OCJ 2016

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped by police and failing an approved screening device test.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues: whether grounds existed for further testing despite the presence of mouthwash in the vehicle, whether the initial stop was arbitrary, and whether the accused's right to counsel was breached.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, but found multiple breaches of section 10(b) when police failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to speak with counsel of choice and made comments discouraging the exercise of that right.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts relating to child sexual exploitation: attempt to live on the avails of a person under 18, exercise control, procuring, and child luring.

The accused, along with two co-accused, lured three young girls aged 14 and 15 into prostitution at the Scarborough Town Centre.

The Crown sought 5 years imprisonment less pre-trial custody credit, while the defence sought 4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, finding this to be the minimum necessary to meet sentencing principles.

The court credited 1,157 days of pre-trial custody at the 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 303 days remaining to be served, followed by 2 years probation and a 10-year s.161 order.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to live on avails, exercising control, and procuring minors for prostitution.

Three girls aged 14-15 were recruited at a shopping mall and exploited in a prostitution scheme.

The Crown sought four years imprisonment; the defence sought three to three-and-a-half years.

The court imposed a four-year sentence, finding it the minimum necessary to meet sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence given the serious harm to the young victims and the cruel exploitation involved.

The accused was charged with eight offences including two counts of sexual assault and four counts of exploitation via compelled prostitution.

The Crown sought to admit a PDF book entitled "Pimpology — The 48 Laws of the Game" recovered from the accused's laptop.

The defence opposed admission on grounds of minimal probative value and significant prejudicial impact.

The court found the book to be relevant circumstantial evidence supporting the complainant's credibility and weighing against the accused's statements denying involvement in human trafficking.

The court admitted the evidence, finding that probative value outweighed potential prejudice.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and possession of stolen property arising from his involvement in a sex trafficking operation in York Region.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a former university student who entered the sex trade.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including numerous internal contradictions, evasive demeanor, and inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her police statement.

The accused did not testify but made a voluntary statement to police.

The court convicted the accused on one count of possession of stolen property (the complainant's cellphone) but acquitted on all other counts, finding the Crown had failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved that a sergeant observed the accused driving erratically, smelled alcohol on the accused's breath, and obtained an admission of drinking.

An Approved Screening Device test was administered at the roadside, which the accused failed.

The accused was arrested and transported to a police station where approved instrument testing resulted in readings of 170 and 180 milligrams.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the stop, the ASD demand, the arrest, and the delay in providing access to counsel.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused.

A school bus driver was convicted of making a lane change not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after striking a vehicle while pulling away from a bus stop.

The driver appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in finding him partially credible, that the burden of proof was not properly applied, and that the defence of due diligence was not considered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court held that credibility assessments are not all-or-nothing propositions, the trial judge properly applied the WD test, and the factual findings did not support a due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding following entry of a guilty plea.

The paralegal representing the accused entered a guilty plea contrary to the accused's instructions and without her consent.

The court found that the decision to plead guilty was the exclusive right of the accused and that the guilty plea was entered without proper authority.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence, alleging that his right to counsel in private was breached when he spoke to duty counsel from a holding cell at the police detachment.

The accused claimed he could hear voices outside the cell and was concerned his conversation could be overheard.

The court found that the accused was in fact afforded privacy, was the only person in the cell block and booking area, and was monitored only by video with no audio recording.

The court rejected the accused's after-the-fact assertion that he reasonably believed his conversation could be overheard, finding his testimony lacked reliability and he took no steps at the time to indicate concern.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

Two brothers were jointly charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal to trial based on surveillance evidence showing hand-to-hand transactions over two days and the subsequent discovery of drugs and cash at a residence where both accused were found.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial cases, examining whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on all three counts.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, with the first accused facing an additional count.

At a preliminary inquiry, both accused contested committal, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.

The court applied the test from R v Arcuri, examining circumstantial evidence including extensive police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, large quantities of cash and drugs found in a locked apartment, drug paraphernalia, and documentary evidence linking both accused to the premises.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on the joint possession counts and the first accused on the additional count.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.

