Court of Justice

The complainant sought a peace bond against the respondents alleging threats and property damage.

The court found that while the respondents engaged in inconsiderate conduct, including bulldozing and spray painting the lawn of the matrimonial home, such actions did not constitute grounds for a peace bond.

The court determined that the complainant failed to establish reasonable grounds for fear of personal injury or property damage on the balance of probabilities.

The application was dismissed.

A Toronto Police Service officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm against a member of the public.

The Crown alleged the officer used excessive force and made an unlawful arrest for public intoxication.

The defence argued the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated and posed a safety risk, and that any force used was necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated, that there was a risk to safety, and that arrest was necessary.

The court also found the officer was entitled to the defence of honest mistake of fact.

The charge was dismissed.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change access arrangements made in 2001, seeking to eliminate or severely restrict the applicant father's access to their son.

The child, initially willing to attend access, began refusing visits in 2009.

The court found that both parents contributed to the deterioration of the father-child relationship through poor decision-making.

The mother was found to have been passive in encouraging access and to have subtly discouraged the relationship, while the father was found to have been rigid, critical, and insensitive to the child's preferences.

The court rejected the mother's position that the child should have unfettered discretion over access and instead imposed a structured access schedule with mandatory counselling for all parties.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused faced charges of impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit arising from an incident on December 27, 2010.

The information was sworn on January 4, 2011, and the trial was scheduled for October 19, 2012, resulting in approximately 21.5 months of delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that while institutional resource constraints accounted for approximately 9.5 months of delay (within the 8-10 month guideline), the accused had not established sufficient prejudice to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle stop in Caledon, Ontario on October 28, 2010.

The Crown withdrew the companion charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 milligrams) due to a breach of the defendant's right to consult with counsel in private, as his voice was inadvertently recorded on the breath room video while he spoke to his lawyer in the privacy booth.

The defendant raised three Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on extensive evidence of impairment, including breath test results of 283 and 267 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was sentenced to a $1,700 fine plus victim fine surcharge and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused was both impaired and over 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his parked car at a military base.

The defence established that the accused had arranged for an alternative plan of transportation (a designated driver), had divested himself of the vehicle keys to a third party, and was merely waiting in the vehicle to shelter from the rain until the designated driver returned.

The court found that the accused had met his burden under s. 258 of the Criminal Code to establish that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a traffic stop on December 18, 2010.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that he was arbitrarily detained when directed to sit in the police car during computer checks, finding that while the detention may not have been reasonably necessary, the evidence should not be excluded under the test in R v Aucoin.

The court also found that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and the breath demand based on observed signs of impairment.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on July 10, 2011.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant, the investigating officer, and a neighbour.

The accused testified in his own defence, claiming self-defence.

The court rejected the accused's version of events and accepted the complainant's account.

The accused was found guilty of assault.

The court noted that the accused failed to attend court on two scheduled dates, resulting in a bench warrant being issued.

The Crown applied under section 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act for access to youth records of A.B., who was convicted of a gang-related assault in 2007.

The Crown sought to use these records to assist its expert witness in establishing that the accused in a 2010 murder case were associated with gang members who committed gang offences in rival gang territory.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that access to A.B.'s records was not necessary for the proper administration of justice, as the Crown had access to records of adult co-offenders from the same incident.

The temporal remoteness of the 2007 assault to the 2010 murder, combined with minimal evidence of A.B.'s continuing gang involvement or connection to the accused, rendered the records insufficiently probative.

The court also found that A.B.'s privacy interests outweighed the Crown's interest in the records.

The Crown sought a stay of proceedings under section 579(1) on the original charges against the defendant.

The Crown's position was that despite a guilty plea entered in October 2012, a Pre-Sentence report with Gladue factors had not been properly prepared by Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto as ordered by the court.

Rather than compel attendance of the report authors, the Crown elected to direct a stay of proceedings given the defendant's particular circumstances and the delay involved.

The court granted the Crown stay, which did not apply to new charges pending in another courtroom.

This is a child protection trial concerning access to two Crown ward children (L., born 2004, and B., born 2006) following their apprehension in December 2009 and Crown wardship order in December 2011.

The mother sought increased access; the father sought bi-weekly eight-hour visits.

The Society opposed any access order, planning adoption.

The court found the children's relationship with their mother was beneficial and meaningful but that both parents failed to establish that an access order would not impair the children's future opportunities for adoption.

The mother's continued desire to have the children returned and lack of acceptance of adoption, combined with the father's inconsistent presence and mental health issues, led to the dismissal of both parents' access requests.

A custody and access dispute concerning a child born in 2009 to parents who had a brief, conflicted relationship.

The applicant father sought joint custody with primary residence, while the respondent mother sought sole custody with supervised access.

The case involved a high-conflict history with 27 court appearances and 16 temporary orders.

The central issue was whether the child should relocate with the mother to Kapuskasing for employment purposes or remain in North Bay with the father.

The court applied the mobility factors from Gordon v. Goertz and Berry v. Berry to determine the child's best interests.

The accused appeared for a bail hearing on charges of obstructing a peace officer and multiple provincial offences under the Highway Traffic Act and Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The accused refused to acknowledge the court's jurisdiction and engaged in disruptive conduct consistent with organized pseudo-legal commercial argument (OPCA) litigant tactics.

The Crown consented to release on conditions.

The court ordered detention on the secondary ground, finding a substantial likelihood the accused would commit further offences or interfere with the administration of justice.

The accused subsequently pleaded guilty to obstruction and received a conditional discharge with probation and community service, and was convicted and fined for the motor vehicle offences.

A motion to change a child support order brought by the biological father seeking to reduce his child support obligation retroactively based on his actual income, and to obtain access to his daughter.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to terminate the relationship between the child and father.

The court found that there had been a change in circumstances justifying modification of the original order.

The father's child support obligation was maintained at $188 per month based on imputed income of $23,500, as the court found he was intentionally underemployed.

The court rejected the father's request to reduce or rescind arrears.

Access was granted on a supervised basis with a detailed schedule for gradual expansion over one year, subject to multiple conditions including counselling, drug and alcohol testing, and restrictions on smoking and substance use.

The applicant father sought to vary a separation agreement filed in the Ontario Court of Justice in 2007, seeking sole custody and a change in child support obligations.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and sought an increase in spousal support.

The father argued that the Ontario Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction because a subsequent divorce proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice in 2008 had directed corollary relief matters to proceed in that court.

The court held that the Ontario Court of Justice retained exclusive jurisdiction to vary the separation agreement filed pursuant to section 35(1) of the Family Law Act, as the Superior Court order was procedural only and the parties had abandoned the Superior Court proceedings through their subsequent inaction and actions in the Ontario Court.

A child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

The Society sought to make the children crown wards without access for adoption purposes.

The maternal grandfather brought a motion to be added as a party to the proceeding and to obtain temporary access to the children, with the intention of proposing that they be placed in his care.

The mother opposed the Society's crown wardship application and proposed placement with her parents as her primary plan.

The court granted the maternal grandfather's motion to be added as a party, finding that his plan merited consideration despite the late involvement and the precarious relationship between him and the mother.

The court also granted a graduated access schedule for the maternal grandfather while noting concerns about the children's adverse reactions to visits.