Michelle M. Biddulph

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that his discussions with co-conspirators amounted to a concluded agreement, and that the trial judge misapplied the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had agreed to join the conspiracy to import cocaine by airplane.

The court also held that the trial judge properly applied the Carter framework and did not improperly rely on hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The youth appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault.

At trial, the judge disbelieved the appellant's exculpatory testimony and concluded he had fabricated his account to deflect blame, using this disbelief as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to identify independent evidence of fabrication before using the disbelieved testimony as circumstantial evidence of guilt, contrary to the framework in R. v. Iqbal.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and his sentence.

The appellant was charged in September 2019 with sexual assault and administering a noxious substance.

The latter charge was withdrawn.

Following a hung jury in June 2022, the appellant was tried before a judge alone, who found that he sexually assaulted the complainant twice.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter regarding an overbroad search of his cell phone; (2) the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 7 of the Charter based on non-disclosure of the information to obtain the search warrant and minimized the materiality of the hotel video in the conviction; and (3) the trial judge erred in failing to grant sufficient sentencing credit for harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The Ontario Securities Commission appealed the acquittal of Stephan Katmarian on four counts of securities violations related to the promotion of Peblik Inc., a cryptocurrency token purportedly backed by the Thierry Mine.

The trial judge acquitted Katmarian on all counts.

On appeal, the Superior Court allowed the appeal on Count 1 (fraud), finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the element of deprivation by requiring proof of detrimental reliance rather than risk of deprivation.

The Court dismissed the appeals on Counts 2 (misleading statements to the Commission), 3 (unregistered trading in securities), and 4 (distribution without prospectus).

The Court entered a conviction on Count 1 and remanded for sentencing.

This decision addresses whether the accused, Peter Nygard, put his character in issue during his evidence-in-chief in a multi-complainant sexual assault trial, and the resulting scope of permitted Crown cross-examination.

The court found that Nygard did put his character in issue by repeatedly asserting he was not the type of person to commit the offences charged.

The ruling details the careful limits placed on the Crown’s cross-examination to avoid undue prejudice, and provides a thorough analysis of the law regarding character evidence and rebuttal in criminal trials.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 68 of Saskatchewan's Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, which sets a balance of probabilities as the applicable standard of proof in inmate disciplinary proceedings.

The majority held that the proceedings constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter because disciplinary segregation and loss of earned remission are functional forms of imprisonment, thereby overruling R. v. Shubley.

The majority further held that s. 68 infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter by permitting findings of guilt without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that this infringement is not saved by s. 1 because an obvious Charter-compliant alternative exists.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that Shubley remains good law and that neither the criminal in nature nor the true penal consequence prong of the Wigglesworth test is satisfied by Saskatchewan's inmate disciplinary proceedings.

The appellant, A.K.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended key evidence regarding photographic exhibits of the complainant’s injuries and the appellant’s statements in a post-incident conversation.

These misapprehensions were material and essential to the trial judge’s reasoning and credibility assessments, warranting a new trial.

The court rejected the appellant’s second ground of appeal regarding the trial judge’s assessment of motive to fabricate.

The appellant, Raimonds Mark Stivrins, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the legal limit.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s findings regarding care and control, the admissibility and weight of certain evidence, and the trial judge’s assessment of credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge’s factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit expert evidence from Dr. Lori Haskell on the neurobiology of trauma in a sexual assault trial against Peter Nygard.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was irrelevant, unnecessary, and that Dr. Haskell was not properly qualified.

The court applied the Mohan framework and a cost-benefit analysis, finding the evidence relevant to disabuse the jury of myths and stereotypes about victim behaviour, necessary to assist in credibility assessment, and that Dr. Haskell possessed the requisite expertise.

The application was allowed, permitting Dr. Haskell to testify for the limited purpose of explaining general responses to trauma.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to adduce count-to-count similar fact evidence against Peter Nygard in his sexual assault trial.

The court granted the application, finding a significant degree of similarity in the alleged acts and circumstances, which demonstrated a specific propensity and connected to the issues of actus reus and complainant credibility.

The similarities included the use of a unique, hidden private space at 1 Niagara Street, Mr. Nygard's control over access, aggressive physical assaults, berating of complainants, and the use of his wealth and power to lure victims.

