ODC 2015

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to stay a decision of the County Council lifting a stop work order and confirming a special permit that allowed the respondent landowner to cut trees on its property.

The applicant argued that the County Council denied it natural justice by accepting reply evidence without allowing rebuttal and by allowing two councillors who had not heard the evidence to vote.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding natural justice, as the reply evidence was responsive to unexpected assertions and the two mistakenly recorded votes made no mathematical difference to the outcome.

The court also found the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Deputy Mining and Lands Commissioner denying them permission to build a home on their land due to flood control concerns raised by the Nottawasaga Valley Conservation Authority.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by presuming a general legislative prohibition on development in floodplains and by elevating safety to a stand-alone head of jurisdiction.

The Court held that the proposed development would have no impact on flood control and directed the approval of the development without conditions.

The respondent sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision adding two parties as applicants and declining to order the applicant to post security for costs in a will challenge proceeding.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal the motion judge's refusal to award costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's substantive orders, and concluding that the costs decision did not raise an issue of sufficient importance to warrant leave to appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order refusing to transfer his Small Claims Court proceeding to the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the order was final, not interlocutory.

Applying established jurisprudence, the court held that an order refusing to transfer a proceeding between courts is a final order.

Consequently, the appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, and the matter was transferred accordingly.

The appellants, a corporation and its sole shareholder, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment holding them jointly and severally liable for unpaid legal fees owed to the respondent law firm.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the individual appellant had personally retained the firm through his conduct.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil due to the corporation's undercapitalization and found that the respondent was entitled to an oppression remedy as a creditor whose reasonable expectation of payment was unfairly disregarded.

The award of damages in Canadian dollars, despite an initial agreement to pay in barter dollars, was upheld based on evidence of a 1:1 equivalency.

The applicant, a paralegal, sought judicial review of a Law Society appeal panel decision that set aside findings of professional misconduct against him but directed a new hearing rather than staying the proceedings.

The applicant argued the appeal panel breached procedural fairness and provided insufficient reasons for refusing the stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the appeal panel reasonably concluded that the stay request should be addressed by a new hearing panel with the benefit of a full evidentiary record.

The Waterloo Region District School Board appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding interest to Erbsville Road Development Inc. on expropriated land from the date of draft subdivision approval, rather than the later date of actual expropriation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 33(1) of the Expropriations Act, interest can accrue from a date preceding expropriation when the owner ceases to make productive use of the land due to the impending expropriation.

The court found the board member's determination that productive use ceased upon draft approval was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay the respondent for money lent and renovation work.

The trial judge had enforced promissory notes with a 35% interest rate and accepted the respondent's oral testimony regarding the value of additional work.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and the 35% interest rate, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court corrected a minor mathematical error in the interest calculation, reducing the judgment amount by $121.46.

The plaintiffs appealed an order staying their action for failure to pay previous costs awards.

Through this appeal, the self-represented plaintiff sought to set aside a $6,450 costs award made by another judge who had dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal a document production order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous costs order could not be collaterally attacked through an appeal of the stay order, and that the costs were appropriately awarded to the successful party on the leave motion.

The appellant police officer appealed a trial decision finding him liable for battery and awarding general and punitive damages to the respondent driver following a traffic stop.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of battery and the award of general damages, concluding that the officer's push, combined with verbal abuse, constituted offensive contact and was not protected by section 25 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, finding that the officer's conduct, while inappropriate, was a spontaneous single event that did not warrant punitive damages.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications and mood stabilizers.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence to uphold the finding and that his procedural fairness rights were infringed when he represented himself at the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own testimony corroborated the treating physician's evidence that he did not believe he had a mental illness, rendering him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The Court also found that the Board properly followed its policy guidelines for unrepresented litigants and safeguarded the appellant's procedural fairness rights.

The proposed interveners, two unions, brought motions for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review concerning the payment of post-retirement benefits by a school board.

The judicial review was scheduled to be heard immediately after a related Stated Case in which both proposed interveners were already participating.

The court dismissed one union's motion to intervene, finding it could efficiently make its arguments in the Stated Case proceeding without prolonging the judicial review.

However, the court added the other union as a responding party because it was a joint signatory to the collective agreement at issue in the underlying arbitration.

The appellant appealed an order passing the accounts of the respondent, who acted as Attorney for Property and Estate Trustee for their parents.

The trial judge had awarded the respondent compensation of $129,861.05 and ordered the appellant to personally pay full indemnity costs of $192,000.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in awarding a care and management fee for the Estate Trustee period and in calculating a deduction from the appellant's share of the residue.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the costs order, substituting a blended order requiring the appellant to pay partial indemnity costs of $115,200, with the balance of the respondent's legal costs payable from the estate.

The applicant, a teacher whose employment was terminated after unsatisfactory performance evaluations, sought judicial review of several decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The HRTO had dismissed his numerous complaints against his former employer, his union, various legal counsel, and several administrative bodies, finding no evidence of discrimination based on race or colour.

The HRTO also declared him a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found no error in the HRTO's decisions, noting that the applicant failed to establish any link between his dismissal or the subsequent administrative decisions and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant sought costs following a successful appeal of a Small Claims Court decision regarding a property loss claim.

The respondent argued against costs due to the novelty of the issues and challenged the amounts claimed.

The court rejected the novelty argument but agreed that some of the claimed costs were excessive or unrecoverable.

The court awarded the appellant $650 for the Small Claims Court proceedings and $650 for the Divisional Court appeal, totaling $1,300.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion for security for costs.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff corporation had sufficient assets by treating a large shareholder loan as equity rather than a liability.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(a), finding there was a conflicting decision regarding the treatment of shareholder loans and that it was desirable to grant leave because the motion judge's calculation of assets and liabilities was unclear.

The moving party sought leave to admit an affidavit on its pending motion for leave to appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the points raised in the affidavit regarding the public importance of the issues could be made by counsel without the affidavit, that other municipalities had already been granted leave to intervene, and that the remaining aspects of the affidavit contained inadmissible opinion evidence.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

The Town of Richmond Hill sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision imposing a cap on the alternative requirement for parkland dedication under s. 42(3) of the Planning Act.

Several other municipalities sought leave to intervene in the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, arguing the Board's decision could impact their own parkland dedication policies.

The Divisional Court granted the motions to intervene, finding the issue transcended the immediate parties and the proposed interveners could offer distinct and useful perspectives on an issue of public importance.

The parties disagreed on the form of the order reflecting the court's appeal decision regarding class certification.

The appellant argued the class should expressly include recipients of both English and French versions of the documents, while the respondent argued it should be restricted to the English version.

The Divisional Court agreed with the appellant, noting no distinction was made during the appeal, and varied the certification order to include both language versions.

The appellant lawyer appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $10,000.

The respondent, a third party, had paid the appellant $20,000 to personally represent a co-accused at a two-day bail hearing.

The appellant attended the first day but, on the client's instructions, sent his partner to the second day.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was a separate oral contract between the respondent and the appellant, which the appellant breached by failing to personally attend the second day.

The appeal was dismissed.