Michal Fairburn

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a manslaughter conviction arising from the death of the accused's mother by ligature strangulation.

The court reiterated the deferential appellate standard for sentence appeals and held that a conditional sentence for manslaughter is not, in itself, an error in principle.

In light of the offender's remorse, rehabilitation, psychiatric evidence, lack of risk to the community, and the trial judge's careful consideration of the sentencing objectives in the Criminal Code, the majority found no basis to interfere.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that denunciation and general deterrence required custody.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a violent kidnapping and assault connected to collection of a drug debt.

The court held that the trial judge erred by telling the jury that if it found the accused's testimony to be a fabrication, that finding could be added as positive circumstantial evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of concoction.

The court also found prejudicial Crown misconduct and related charge errors concerning the right to remain silent, improper cross-examination tied to defence counsel's failure to confront a witness under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and improper closing submissions suggesting a key Crown witness had been believed in another proceeding.

Given the credibility-driven record and the non-overwhelming Crown case, the proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for first degree murder and related offences arising from the kidnapping, confinement, sexual assault, and deaths of two teenage victims.

He admitted the predicate offences and argued that another participant alone committed the killings, leaving him guilty only of manslaughter.

The court rejected challenges to the admission of similar fact evidence and expert evidence on battered woman syndrome, found no reversible error in the jury charge on burden of proof, party liability, or credibility, and upheld the jury selection procedure under s. 635(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was dismissed in full.

The appeal concerned whether a separately charged co-accused could be compelled to testify at the criminal trial of another accused arising from the same incident, and whether s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of fundamental justice, but that the constitutional structure contemplates a general rule of witness compellability coupled with use immunity, rather than an absolute right to silence for such witnesses.

The Court further held that s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act is constitutional, while recognizing varying approaches among the judges to residual protection under s. 7, including limited derivative-use immunity or case-specific exceptions grounded in fairness.

The Court also upheld the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial after the Crown's successful appeal from acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for common nuisance after donating blood he knew to be HIV-contaminated to the Red Cross.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 216 of the Criminal Code imposed a duty of care on the appellant when giving blood.

The Court found this duty was breached by his failure to disclose that his blood contained HIV antibodies, which endangered the life, safety, and health of the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding force vitiating consent was inadequate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that the instructions, read as a whole, contained no error and adequately explained the necessity of a nexus between the force applied and the consent.

Major J. dissented, finding the instructions conveyed that mere touching was sufficient to prove force.