferred until the equalization payment was determined.

The wife and her boyfriend brought a motion to remove the husband's lawyer due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The boyfriend had a brief consultation with the lawyer for his own matrimonial matter, and the husband's answer in the current litigation alleged an affair between the wife and boyfriend and extravagant spending.

The moving parties claimed the lawyer breached duties of confidence, loyalty, and candour, and faced a potential conflict in cross-examining the boyfriend as a witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no confidential information was disclosed, the relationship between the wife and boyfriend was not confidential, and the two matrimonial litigations were not sufficiently related to create a presumption of conflict.

The court also found no breach of a limited duty of loyalty or candour, and no impediment to cross-examination.

The appellant, a physician, sued the respondent lawyers who represented her former patients in medical malpractice actions and complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The appellant alleged defamation, malicious prosecution, champerty and maintenance, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress based on statements published on the respondents' website and in the news.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim in its entirety for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defamation claim was based on statements incapable of defamatory meaning, the other tort claims were premature or improperly pleaded, and the action as a whole constituted an abuse of process designed to collaterally attack the ongoing proceedings against the appellant.

The applicants sought to bring their application for judicial review before a single judge of the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The underlying application challenged the respondent hospital's decision to suspend the applicants' research activities following a finding of research misconduct.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to establish the requisite urgency or that a delay would result in a failure of justice, noting the applicants' own delay in bringing the application.

The matter was transferred to be heard by a full panel of the Divisional Court.

The parties separated in 1999 after a 17-year marriage.

Following the wife's death in 2011, her estate obtained a summary judgment order declaring that all property owned by either party at separation was co-owned equally and held in trust.

At trial to determine the equalization payment, the court rejected both experts' extreme interpretations of the summary judgment order.

The court found the order did not impose retroactive trust obligations that would penalize post-separation consumption or require compounding interest.

The court also determined that substantial bonuses paid to the husband by his company post-separation were remuneration for his active management services, not shareholder distributions, and thus were not subject to equal division.

After valuing the respective assets, the court ordered the husband to pay the estate an equalization payment of $7,932,647.50.

In CCAA proceedings involving the Nortel group, the joint administrators of certain European, Middle Eastern, and African debtor entities brought a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production of documents from a non‑party accounting firm relating to transfer pricing arrangements and intellectual property development.

The court reviewed the governing principles for non‑party production, including the requirement that such orders be granted only in exceptional circumstances and where it would be unfair to require the moving party to proceed to trial without the documents.

The court found that many of the requested documents had already been communicated to the client and were likely produced through existing discovery processes.

For documents not communicated to the client, the moving party failed to demonstrate their importance or any evidentiary gap justifying exceptional production.

The court concluded that proceeding to trial without the requested materials would not be unfair and dismissed the motion with costs.

The appellants appealed an order striking their plea of equitable fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that it was not 'plain and obvious' that a claim in equitable fraud could not succeed, citing relevant jurisprudence.

The order striking the plea was set aside, the defendants' motion was dismissed, and the appellants were permitted to amend their statement of claim.

A receiver was appointed over a fraudulent investment scheme where the deposits of 24 investors were commingled.

The receiver sought directions on how to distribute the remaining funds, which had a significant shortfall.

One group of investors argued for a pro rata distribution based on original contributions, while another argued for the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR).

The court held that LIBR is the general rule for resolving competing claims to commingled funds unless it is unworkable.

Finding that the receiver could practically calculate the LIBR distributions, the court ordered the funds to be distributed according to LIBR.