Court of Justice

A costs decision following an interim motion and cross-motion concerning child residential schedule, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent mother achieved greater success on the motion, particularly regarding spousal support entitlement despite a marriage contract waiver.

The applicant father sought to deprive the respondent of costs based on alleged bad faith in failing to comply with a prior consent order for mediation.

The court found the respondent's behaviour unreasonable but not in bad faith, and awarded partial costs to the respondent.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the validity of breath demands made under sections 254(2) and 254(3) of the Criminal Code, and argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on observed driving behavior and the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath.

The court also found that the ASD fail result provided reasonable and probable grounds for the section 254(3) breath demand, and that the presence of empty beer cans in the vehicle did not undermine the reliability of the ASD result.

The court concluded that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, considering the lodging process, counsel contact, and the overall timeline.

The accused was found guilty.

This is a Crown appeal from acquittals on charges against a motor vehicle dealer and two salespersons for engaging in an unfair business practice by making an unconscionable representation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.

The trial involved a complex transaction where the consumer purchased a 2011 GMC Acadia with negative equity financing, trading in a 2011 Saturn.

The Justice of the Peace acquitted all defendants after finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an unconscionable representation had been made.

The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments.

This is a retrial following a successful appeal in a criminal case involving six charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against the defendant MCJ.

The charges involved three complainants: LJ (alleged offences between December 5, 1987 and December 5, 1992), KJ (alleged offences between June 15 and September 10, 2007), and LH (alleged offences in 1998 and July 23, 2005).

The defendant was the uncle of two complainants and the uncle of the mother of the third complainant.

The trial judge found that while the complainants were credible in their sincerity, their evidence was not reliable to the requisite degree due to numerous material inconsistencies, evolving allegations, and implausibilities.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused, a 23-year-old international student from China, sought judicial interim release on eight criminal charges including criminal harassment, assault, sexual assault, break and enter with intent, unlawful confinement, and possession of a weapon.

The accused had previously been released on bail with no-contact conditions but allegedly breached those conditions by communicating with the complainant after his father departed Canada.

The court imposed publication bans under sections 486.4 and 517(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the presumption of innocence and constitutional rights to reasonable bail are fundamental, the secondary ground for detention—protection of the public and the complainant—was not adequately addressed by the proposed release plan.

The court denied bail and ordered the accused detained.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon without authorization, two counts of possession of a prohibited weapon, careless storage of a firearm, careless storage of ammunition, possession of a firearm obtained by an indictable offence, and possession of a firearm with its serial number defaced.

A .32 calibre silver revolver with three live rounds and a spent shell casing were discovered during a search warrant execution at the accused's apartment.

The accused challenged committal for trial, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge, a material element of possession.

The court found the evidence circumstantial and sparse, with equally plausible inferences available regarding knowledge by either the accused or a third party with regular access to the apartment.

The court discharged the accused, finding the Crown failed to meet the threshold for committal.

A commercial trucking company was charged with transporting dangerous goods (wet-filled acid batteries) without displaying required safety placards and labels in violation of the Dangerous Goods Transportation Act.

The defendant argued that an exemption under 49 CFR 173.159(e) applied because the shipment originated from the United States.

The court rejected this argument, finding that 173.159(e) pertains only to packaging and bracing requirements, not placarding and safety marking requirements.

The court held that the exemption under section 9.1 of the Canadian Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 only applies when United States placarding and marking requirements are met, which they were not.

The defendant was convicted.

At a preliminary inquiry, the defendant was charged with attempted murder under s. 239 of the Criminal Code for an alleged assault on the complainant on August 18, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of a brutal beating with a wooden board that resulted in serious injuries including a lacerated liver, broken ribs, broken arm, and head injury requiring a three-and-a-half-week coma.

The defendant did not testify but called one witness.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, or whether the evidence only supported a committal on the lesser charge of aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of trafficking in crack cocaine.

The court imposed a sentence of three years on count one (trafficking nine ounces), concurrent on count two (trafficking three ounces), and one year consecutive on count three (trafficking 2.1 ounces with co-accused).

The defendant received 1.5 days credit for each day of pre-trial custody.

A 109 order for ten years and a non-communication order with respect to a co-accused were also imposed.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives with proportionality and rehabilitation considerations, given the defendant's youth and first penitentiary sentence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and failing or refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop on Highway 10 in Orangeville in the early morning hours of January 12, 2012.

The Crown alleged the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that he refused to comply with a valid breath demand.

The defendant denied impairment and claimed he sought only to delay the breath test until he could speak with his chosen counsel.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving but guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court rejected the defendant's Charter arguments regarding denial of counsel, arbitrary detention, and lost video evidence.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual touching, counselling to touch, and incest involving his daughter over a period from 2005 to 2012.

The complainant was between 9 and 15 years old during the alleged offences.

The case involved testimony from the complainant, her mother, and her brother, with significant credibility issues arising from recantations and minimizations during trial testimony compared to original police statements.

The court found the accused guilty on all eight counts, relying primarily on the original videotaped police statements and the corroborating evidence of the witnesses, while rejecting the minimized trial testimony as influenced by family pressure and the complainant's desire to reunite the family unit.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit ("Over 80") after failing a roadside screening device test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results from an approved instrument to establish the accused's blood alcohol level.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the Crown failed to prove the breath demand was made "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, thereby depriving the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c).

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the demand was delayed, the failure to comply with the timing requirement in section 254(3) does not render the breath test evidence inadmissible or deprive the Crown of the section 258 presumptions in the absence of a Charter application.

The applicant brought a motion for financial disclosure from the respondent in a child support matter.

The respondent, a family law lawyer representing himself, had failed to comply with disclosure obligations under a prior consent order, the Family Law Rules, and the Child Support Guidelines.

The court found the respondent had not complied with his disclosure obligations, had behaved unreasonably, and had repeatedly failed to follow court orders and timelines.

The court granted an expansive disclosure order with specific deadlines and granted the applicant leave to bring a motion to strike the respondent's pleadings if he failed to comply.

A judicial interim release hearing for an 18-year-old accused charged with multiple offences including break and enter with intent, possession of property obtained by crime, and failure to comply with bail conditions.

The accused had an extensive criminal history dating back to 2010, including weapons offences, break and enters, and trafficking-related charges.

The Crown's primary concern was public safety under the secondary ground.

The court found the Crown had a very strong case based on eyewitness identification, GPS tracking, and recovered stolen property.

Although the accused's mother offered to act as surety with additional financial pledges and the defence proposed a mental health support plan, the court determined the proposed release plan was inadequate to address public safety concerns given the accused's escalating pattern of criminal conduct, history of non-compliance with court orders, and substance abuse issues.

The offender pleaded guilty to production of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of chemicals knowing they would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The offender was found in possession of approximately 1 kilogram of pure methamphetamine and precursors capable of producing at least 6 kilograms of methamphetamine, with an estimated street value of $700,000 to $1,050,000.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years and 6 months less credit for 5 weeks of pre-trial custody, resulting in 6 years and 4 months to be served, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to drive in a marked lane contrary to section 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) whether the Justice of the Peace had a duty to inquire if the appellant required interpreter services, and (2) whether the Justice of the Peace should have inquired into the suitability of an adjournment given that disclosure was provided on the trial date.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that no inquiry into interpreter services was required as the appellant had completed the Notice of Intention without requesting an interpreter and conducted the trial in English without apparent difficulty.

While the court acknowledged that providing disclosure on the trial date presents procedural concerns, it found that the Justice of the Peace appropriately addressed the issue by permitting a recess for the appellant to review the disclosure and determine how to proceed.