Michael Simaan

The appellants appealed a summary judgment holding them liable as guarantors for unpaid principal and interest under promissory notes.

The principal debtor was restricted from making payments by an inter-creditor agreement.

The appellants argued that because the principal debtor was not in default due to the inter-creditor agreement, the guarantees were not triggered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the guarantees were triggered by the failure to pay, regardless of the inter-creditor agreement's restrictions on the principal debtor.

The court determined the quantum of costs for the plaintiff, Turn-Key Projects, following a remittal from the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had found that Turn-Key was the successful party at trial, overturning the trial judge's initial decision to award no costs.

The court considered the parties' unreasonable positions on costs and applied Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the plaintiff's partial success at trial (recovering 64% of the principal amount sought).

The court awarded Turn-Key $25,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The defendants appealed a master's decision dismissing their motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiff purchaser.

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to disclose a 'no registration' clause in the agreement of purchase and sale and that the master misapplied the test for a CPL.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law regarding material non-disclosure, as the clause did not unambiguously prohibit a CPL after the vendor terminated the agreement.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the master's assessment of the property's uniqueness and the balance of convenience.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of entitlement to renew a lease agreement for a gas station.

The Defendant opposed, alleging material breaches of the lease, specifically non-compliance with Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) requirements regarding daily dip records and unauthorized use of the premises for truck parking.

The court found that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving they were not in material default of the lease, particularly concerning TSSA compliance.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and equitable relief from forfeiture was denied, as the case involved a failure to crystallize a right rather than a loss of an existing right.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed the trial judge's factual findings on an off-set issue and the costs disposition.

The respondent cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the off-set issue, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court allowed the appellant's costs appeal and dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, as the parties agreed the trial judge erred in principle by determining success on a distributive-costs basis.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge to determine the quantum of costs.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action against the developers of a cancelled pre-construction condominium project, alleging breach of contract and bad faith in invoking an early termination condition.

Following a settlement meeting and document review, the parties agreed to a without-costs discontinuance.

The court approved the consent motion to discontinue the action under section 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding that the discontinuance would not prejudice the putative class members, who had not yet been notified of the proceeding and could still pursue individual claims before the expiry of the limitation period.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the defendant taxi management company held insurance premiums collected from its fleet members in trust for the insurer.

The court granted partial summary judgment regarding the first insurance contract (RSA Contract), finding a statutory trust arose under section 402 of the Insurance Act because the defendant acted as an agent in negotiating the insurance and received premium monies.

The court declined to grant partial summary judgment regarding the second insurance contract (FA Contract) due to factual complexities, but ordered the defendant to pay the collected premiums into court.

The defendants brought an urgent motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) that the plaintiff had obtained without notice.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff failed to disclose a "No Registration" clause (NRC) in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) as a material fact.

The court found that the NRC was not material because the vendor had terminated the APS prior to the CPL motion.

Furthermore, the NRC did not explicitly prohibit CPL registration.

Applying the Dhunna factors, the court determined that justice favored maintaining the CPL, given the uniqueness of the land, the plaintiff's intent to reside there, and the inadequacy of damages as a remedy.

The defendants' motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a pre-trial conference, where the defendants agreed to pay $200,000.

The defendants argued the motion was premature, citing difficulties in refinancing their home to secure the funds.

The court found that a reasonable time for payment had passed, regardless of whether the payment was conditional on refinancing, as the defendants controlled the timing of the event.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The appellant, Mr. Lotey, appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to comply with documentary production obligations over a three-year period.

His law firm also sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to personally pay the costs of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Lotey's appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 30.08(2) given the deliberate and continuous failure to produce relevant documents.

The Court also denied the law firm leave to appeal the costs order, finding the firm was complicit in the flagrant disregard of the Rules and court orders.

The applicant, Maryam Rezaee, brought a motion for a mandatory injunction to restore her as manager of a hospitality business, alleging that a corporate restructuring which transferred control to her son, Raymond Zar, was unenforceable due to *non est factum* and constituted oppression.

She also sought alternative prohibitory injunctions.

The respondent, Raymond Zar, brought a cross-motion to remove an existing interim order preventing property encumbrance, arguing non-disclosure of independent legal advice during the *ex parte* application for that order.

The court dismissed Maryam's motion for both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, finding she did not meet the "strong prima facie case" standard for mandatory relief or the "irreparable harm" standard for either.

