Michael Simaan

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim and to add defendants.

The parties agreed to argue two preliminary issues: whether to validate service of the original statement of claim, and whether the limitation period for certain claims was governed by the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA) or the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court validated service on all defendants except Sundeep Gupta, who had never been served.

The court found that the claims against the Schedule C and D companies sought constructive trusts and tracing of profits into land, and were thus governed by the 10-year limitation period under the RPLA.

The claims against the Schedule E company sought damages simpliciter and were governed by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The applicants, Mejo Varghese and Bincy Joseph, brought an application seeking the return of their $60,000 deposit after refusing to close on the purchase of a new home constructed by the respondent, Hogg Construction Ltd. The applicants alleged a material breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) due to a significant reduction in the living room size (approximately 3'6" shorter than planned), which they argued was not a "minor change" permitted by the contract.

The respondent contended the applicants misinterpreted the plans and that any changes were minor.

Applying the principle from Stefanovska v. Kok, the court found the reduction in the living room's length was objectively significant, affecting the property's use and enjoyment, and thus constituted a major change and a repudiation of the APS.

The applicants were not obligated to complete the transaction.

This is a costs decision following a trial of an issue in a construction lien action.

The Torgerson Defendants sought substantial indemnity costs from Bellsam Contracting Limited.

The court found the Torgerson Defendants' overall costs claim excessive and disproportionate, particularly given the limited scope of the trial of an issue.

While acknowledging the Torgerson Defendants' success and their beating an offer to settle, the court significantly reduced the claimed costs, fixing them at $287,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by Bellsam.

The decision also addressed the recoverability of eDiscovery specialist fees.

The applicant (Purchaser) sought the return of a $200,000 deposit paid for the purchase of a Volkswagen dealership's assets, arguing the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) was terminated due to the failure to obtain necessary approvals from the Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council (OMVIC) and Volkswagen Group Canada (VW Canada).

The respondent (Vendor) refused, asserting the Purchaser breached its contractual obligations to use "reasonable commercial efforts" and act "on a timely basis" to secure these approvals.

The court found that the Purchaser indeed breached the APA by delaying its OMVIC application, failing to provide required documentation, and intentionally not signing and returning VW Canada's Letter of Intent by the stipulated deadline.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the deposit was forfeited to the Vendor.

This endorsement addresses several requests to vary existing Mareva, Norwich, Anton Piller, and Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) orders.

The Gendelman Defendants sought funds for living and legal expenses, continued funding for real estate projects, the lifting of a CPL on a property for sale, directions on seized evidence, and the return of their passports.

The court granted limited interim funds for living and legal expenses, adjourned the CPL issue for further discussion, directed the establishment of a protocol for seized evidence, and ordered the return of the Gendelmans' passports, emphasizing the high threshold for infringing liberty by retaining passports.

The plaintiff, an elderly woman, brought a motion to extend an interim and interlocutory Mareva Injunction against multiple defendants, alleging over $1 million in payments for uncompleted home renovation work constituted fraud.

The Mareva Injunction had been previously ordered and extended, and a Norwich Order was made against TD Bank.

Defendant Rahimi cross-moved to lift the injunction, claiming a payment was for a Rolex sale, but his explanation was deemed unsatisfactory and his compliance with disclosure incomplete.

Defendant Alradhi sought access to funds for living and legal expenses.

The court dismissed Rahimi's motion to lift the injunction but allowed him $10,000 for preauthorized expenses.

Alradhi's request for $15,000 for expenses was granted.

The Mareva Injunction was continued against all defendants, and TD Bank was ordered to immediately comply with the Norwich Order.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to add claims against the corporate directors for unpaid wages under the OBCA and CBCA.

One of the directors opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to strike the existing ESA claims, arguing the claims were premature because the corporate employer had not yet been sued to judgment and execution returned unsatisfied.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend, finding the claims were not clearly untenable at law and could be tried together with the corporate claims.

The court dismissed the director's cross-motion to strike, finding it was brought too late and was an improper disguised summary judgment motion.

During a condominium dispute proceeding, the parties submitted documents containing sensitive personal medical information.

The Tribunal, with the agreement of the parties, issued a confidentiality order under Rule 21.5 of the Condominium Authority Tribunal Rules of Practice to protect these documents and the recording of a cross-examination session from public disclosure.

The appellants, Monica Murad, Aaron Murad, and 997322 Ontario Inc., sought to appeal a non-competition order issued by a motion judge during the receivership of Mill Street & Co. Inc. The motion judge had included the appellants in the order, despite their not being directly implicated in obstruction or fraudulent licensing, because the Murad companies operated as family businesses.

The Court of Appeal found no jurisdiction under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act as the right to compete is a present, not future, right.

Leave to appeal under s. 193(e) was denied because the issue of making a non-competition order against a non-party did not arise, as the appellants were considered "Murad Parties" and treated as parties throughout the receivership.

The appeal was quashed.

