Paul Kane

The appellant, Kriss Stewart, appealed his conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on two grounds: an alleged violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and a misapprehension of evidence regarding indicia of impairment.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's decision on the s. 11(b) application, finding no error in the calculation of institutional delay or the consideration of relevant factors, and noting the defence's contribution to delays.

Regarding the second ground, the court found that the trial judge had sufficient evidence of impairment from four witnesses and adequately considered and rejected alternative explanations for the appellant's physical symptoms.

The court found no error of law in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusion.

The applicant sought divorce, child support, s. 7 expenses, and an unequal division of net family property.

The respondent failed to attend the uncontested trial and did not provide financial information.

The court granted sole custody to the applicant, ordered child support and arrears based on imputed income for the respondent, and ordered payment of s. 7 expenses.

The court adjusted the net family property equalization to zero, finding it improper to reward the non-compliant party for their conduct and failure to contribute to joint debts.

The court also ordered the sale of an investment property with net proceeds to the applicant and granted judgment for specific joint debts paid by the applicant.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The mother brought multiple motions to vary a prior child support order seeking retroactive child support and retroactive section 7 special expenses.

The court found the evidentiary record concerning section 7 expenses was inadequate and adjourned that issue, directing the parties to provide detailed affidavits with proof of expenses and payments.

The court declined to impute income to the mother, accepting that her reduced income resulted from injuries and long-term disability following an accident.

Applying the Child Support Guidelines and the parties’ respective incomes, the court varied the earlier order, reduced support to one child effective July 2014, terminated support effective July 31, 2015, and ordered the father to pay retroactive child support subject to certain offsets.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent brought a contempt motion alleging the applicant failed to permit questioning and sought costs relating to unsuccessful attempts to conduct examinations and a failed trial management conference.

The court found that both parties contributed to delays in disclosure and scheduling questioning, and that the contempt motion was not properly pursued in accordance with prior court directions.

The motion was dismissed when the respondent elected not to proceed with it at the scheduled hearing.

The court issued procedural orders compelling document disclosure, scheduled examination dates for both parties, and addressed outstanding financial obligations including section 7 expenses and life insurance required under minutes of settlement.

Given the shared responsibility for delay and inefficient litigation conduct, both parties’ requests for costs were dismissed.

On competing interim motions in a custody dispute concerning a four‑year‑old child, the court considered whether to alter the existing parenting arrangements following a period during which the child had primarily resided with the father.

Applying the Children’s Law Reform Act and the principle that interim orders should generally preserve the status quo absent compelling evidence, the court examined stability, parental capacity, and recent changes in the mother’s circumstances.

Evidence included frequent moves by the mother, concerns about drug use, and the father’s stable home environment and childcare arrangements.

The court concluded that the child’s best interests were served by maintaining primary residence with the father while preserving meaningful parenting time for the mother.

Joint interim custody was ordered, with the father having decision‑making authority over health and education.

Investors sued a chartered accountant and his consulting corporation alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence after losing money in complex domestic and offshore investment structures connected to an investment club and related entities.

The court found the advisor promoted the investments, failed to disclose commissions, and reassured the investors about the legitimacy of the structure despite serious regulatory concerns and structural deficiencies in the investment scheme.

The relationship involved trust, reliance, and vulnerability sufficient to create a fiduciary duty.

The advisor breached that duty by failing to disclose conflicts, failing to warn about regulatory issues, and misrepresenting the diligence performed.

Liability was imposed for the plaintiffs’ investment in the domestic issuer but not for later investments made after regulatory warnings, which the court held the plaintiffs unreasonably failed to mitigate.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The proceeding had been dismissed after repeated failures to meet trial‑setting deadlines under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the established factors for setting aside an administrative dismissal—including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice—the court found the delay largely attributable to counsel error and that the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice.

The complexity of parallel accident litigation and prior defence consents to extensions rebutted any presumption of prejudice.

The dismissal order was set aside, but costs of the motion were awarded to the defendant and made payable by the plaintiff’s counsel.

The father brought a motion seeking appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, joint custody, and equal parenting time, or alternatively an interpretation of a separation agreement to increase his parenting time.

The court found that the agreement established a minimum amount of parenting time rather than a ceiling, meaning increased access could be considered without proof of a material change in circumstances.

However, due to ongoing parental conflict and uncertainty about the child’s wishes, the court declined to order equal parenting time on an interim basis.

Instead, the court quantified additional interim access for the father and set communication boundaries between the parents.

The court indicated that if equal parenting time continued to be pursued, the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer may be appropriate.

The plaintiff tenant brought a motion seeking various remedies including contempt findings, striking the statement of defence, sequestration, and other relief arising from alleged repeated breaches of court orders by the defendant landlord and its principal.

The court reviewed a lengthy procedural history involving numerous orders related to lease obligations, discovery compliance, and remediation work at the leased premises.

The defendants repeatedly failed to comply with several court orders, including orders requiring document production, attendance at examinations and cross‑examinations, and completion of repair obligations.

The court held that the defendants’ persistent non‑compliance and disregard for court orders justified the extraordinary remedy of striking the statement of defence.

The remaining requested relief, including contempt findings, was dismissed due to procedural deficiencies.

The child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of a child for adoption or other permanent placement, along with approval of substituted service on the father.