The court also dismissed Zar's cross-motion, thereby maintaining the interim order pending the resolution of the Certificates of Pending Litigation motion.

Following a summary judgment, the court determined the post-judgment interest rate and confirmed an agreed-upon costs award.

The plaintiff sought the contractual rate of 6% per annum on outstanding principal and unpaid interest.

The court ruled that the contractual rate of 6% applies to the outstanding principal, citing the Courts of Justice Act and Supreme Court precedent.

However, for unpaid interest, the court applied the lower CJA rate, as the promissory notes did not provide for compound interest.

Costs were settled by agreement at $60,000.00.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce promissory notes and personal guarantees arising from a share purchase transaction.

The defendants argued that an Inter-Creditor Agreement with a senior lender prevented the corporate debtor from making payments, and therefore the guarantors were also shielded from liability.

The court found that while the Inter-Creditor Agreement restricted the corporate debtor from repaying the principal amounts, it did not restrict the payment of monthly interest.

Furthermore, the court held that the guarantees operated independently of the Inter-Creditor Agreement, making the guarantors jointly and severally liable for the principal amounts and unpaid interest.

The plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

Consultants retained by multiple landowners to assist in obtaining government approval for urban development entered into a Cost Sharing Agreement providing for hourly fees and a bonus payment upon formal adoption of a Regional Official Plan Amendment.

One landowner purported to terminate the Agreement unilaterally in 2004.

The Regional Official Plan Amendment was adopted in 2009 with all appeals exhausted in 2015.

The consultants commenced an action for the bonus in 2015.

The respondents moved to dismiss on limitation grounds.

The motions judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the termination was ineffective because only collective termination was permitted and that the limitation period had not expired.

The Court of Appeal held that while individual termination was not permitted, the appellants had accepted the anticipatory repudiation through their conduct and inaction over 11 years, thereby accepting the termination and causing the limitation period to expire.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim to add new defendants and claims for unjust enrichment and conversion after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Master committed a palpable and overriding error.

The respondents failed to adduce any direct evidence to rebut the statutory presumption under section 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, that they knew of the matters underlying the proposed claims when the acts took place.

The appellants appealed from a Superior Court judgment that enforced a term of Minutes of Settlement between the parties arising from a failed business arrangement and law practice shared between siblings.

The appellants raised two issues: (1) that the application judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment, and (2) that the application judge erred in concluding that paragraph one of the Minutes of Settlement was a separate enforceable term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjournment was properly refused and that paragraph one was indeed a separate enforceable obligation independent of other disputed amounts between the parties.

The applicant landlord and respondent condominium corporation disputed the status of a lease for parking units after the original term expired.

The parties had signed a handwritten agreement to reduce rent and parking spaces, conditional on rezoning applications.

The court found the handwritten agreement unenforceable due to mutual breaches.

Consequently, the condominium corporation was found to be an overholding month-to-month tenant under the original lease and was ordered to pay rent arrears.

The court also held that the condominium's declaration and municipal by-laws did not compel the parties to maintain the lease in perpetuity.

The applicant's motion to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's Certificate of Assessment was deemed abandoned due to repeated non-compliance with court orders and failure to file materials.

The court declined a further adjournment request from the self-represented applicant and awarded costs of $10,000 plus disbursements of $880.48 to the respondent law firm on a partial indemnity basis.

This application sought a determination of contractual rights regarding an early termination provision in pre-construction condominium agreements.

The applicants argued that a 'sole, absolute and unfettered discretion' proviso in a financing condition rendered the entire condition null and void under the Tarion Addendum, leading to a breach of contract claim.

The court found that the proviso did not form part of the early termination condition or, if it did, it was inconsistent with the Addendum's requirement for commercially reasonable steps and was therefore unenforceable.

The court interpreted the condition to require vendors to take all commercially reasonable steps to arrange satisfactory financing, upholding the validity of the termination condition and dismissing the application.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Claim to add six new corporate and individual defendants (the "Proposed Defendants") and to advance claims for tracing remedies, unjust enrichment, and conversion.

The Proposed Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the new claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, asserting that the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge or ought to have discovered the claims earlier.

The court found that the Plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge until receiving a second forensic report and that their diligence in waiting for this report was reasonable, thereby raising triable issues of fact and credibility regarding discoverability.

The court also determined that granting the amendments would not cause actual, non-compensable prejudice to the Proposed Defendants.

Leave to amend was granted, with the Original Defendants permitted to plead limitations defences.