Paul M. Michell

The applicants, who own and operate pharmacies in Ontario, challenged the validity of provincial regulations that prohibited 'private label' generic drugs from being designated as interchangeable or listed for public reimbursement.

The Divisional Court held that the regulations were ultra vires the Ontario Drug Benefit Act and the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act.

The Court found that the enabling statutes authorized the imposition of conditions, not absolute prohibitions, and that the ban on private label products was extraneous to the legislative purpose of controlling drug costs.

The regulations were declared invalid and of no force and effect.

The respondent previously succeeded on an appeal declaring that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.

The resulting order included a paragraph directing compliance with the agreement, which the motion judge subsequently interpreted as requiring the appellants to assert their repudiation claim in a new action rather than as an excuse for non-performance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appellants' appeal, finding that the original panel had not considered the disputed paragraph or its implications for the repudiation claim.

The court set aside the motion judge's order and directed the parties to submit their questions directly to the original panel for clarification.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing their request to amend their Statement of Defence.

The action was commenced in 1986, and the motion to amend was brought just as a trial date was about to be set.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that the motion was an abuse of process designed to delay the trial.

The court agreed that the extraordinary delay, lack of reasonable explanation, and irremediable prejudice to the plaintiffs justified refusing the amendments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant brought a motion for directions to determine whether an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of defence in an oppression action lies to the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the motion to amend was a final order.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the order was 'made under' the Business Corporations Act within the meaning of s. 255, as the power exercised was sufficiently close to the legislative source of adjudicating oppression claims.

Consequently, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court, and the matter was transferred accordingly.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the National CAIS Committee - Ontario Appeals Sub-Committee regarding agricultural stabilization benefits.

The applicant argued the Committee made findings of fact without evidence and that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed because a policy advisor to the Administration retired with the Committee during its deliberations.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the presence of the policy advisor during deliberations created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decision was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached during mediation of a defamation action.

The motion judge had found the agreement was conditional on further elaboration of the words 'disparage' and 'scientific' based on the respondents' subjective intent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in relying on subjective intent rather than an objective reading of the written offer.

Viewed objectively, the written offer contained all essential terms and was not conditional.

The court declared the settlement agreement enforceable.