The mother did not participate and provided no evidence, and the father was in default and of unknown whereabouts.

The evidence showed repeated parental substance abuse issues, missed access visits, and instability, while the child had lived primarily in the same foster home since birth and was thriving.

Applying the summary judgment framework under the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the child’s best interests.

Crown wardship was granted against the mother and conditionally against the father, with continued discretionary access to the mother.

In a child protection proceeding, the society sought continuation of an interim order placing three children in its temporary care and custody following apprehension.

The motion focused on the mental health condition of one parent, including psychiatric diagnoses, medication compliance concerns, and recent warnings from the treating psychiatrist indicating potential risk if the children were returned home.

The court emphasized the absence of the ordered family court clinic assessment and the uncertainty surrounding the parent's mental health stability.

Given recent concerns about medication non‑compliance and potential substance use, the court concluded that the risk to the children had not been adequately resolved.

The interim order continuing society care was granted pending the forthcoming assessment.

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s 213‑page statement of claim brought against numerous defendants arising from domestic conflict, criminal proceedings, and child protection litigation concerning the plaintiff’s child.

The court found the pleading defective for failing to clearly identify causes of action, material facts, or specific allegations against individual defendants.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., the court held that a Children’s Aid Society and its employees owe a duty of care to the child, not the parent, and therefore the negligence claims against the CAS defendants disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court further held the action constituted an abuse of process because it attempted to re‑litigate issues already determined in multiple prior child protection proceedings and collateral attacks on those orders.

The claims were also barred by statutory immunities, deficiencies in pleading intentional torts, lack of standing to sue on behalf of the child, and limitation periods.

A physician brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s claims alleging negligent medical treatment of the plaintiff’s child, conspiracy, defamation, abuse of public office, and Charter breaches.

The court held that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, lacked necessary material facts, and improperly advanced speculative allegations against numerous defendants.

The court further found no duty of care owed by the physician to the plaintiff personally, as the treatment was provided to the child and no therapeutic relationship with the plaintiff was pleaded.

Several asserted causes of action were legally untenable or inadequately pleaded, and the claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The claims against the physician were struck without leave to amend.

A tribunal and one of its members moved to dismiss or strike a civil action arising from the tribunal’s review of a complaint against a physician.

The plaintiff alleged conspiracy, conflict of interest, and negligence in connection with the tribunal’s confirmation of a professional regulator’s decision not to take action against the physician.

The court held the pleadings failed to allege material facts establishing bad faith, which is required to overcome statutory immunity for tribunal members acting in good faith.

The claim was also a collateral attack on the tribunal’s decisions and was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period.

The statement of claim against the moving parties disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

The moving party police association brought a motion seeking dismissal of a civil action against it on the basis that the claims were statute‑barred, disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and were frivolous and vexatious.

The self‑represented plaintiff had sued numerous defendants, including police, government officials, and agencies, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, Charter breaches, and related torts over a lengthy period.

The court held that most allegations against the association were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The remaining allegations failed to disclose material facts capable of establishing any recognized cause of action against the association.

The pleadings were struck and leave to amend was denied.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff previously succeeded on a Rule 21 motion declaring a termination clause in the employment contract void for non‑compliance with the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court addressed the quantum of costs arising from that motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the indemnity principle, the court held that partial indemnity costs were appropriate because any settlement offer relating to the broader litigation could not yet be considered.

While most hours and rates claimed were reasonable given the complexity and importance of the issue, some adjustments were warranted.

The court fixed the plaintiff’s costs of the motion and determined a conditional additional amount should substantial indemnity later be awarded by the trial judge.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of counselling records from a woman’s abuse counsellor relating to the complainant’s allegations of sexual assault.

The defence argued the records were relevant to credibility and reliability and necessary to challenge alleged fabrication.

The court applied the two‑stage framework governing third‑party records under ss. 278.1–278.7 and considered whether the accused met the threshold of likely relevance.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate that the counselling records were likely to contain new or contradictory information beyond material already disclosed, including medical notes and police statements.

Given the high privacy interests attached to therapeutic counselling records and the absence of a demonstrated impairment to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence, the application was dismissed at the first stage.

Following prior reasons for judgment on a summary judgment motion limited to the issue of possession, the court convened to settle the form of order and address case management issues.

The court clarified that the plaintiff’s claim relating to contaminated soil and debris had not been dismissed and ordered that the reference in the draft order suggesting otherwise be deleted.

The plaintiff was directed to serve an amended statement of claim clearly articulating the causes of action, material facts, and relief sought against each defendant, with corresponding timelines for amended defences and related pleadings.

The court also scheduled completion of remaining discoveries, struck the jury notice by consent, adjourned the previously scheduled trial date, and set a new trial date.

The accused applied under s. 276.2 of the Criminal Code for permission to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defence sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding previous consensual sexual activity involving physical force, including grabbing and slapping, and whether bruising observed on the complainant on the alleged offence date could have been caused by earlier consensual activity.

The Crown did not oppose the application if limited to the specified topics.

The court held the evidence was relevant and significantly probative to the defence theory that no sexual activity occurred on the charged date and that the bruising may have originated earlier.

The court granted the application, allowing cross‑examination limited to the three identified points to protect the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.