Court of Appeal

The Information and Privacy Commissioner appealed a Divisional Court decision which held that confidential mediation and settlement records involving the Liquor Control Board of Ontario were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the term 'litigation' in the second branch of s. 19 of FIPPA includes both mandatory and consensual mediation.

The court held that the exemption is not limited to documents falling within common law litigation privilege, and therefore the disputed records were protected from disclosure.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation for DNA evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of intoxicated witnesses, and misused evidence of vaginal bleeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she did not err in her treatment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by provisionally ruling that if the defence led 'other suspect' evidence regarding strychnine in the deceased's home, the Crown could lead evidence of the accused's wife's death by strychnine poisoning the previous year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly held that without evidence of the accused's special access to strychnine, the other suspect evidence would leave the jury with a distorted picture.

The ruling was a fair balancing of the evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the respondent brought a motion to re-open the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The court declined to re-open the appeal.

The appellant sought costs of $7,500 for preparing responding materials and costs submissions.

The court awarded the appellant costs fixed at $2,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the action on the condition that the appellant pay the respondent's agreed costs thrown away of $13,600 within 60 days.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and appealed his sentence after having already served the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was fit.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's decision dismissing their claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the claim.

The court noted that the trial judge correctly addressed the pleaded theory of liability and found no liability or damages.

The court also held that even if a breach of contract theory had been advanced, the claimed damages were not attributable in law to such a breach.

The respondent municipality gave notice of termination of a 1999 lease to the appellant soccer park corporation.

The respondent offered a new lease for the same property, but with a shorter term and a requirement that the appellant contribute to maintenance costs.

The 1999 lease required the respondent to provide another reasonably similar soccer facility at another location at its own expense upon termination.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent failed to comply with these clear terms, rendering the termination invalid.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and 15-year sentences for attempted murder.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to unreliable eyewitness identification and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The appellant Nguyen also argued the trial judge erred in applying party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the identification evidence was supported by other evidence and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeals, holding that the 15-year sentences were within the appropriate range given the horrific nature of the shooting that rendered the victim quadriplegic, and that the trial judge did not err in denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit to an offender who committed the offence while serving a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief, misapprehending expert evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief.

The court also held that the trial judge properly used expert evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent and anal intercourse, and found no indication of uneven scrutiny.

The tenant appealed an order affirming his eviction by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The landlord, a corporation, sought possession of the rental unit for the personal use of its sole shareholder.

The tenant argued that a corporation cannot require possession for personal use and that the corporate veil should not be pierced to benefit the landlord.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sole shareholder, as the directing mind who permits occupancy, falls within the definition of 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Court also found that the Board properly relied on s. 202 to disregard the separate corporate existence to ascertain the real substance of the transaction.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for adverse possession over a 2.6-foot strip of land on the respondents' property.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in his factual findings and in applying the test for adverse possession, specifically regarding mutual mistake and the requirement to exclude the true owner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and confirming that effective exclusion of the true owner throughout the 10-year period remains a requirement for adverse possession, even in cases of mutual mistake.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to allow a deduction for reasonably foreseeable future legal costs related to ongoing litigation at the date of separation, allowing a $300,000 deduction.

The Court also corrected calculation errors in retroactive spousal support and adjusted ongoing spousal support to $1,400 per month.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the equalization payment and spousal support amounts reduced.

The appellant brought a motion on the day of the appeal, which the Court of Appeal dismissed for being brought too late.

The Court found no error in the two orders granted by the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

Costs were fixed at $2,500 to each respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims for recovery under a contingency retainer agreement.

The corporate appellant abandoned its appeal.

The individual appellant's appeal was dismissed because he had failed to respond to a Request to Admit, resulting in deemed admissions that nothing was owed by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal devoid of merit and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the individual appellant.

The appellant brought an action in the Ontario Superior Court attacking a decision of the tax court.

The appellant had already exhausted his right to appeal the tax court decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant is not entitled to collaterally attack the tax court decision in the Superior Court.

The respondents were entirely successful in the appeals and settled their costs with the appellant Molson Sport & Entertainment Inc. They sought costs from the appellant Jonathan Vrozos, who took no position.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents payable by Vrozos in the amount of $49,768.00.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.