Court of Justice

The accused was convicted of attempted murder after stabbing his co-worker multiple times in the head and neck on January 6, 2016, leaving the victim permanently and severely disabled.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused suffered from a mental disorder rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The court found the accused probably suffered from mental illness and depression but retained the ability to know right from wrong.

The accused was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to 12 years and 9 months.

The court balanced the brutal nature of the offence and devastating injuries to the victim against the accused's mental illness as a mitigating factor.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder after repeatedly stabbing his co-worker in the head and neck, leaving the victim permanently and severely disabled.

The Crown sought a life sentence, while the self-represented offender sought a reformatory sentence due to his mental illness.

The court found that the offender's mental illness, likely schizotypal personality disorder and depression, contributed to his perceived harassment by the victim and reduced his moral culpability.

The court sentenced the offender to 17 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood following a single-vehicle accident on January 31, 2017.

The Crown established that the defendant was found in the driver's seat of a severely damaged vehicle that had travelled over 150 meters off the road.

The defendant's blood alcohol content was measured at 220 milligrams at 2:10 and 3:01 a.m., which toxicological evidence interpolated back to 220-260 milligrams at the time of the accident.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding the right to counsel and found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a traffic sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant admitted to proceeding through an intersection marked "right turns only" to access a Tim Hortons but raised a defence of necessity due to an urgent need to use the washroom.

The court found the defendant not guilty because the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the actus reus of the offence—that the traffic sign complied with the regulatory requirements.

The constable's testimony regarding the sign's appearance was inconsistent with the prescribed regulatory specifications for such intersections, and the evidence was insufficient to establish either the sign's compliance or the existence of a supporting municipal by-law.

A provincial offence trial under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act concerning whether a tobacco retailer failed to post prescribed government identification signs in a conspicuous manner as required by regulation.

The Crown alleged the defendant failed to post the identification sign where tobacco transactions occurred.

The defendant argued the sign was posted conspicuously on the countertop near the cashier and that even if the actus reus was proven, a due diligence defence applied.

The court found the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt due to conflicting testimony regarding sign placement and visibility.

The defendant was acquitted.

The court also found that had the actus reus been proven, the defendant would have successfully mounted a due diligence defence based on the owner's comprehensive compliance systems, training procedures, and reasonable care measures.

The accused was charged with "over 80" and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following an accident in Brampton.

The Crown sought to rely on three sets of statements made by the accused to police and a breath technician.

The defence challenged the admissibility of all statements under section 7 of the Charter, arguing they were obtained in violation of the accused's rights.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that only the accused's spontaneous remarks to himself in the police cruiser were admissible.

All other statements were excluded because they were made under an honest and reasonably held belief that the accused had a statutory duty to report the accident.

Without the excluded statements, the Crown could not establish the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit (Over 80) contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter voir dire alleging multiple breaches of the accused's rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The court found that while there was a minor breach of s.10(b) regarding the timing of right to counsel advice, this breach had no impact on the Charter protected rights of the accused and did not warrant exclusion of evidence under s.24(2).

The remaining alleged Charter breaches were not proven on the balance of probabilities.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol after failing an Approved Screening Device test and subsequently providing a breath sample of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant brought multiple Charter challenges, including challenges to the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the timing of the ASD demand, compliance with section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, and alleged violations of rights to counsel.

The court rejected all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of the offence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, making child pornography available, and agreeing by telecommunication to commit an offense under section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought 18 months.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years in custody, with credit for 315 days of pretrial custody enhanced at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence are paramount sentencing principles in child pornography cases, particularly given the egregious nature of the written material discovered in chat logs that reached the highest level of depravity on the Oliver scale.

A child protection motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking an order for extended society care without access to either parent.

The child was placed in care due to the mother's inability to manage the child's behaviour.

The father had no contact with the child for seven years prior to the Society's involvement.

On the motion, the parties consented to an order placing the child in extended society care with access to the mother.

The only outstanding issue was whether access to the father should be ordered.

The court dismissed the motion with respect to paternal access, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and that such access would not be in the child's best interests.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to break and enter a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence and theft under five thousand dollars.

The Crown sought a global sentence of twelve months less pre-sentence detention credited at 1.5 to 1, followed by three years probation.