The respondent mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the applicant father's Motion to Change and for costs.

The father sought to vary custody and access provisions of orders made in 2010, 2013, and 2015.

The court found that the father failed to establish a material change in circumstances as required by section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father's evidence consisted primarily of one affidavit from the maternal aunt and reliance on a psychological assessment report that did not constitute proof of material change.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the father's Motion to Change was dismissed.

In a custody and access dispute between separated parents, the court determined that joint custody should be ordered with equal shared parenting time on a week-about basis.

The applicant mother sought to increase her custodial time from the unequal arrangement established in a separation agreement executed when she was residing in Alberta.

The respondent father opposed equal shared parenting, arguing the current arrangement was working well.

The court found that the children's expressed wishes to spend more time with their mother, combined with the best interests analysis under the Children's Law Reform Act, supported equal shared parenting despite the father's concerns about the mother's ability to assist with French homework and supervision.

The accused was charged with two counts of making child pornography and possession of child pornography.

The Crown established that the accused created composite images by attaching the face of a young girl (cut from a Sears catalogue) to altered images of adult bodies, manipulating the images through photocopying and hand-drawing to emphasize child-like features including genitalia and breasts.

The accused claimed the images served scientific and educational purposes related to theories about human sexuality and reproduction.

The court rejected the accused's defences of scientific purpose and public good, finding that the images had child sexual abuse material as their dominant characteristic and were created for sexual purpose.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

A child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving a child born with neonatal abstinence syndrome due to in-utero drug exposure.

The child was apprehended at birth and remained in Society care.

The mother sought return of the child subject to supervision, while the biological father (identified through DNA testing) supported the mother's position.

The Society sought Crown wardship for purposes of adoption.

The court found the child in need of protection due to risk of emotional harm from parental conflict, unresolved maternal trauma and anger management issues, ongoing health concerns, and past substance abuse.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding this was in the child's best interests despite the mother's improvements and demonstrated parenting capacity during supervised access.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts arising from a domestic violence incident: possession of a prohibited weapon (butterfly knife), uttering death threats, and assault.

The victim suffered significant physical injuries and psychological trauma during a violent attack in their shared residence.

The court balanced aggravating factors (severity of the attack, spousal abuse, significant victim impact) against mitigating factors (guilty plea, remorse, rehabilitation efforts, mental health and addiction treatment, stable employment, and family support) to impose a sentence of 15 days incarceration for assault, 4 months conditional sentence for uttering death threats, and 2 years probation for possession of a prohibited weapon.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained following an approved instrument demand.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the initial approved screening device (ASD) demand, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding the grounds for the ASD demand was contradicted by video evidence.

The officer had decided to demand an ASD before obtaining information about when the accused consumed alcohol or observing signs of impairment.

The court concluded the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the ASD demand and excluded the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, resulting in acquittal.

The accused pleaded guilty to five offences involving the sexual abuse of a four-year-old child: sexual interference, invitation to touch for a sexual purpose, making child pornography through text communications, possessing child pornography, and agreeing with the child's mother to commit sexual interference.

The offences occurred over a three-day period in January 2016.

The accused was 27 years old at the time and had no prior criminal record.

The sentencing hearing required the court to balance aggravating factors including the extreme vulnerability of the victim, the planned and deliberate nature of the offences, and the depravity of the text messages, against mitigating factors including guilty pleas, cooperation with authorities, expressions of remorse, and family support.

The court imposed a total sentence of six years less pre-sentence custody credit.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with possession of a prohibited handgun and related firearm offences.

The accused conceded to committal on all charges except those relating to possession of a handgun, arguing that the seized Jennings J-22 was not operational as defined in the Criminal Code.

The Crown's expert testified that the gun had a broken or missing breechface that prevented it from firing, but that the part could be repaired or replaced with a readily available slide assembly.

The court found that the evidence established the gun could be made operational through straightforward installation of readily available parts in a reasonable timeframe, and committed the accused to trial on all charges.