This case involved two consolidated actions arising from a failed joint real estate venture.

The plaintiff, 2270752 Ontario Inc., sued Baljit Dhaliwal for breach of trust for failing to return $600,000 advanced for the venture.

Concurrently, the plaintiff sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of Baljit Dhaliwal's matrimonial home to his wife, Arvinder Dhaliwal, alleging it was done to defeat creditors.

The court found Baljit Dhaliwal liable for breach of trust and ordered the return of the $600,000.

The court also found the transfer of the matrimonial home to be a fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, citing multiple "badges of fraud" and set it aside.

The actions against Century 21 New Star Realty Inc. and Arvinder Dhaliwal (for the breach of trust claim) were dismissed, as they were not involved in the breach of trust or vicariously liable.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendants to answer undertakings and refusals given during examinations in aid of execution, and to produce documents.

The court found that the plaintiff had established a sufficient connection between the individual defendants and various corporate entities and properties to justify the questions asked.

The court ordered the defendants to answer the outstanding questions, produce the requested documents, reattend examinations within 30 days, and pay costs for both the examinations and the motion.

This appeal concerned a failed condominium purchase where the central issue was the vendor's compliance with the Tarion Warranty Corporation Addendum, specifically regarding the delivery of an occupancy permit or confirmation of occupancy conditions.

The application judge found that no occupancy permit was required and that a letter from the builder was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding that the letter was *delivered* as required by the Addendum.

The evidence showed the letter was merely available for pick-up, not delivered.

The Court allowed the appeal, declared the vendor in breach of the agreement of purchase and sale, and ordered a reference to determine damages, along with costs to the appellants.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial and counsel attended trial scheduling court to fix a date.

The judge convened a case conference and determined that the action, commenced in 2014 regarding a construction dispute, was not ready for trial.

Interlocutory steps including undertakings, potential refusal motions, and expert reports were incomplete, and a companion action had sat dormant.

The judge struck the action from the trial list, directing counsel to return only when the matter is truly ready for trial.

The defendants brought a second motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiff against a residential property.

The defendants argued that new facts, including the plaintiff's rejection of a 'with prejudice' settlement offer and new evidence of financial hardship, justified the discharge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants were improperly attempting to relitigate issues already decided on the first discharge motion and appeal.

The court held that the new evidence did not meet the exceptional circumstances test to overcome res judicata, and the equitable factors continued to favour maintaining the CPL.

The third party moved to strike several paragraphs of the defendant's affidavit filed for a simplified procedure trial.

The moving party argued the paragraphs introduced evidence refused on discovery and relied on inadmissible hearsay.

The court struck two paragraphs: one that improperly adopted another witness's affidavit and one containing inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the remainder of the motion, finding the moving party was not prejudiced by the discovery refusal and that the other hearsay statements fell under the admissions exception.

The applicant landlord sought to terminate a commercial lease and obtain vacant possession due to the respondent tenant's non-payment of rent, failure to maintain insurance, and unauthorized residential use of the premises.

The tenant, who operated a martial arts studio, had been forced to close due to COVID-19 provincial orders and paid only 25% of the rent.

The court declined to grant the landlord's application, finding that the default was clearly related to the global pandemic and government-mandated shutdown.

The court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant the tenant relief from forfeiture, conditional upon the tenant providing proof of insurance and ceasing residential use within ten days.

The third party in an equipment rental dispute brought three preliminary motions before trial: to permanently stay the third party claim due to late disclosure of an alleged Mary Carter agreement, to permit calling an expert witness, and to permit cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness despite not defending the main action.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the agreed statement of facts was disclosed in a timely manner.

The court allowed the motions to call the expert witness and to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness, finding interference with the expert's retainer and relevance of the plaintiff's evidence to the third party's defence.

The appellants, four individuals who purchased a property, appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering them to pay $24,478.63 in real estate commissions to the respondent real estate agent and brokerage.

The appellants argued the Deputy Judge erred in finding an enforceable oral agreement and in applying the principles of unjust enrichment, as no Buyer Representation Agreement was signed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's factual inferences that the appellants deliberately cut the respondents out of the transaction to save on commission, thereby unjustly enriching themselves.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering them to pay $24,478.63 in real estate commissions to the respondents.

The appellants argued the Deputy Judge erred in finding an enforceable oral agreement and in applying the principles of unjust enrichment after they purchased a property using the seller's agent instead of the respondents.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's factual inferences or application of the law of unjust enrichment.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Ottawa to Toronto.

The plaintiff, a corporation providing electricity bill consultation services, commenced the action in Ottawa for unpaid invoices.

The defendants argued that none of the parties reside in Ottawa, the agreement was executed in Toronto, and the witnesses are in Toronto or the Greater Toronto Area.

The court found that the only connection to Ottawa was the plaintiff's solicitor's office.

The court granted the motion, holding that the defendants discharged their onus to demonstrate that a transfer to Toronto was reasonable and in the interests of justice.