Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The self-represented applicant moved to set aside a previous decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing his family law appeal, seeking a new hearing under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that Rule 37.14 had no application and that the authority to reconsider a decision under Rule 59.06 is exercised sparingly.

The applicant's arguments amounted to mere disagreement with the correctness of the appeal decision.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the proper route to contest the decision was to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent sued the appellants for constructive dismissal.

During a summary judgment motion, the appellants sought production of draft affidavits, which the motion judge dismissed as privileged, while also prohibiting further examinations without leave.

The appellants appealed these orders to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the orders were interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, quashed the appeal, and directed the appellants to seek leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action for breach of contract and solicitor's negligence against their former counsel, Gardiner Roberts LLP.

The appellants alleged errors in judgment, failure to properly advise, and failure to consider costs during the firm's representation of them in a prior action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the firm communicated steps to the appellants, advised them of risks, and did not breach the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of the appeal to the respondent in the fixed amount of $16,800.00, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant appealed the dismissal on summary judgment of his claims against the Attorney General of Canada and the Ottawa Police Services Board for negligent investigation and harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis in evidence or law to interfere with the motion judge's comprehensive reasons and fact-finding powers.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to each respondent.

The parties were involved in multiple actions concerning their respective security businesses.

In one action, the motion judge struck the defendant's counterclaim as an abuse of process because it duplicated a counterclaim in another action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider the context of the litigation, noting the plaintiff initiated the multiple proceedings.

A second appeal by the plaintiff from an order refusing to strike a counterclaim in another action was quashed as the order was interlocutory and the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, Mr. Lotey, appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to comply with documentary production obligations over a three-year period.

His law firm also sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to personally pay the costs of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Lotey's appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 30.08(2) given the deliberate and continuous failure to produce relevant documents.

The Court also denied the law firm leave to appeal the costs order, finding the firm was complicit in the flagrant disregard of the Rules and court orders.

The appellant, a commercial tenant, commenced a Superior Court action against its former landlord and another tenant for breach of contract and various torts.

The motion judge struck the claim as an abuse of process because the issues were substantially the same as two small claims actions the appellant had already commenced against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the actions were substantially the same and constituted an abuse of process.

The court also upheld the motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision that a single notice letter satisfied the 60-day notice requirement under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act for 15 separate class actions.

The actions alleged the Crown failed to enforce HST guidelines against automobile insurers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the notice letter communicated a broad complaint on behalf of a defined class and fulfilled the legislative purpose of allowing the Crown to investigate and prepare for litigation, even though 15 separate actions with different representative plaintiffs were ultimately commenced.

The appellant was successful on appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motions.

The parties agreed to fix the appeal costs at $75,000.

For the motions, the appellant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $212,500.

The respondents argued this amount was excessive and not within their reasonable contemplation, suggesting a cap of $125,000.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was some overlap in the respondents' work, it was not considerable, and fixed the motion costs at $175,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a leased vehicle.

The appellant sued the driver, the lessees, the legal owner (Daimler Financial), and the beneficial owner (Chrysler).

The motion judge found that Chrysler was an owner under the Highway Traffic Act and vicariously liable, but that both Chrysler and Daimler Financial were lessors under the Insurance Act and entitled to a $1 million cap on liability.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellant's claim that the driver was an unnamed insured under Daimler Financial's excess policy and dismissed the negligent entrustment claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld all of the motion judge's findings, dismissing both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The appellant was injured while working as a go-kart race director.

He had signed a waiver releasing the respondents from liability.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action based on the waiver.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant was an employee covered under Part X of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The court held that it is contrary to public policy to allow individuals to contract out of the protections of Part X of the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $7,500 following an appeal.

The appellants argued no costs should be awarded due to divided success on the appeal's two issues.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents their requested costs, finding that they succeeded on the more significant issue regarding restrictions on the sale of shares to a third party.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that they were engaged in a joint venture involving repeated and dangerous violations of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly instructed herself on the law of joint venture tort liability and that her finding was reasonable on the evidence.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent insurer.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation against her former solicitor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the 'but for' test for causation applied and that the conduct of the solicitor retained after the respondent effectively broke the chain of causation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent in an appeal brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of execution on a trial judgment awarding him wrongful dismissal damages, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The appellant had initially only appealed the portion of the judgment awarding damages for the value of shares, but later filed a supplementary notice of appeal challenging the wrongful dismissal damages.

The court applied the three-part test for lifting a stay, finding that the respondent demonstrated financial hardship, the appellant's financial condition was deteriorating, and the merits of the wrongful dismissal appeal were weak.

The motion to lift the stay was granted.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that allowed the respondents to pursue claims for pre-bankruptcy breaches of fiduciary duty.

The respondents brought a motion declaring the appellant had no right of appeal under s. 193(b), while the appellant sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had no appeal as of right because the order was not likely to affect other cases in the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise an issue of general importance and lacked prima facie merit, as settled law does not require a court to scrutinize the merits of an action when lifting a bankruptcy stay.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, which sought to declare mortgages granted by the respondent parents to their children as fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge found good consideration for the mortgages and no intent to defraud, dismissing the action against the children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the motion judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and rejecting the appellant's attempt to raise new claims on appeal.

The appellants brought an action to enforce promissory notes and a claim for fraudulent conveyance.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the appellants on the promissory notes but dismissed their fraudulent conveyance claim.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim when the defendants had not moved for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that summary judgment may be granted against a moving party.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part on consent to reduce the damages awarded on the promissory notes from $710,000 to $650,000.