Paul Joseph Calarco

An appeal concerning a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons for decision regarding the applicability and scope of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

This decision concerns a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons addressing the application of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

The decision itself contains information covered by the non-publication order and will only be made available on the Court of Appeal's website once the order ceases to be in effect.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Varinder Singh, who had been convicted after a jury trial of obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The court found that the trial judge erred by directing a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offence, rather than leaving the verdict to the jury.

The court held that, even where the evidence is overwhelming, an accused is entitled to the jury’s verdict.

A new trial was ordered on the included offence.

The appellant, Jason Windebank, appealed his designation as a Dangerous Offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following convictions for violent offences against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge’s errors were immaterial, that Gladue principles were sufficiently considered, and that the judge properly exercised her discretion in imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown’s appeal from a sentencing decision that declined to impose a SOIRA order on the respondent, who had pled guilty to sexual interference with a 15-year-old.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to apply the statutory presumption in favour of a SOIRA order and by not properly considering all relevant factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court set aside the exemption and imposed the SOIRA order.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility and by overemphasizing peripheral inconsistencies in the context of childhood abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's repeated focus on why the complainant continued to engage with the respondent, despite knowing the risk of assault, constituted stereotypical reasoning, which is an error of law.

This error was deemed to have materially affected the verdict, as the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years imprisonment for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, which was consecutive to a prior four-year sentence for similar offences.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the totality principle, resulting in an unfit total sentence of eleven years.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge did consider the totality principle and that the combined sentences were fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the quantity of drugs, commercial gain, and the commission of new offences while on release.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his daughter and two nieces, for which he received a 10-year sentence.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The court found the grounds of appeal, concerning similar fact evidence and the trial judge's assessment of credibility, to be weak, though not frivolous.

In balancing enforceability and reviewability under section 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court emphasized the seriousness of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the breach of trust, concluding that the public interest in enforceability outweighed the interest in reviewability.

The appellant, William Savage, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised several grounds, including issues with oath-helping evidence, the sufficiency of cautionary instructions regarding a key witness's reliability, the use of ante-mortem statements, instructions on post-offence conduct, alleged misstatements by Crown counsel in closing arguments, the W.(D.) instruction, and the trial judge's decision to instruct the jury on included offences (second-degree murder and manslaughter).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's conduct that would warrant a new trial.

The appellant, O.F., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his 15-month sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admissibility of fresh evidence (social media chats/postings), the trial judge's dismissal of a s. 276 application to admit prior sexual activity evidence, and the finding that consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application due to lack of cogency and credibility.

It upheld the trial judge's s. 276 ruling, finding the prior sexual activity irrelevant to consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, and that the defence's argument invoked prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court found it unnecessary to rule on the vitiated consent issue, as the trial judge's finding of no factual consent was dispositive.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed, as the 15-month sentence for a sexual assault on a vulnerable victim was deemed fit.

The appellants, C.O. and N.P., appealed convictions for failure to provide necessaries of life and an order for a new trial on unlawful confinement, stemming from the unsanitary conditions in their apartment and the confinement of their four-year-old daughter, J. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, affirming that risk of harm is an element of the necessaries offence under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and that the conditions of confinement are relevant to the "lawful authority" defence under s. 279(2).

The court found the trial judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the health risks posed by the cumulative unsanitary conditions.

The matter was remitted for sentencing on the necessaries charge.

The appellant, Jevane Fuller, appealed his convictions for multiple break and enters, assault, confinement, and robbery, and his total sentence of 15 years.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of a key witness's evidence and the admission of similar act evidence, both cross-count and from prior Toronto robberies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the appeal was allowed only to the extent of removing a victim fine surcharge, with the overall 15-year sentence upheld as fit.

The appellant, Dwayne Brown, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences, challenging the validity of a general warrant that authorized covert entries into a storage locker.

Police discovered cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam, and Canadian currency in the locker.

Brown argued that the warrant violated his s. 8 Charter rights, contending that the reviewing judge applied an incorrect standard for reasonable grounds and that the requirements of s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code were not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the reviewing judge correctly applied the "reasonable probability" standard for issuing the warrant and that all statutory preconditions for a general warrant, including the "best interests of the administration of justice" and "no other provision" elements, were satisfied.

The Crown sought leave to appeal two sentences imposed on the respondent for failing to remain at the scene of an accident and firearms offences, arguing that the first sentencing judge erred in calculating pretrial custody credit, which impacted the subsequent sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave for both appeals.

For the first sentence (Marshall #1), the Court found the trial judge erred by departing from an agreed-upon "Duncan" credit and by "double counting" mitigating factors, varying the pretrial custody credit from 39 days to 107 days, but not altering the suspended sentence.

For the second sentence (Marshall #2), the Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the suspended sentence, finding that the trial judge was entitled to give substantial credit for guilty pleas given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The appellant, Todd Crowe, appealed his total sentence of twelve years imprisonment for drug trafficking and weapons offences.

He argued that the concurrent four-year sentences for possession of proceeds exceeded the statutory maximum and that the sentencing judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentences for possession of proceeds to 18 months concurrently, as conceded by the Crown, but dismissed the appeal regarding the Gladue principles, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application or the weight given to the factors.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence.

The accused, R.A., appealed a global sentence of five and one-half years' imprisonment (reduced to five years for time served) imposed after pleading guilty to sexual assault, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and two counts of child luring.

The complainant was 15 years old, and the accused also engaged with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The sentencing judge considered significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, remorse, openness to therapeutic intervention, absence of a criminal record, and strong work history, alongside aggravating factors such as the victim's age, age gap, grooming techniques, and repeated sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge and concluding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed the importance of deterrence and denunciation for child sexual offences and noted that mid-single digit penitentiary terms are normal for such crimes.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of failing to provide necessaries of life and forcible confinement of their four-year-old child.

The trial judge erred by requiring proof of actual risk of harm for the necessaries charge under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, and by not considering the egregious conditions of confinement for the forcible confinement charge.

The appeal court found that a sanitary environment is a necessary of life and the child was in necessitous circumstances, overturning the acquittal on necessaries.

For forcible confinement, the court held that the parents' authority to confine ceases when conduct is abusive or harmful, remitting this charge for a new trial.

The appellant, G.J.S., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty of these charges but not guilty of sexual exploitation, distinguishing between earlier and later alleged incidents.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's use of the complainant's prior consistent statements and a threatening incident involving her biological father.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly used this evidence to enhance the complainant's general trustworthiness and reliability, rather than solely to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

This improper use was deemed determinative of guilt for the earlier allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both counts.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) to continue his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), rejecting a joint submission for transfer to Waypoint Centre for Mental Health.

The appellant argued the ORB breached procedural fairness by not giving express notice of its intent to reject the joint submission and that its decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB's "significantly probing" questions during the hearing provided sufficient implicit notice and that its decision to reject the transfer was reasonable, as the evidence did not support the claimed benefits of transfer or a treatment impasse at CAMH.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after trial of firearm and other offences and received a total sentence of 70 months (84 months with 14 months credit for pretrial custody).

The appellant appealed the sentence on grounds including the restraint principle, arguing that a lengthy penitentiary term was unnecessary given his lack of prior incarceration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that for serious domestic violence offences involving a lethal weapon, deterrence, denunciation, and victim protection must take precedence over the restraint principle.

The court corrected three technical sentencing errors but found no net effect on the total sentence imposed.