The defence sought time served plus two years probation, emphasizing the accused's difficult personal history as a Kurdish Convention refugee and the minimal nature of the offences.

The court imposed a sentence of time served plus one day in gaol on the attempt charge, with fifteen days concurrent on the theft charge, followed by three years concurrent probation.

The court considered collateral consequences under immigration law but found no risk of deportation given the accused's protected status as a Convention refugee.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of Fraud Over $5,000 for stealing approximately $162,480.29 from his employer over a period of 5½ years by making unauthorized technology purchases and reselling the equipment online.

The Crown sought 8-10 months in jail followed by two years of probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 12-18 months plus three years of probation.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by three years of probation, finding exceptional mitigating circumstances including the accused's status as a first offender, guilty plea, genuine remorse, addiction-driven offending, community support, and two years of abstinence from gambling and drugs.

This is a child protection motion for summary judgment under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that a one-year-old child (T.) is in need of protection, a disposition order, and a determination regarding parental access.

The court found the child in need of protection based on risk of physical harm from the mother's chronic drug addiction, domestic violence involvement, and inability to provide stable care.

The court declined to make a finding on emotional harm grounds due to insufficient evidence.

For disposition, the court ordered the child remain in the care and custody of the paternal grandmother (B.D.) subject to a supervision order by the society for nine months, rather than granting the deemed custody order sought by B.D. The court adjourned the access issue for trial, finding a genuine issue requiring adjudication regarding the scope and conditions of parental access.

This is a child protection proceeding concerning two children.

The court addressed trial readiness issues and the appointment of amicus curiae for the unrepresented mother.

The mother had cycled through three lawyers and was unable to retain counsel despite having a legal aid certificate.

The court appointed amicus to assist in presenting the mother's case at trial, ensuring the proceedings could move forward without further delays and that the children's interests would be protected through a fair and organized trial process.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was unconstitutionally strip searched and that his thread bracelets were improperly removed and destroyed during the search incident to arrest.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel when police questioned the defendant before he had consulted with duty counsel.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, finding that exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) was an adequate remedy.

The Intoxilyzer results were excluded, resulting in dismissal of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was convicted of impaired driving based on the officer's observations of impairment.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

The trial judge addressed multiple pre-trial motions including a ruling on whether the judge was the trial judge, a recusal motion, a change of venue motion, and a motion to stay proceedings for delay under the Charter.

The judge ruled that he would continue as the trial judge, rejected the argument that he should recuse himself or transfer the case on his own motion, and scheduled the remaining motions for argument on the trial date.

The judge also addressed concerns about successive applications for prerogative relief potentially delaying the trial indefinitely.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with the complainant on February 12, 2017.

The complainant alleged that she initially consented to protected sexual intercourse, but withdrew her consent when the condom slipped off.

She maintained that the defendant continued with unprotected intercourse without her consent.

The defendant claimed that the complainant consented to resuming unprotected intercourse after he reminded her that he had no protection.

The case turned entirely on credibility and the question of whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted without the complainant's consent.

The court found that while the complainant's account was coherent, the defendant's account, when combined with concerns about the complainant's narrative, left reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant knowingly proceeded without consent.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and possession of cocaine following a minor motor vehicle collision in Waterloo.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and/or drugs.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the reliability of the drug recognition evaluation.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

However, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal on the impaired driving charge.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of cocaine, rejecting his testimony that he was unaware of the drug in borrowed sweatpants.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The sole issue was whether the demand for a breath sample was valid, specifically whether it was made "forthwith" as required by law.

The constable delayed approximately five to seven minutes between detecting alcohol on the accused's breath and making the demand, during which time he conducted a records check and reflected on which demand to make.

The court found that the delay was not justified and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the demand was made forthwith.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant father sought to maintain jurisdiction in the Ontario Court of Justice over custody and access matters involving his son, who had been relocated to Japan by the respondent mother following a mobility order granted in August 2017.

The court determined that while it had jurisdiction when the proceedings were commenced in 2016 (when all parties and the child were physically present in Ontario), it no longer had jurisdiction after the child's relocation to Japan.

The court found that the criteria under section 22(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act could no longer be satisfied, specifically regarding substantial evidence availability, real and substantial connection to Ontario, and balance of convenience.

The court stayed the proceedings.