The court also addressed the defence's arguments regarding tainting and collusion, concluding that while an opportunity for inadvertent tainting existed due to media reports and shared therapy, there was no air of reality to actual collusion, and the issue of reliability was left to the jury.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay drug trafficking charges against the respondent, Angelo Kirkopoulos, on the grounds of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge had found a net delay of 35.5 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence delay and 14 months attributed to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance.

The Crown argued that an additional 8-month period, which the application judge classified as institutional delay due to court backlogs, should also be considered an exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the application judge's characterization of the 8-month period as institutional delay.

The court emphasized that while the pandemic caused exceptional circumstances, the Crown must still demonstrate reasonable efforts to mitigate delay, and deference is owed to a trial judge's factual findings and local knowledge regarding delay attribution.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the sole defense witness.

The sentence appeal sought a conditional sentence instead of the imposed custodial term.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessment, noting the deference owed.

Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the custodial term, emphasizing the serious nature of the offence, which involved the appellant pointing a gun at his son and wife and threatening to kill them.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Juan Guillermo Gutierrez, appealed three orders from the Superior Court of Justice: a finding of civil contempt, a 30-day imprisonment sentence, and a full indemnity costs award of $563,485.00.

The contempt finding stemmed from his interference with a court-appointed receiver by signing a false declaration in Guatemala to initiate a criminal complaint against the receiver's representatives.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, affirming the lower court's jurisdiction based on a "real and substantial link" to Ontario, upholding the contempt finding due to intentional breach of the receivership order, confirming the 30-day sentence as fit given the egregious nature of the contempt and lack of remorse, and upholding the full indemnity costs award due to the seriousness of the conduct and the financial burden placed on the judgment creditor.

The Crown applied to introduce similar fact evidence from a ninth complainant (S.R.) in a sexual assault and forcible confinement trial against Peter Nygard.

The court analyzed the probative value of S.R.'s evidence, considering similarities with the on-indictment complainants, potential for collusion, and credibility issues.

The judge found sufficient similarity and high probative value, concluding that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and allowed the Crown's application.

Bradley MacGarvie and Thomas Nagy appealed their convictions for first- and second-degree murder, respectively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct evidence, failing to adequately explain its relevance and possible inferences.

For Nagy, the trial judge also incorrectly defined the mental element for party liability for murder under a common unlawful purpose and failed to provide a decision tree, leading to jury confusion.

While the provocation defence was correctly rejected for MacGarvie, and the admission of Nagy's criminal record and lay opinion evidence was upheld, the errors in jury instructions were deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a new trial for both appellants.

The applicant, H.K., sought release pending appeal of his 10-month imprisonment sentence.

The court found that the appeal, particularly concerning the sentence, met the "not frivolous" test.

It was noted that denying release would likely render the sentence appeal moot, as the applicant would serve the custodial portion of his sentence before the appeal could be heard.

The court granted the application for release pending appeal and imposed a publication ban.

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and break and enter after consuming alcohol and psilocybin mushrooms and committing violent acts while in a state of extreme intoxication akin to automatism.

The Crown invoked s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code to bar the defence of self-induced extreme intoxication.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that s. 33.1 violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting conviction without proof of mens rea or voluntariness, and that these violations could not be saved under s. 1 because the provision is not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweigh its salutary benefits.

Section 33.1 was declared unconstitutional and of no force or effect, and the trial acquittal was restored.

The appellant, Xiu Jin Teng, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder and her sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was the trial judge's dismissal of her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, which the trial judge found was not bona fide but an attempt to delay the trial.

Other grounds included Charter breaches (s. 11(b) right to trial within reasonable time, s. 10(a) and (b) detention rights), jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Rowbotham application was an abuse of process and that the trial was fair.

It also found no Charter breaches, no error in jury instructions, and that the conviction was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was allowed on a narrow point, varying a communication prohibition order to allow for family law-related communications.

The appellant, Jordan Brown, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault by wounding and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on "wounding" and intent to endanger life.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence despite a conceded error by the trial judge regarding the consideration of treatment prospects at the designation stage, finding no reasonable possibility that the outcome would have differed.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed the mandatory revocation of his registration for professional misconduct (sexual abuse of a patient, his eventual spouse).

The appeal challenged the Court of Appeal's prior decisions in Leering and Mussani, arguing that the "zero-tolerance" policy and mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code infringed sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that sexual abuse is established by the concurrence of a health professional-patient relationship and a sexual relationship, and that mandatory revocation does not violate Charter rights, as economic interests are not protected by sections 7 or 12, and the penalty is not cruel or unusual.

The court also clarified the narrow scope of the spousal exception.