Michael Simaan

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to re-attend cross-examination to answer refusals.

The court reviewed the refused questions in the context of the plaintiff's claims of unjust enrichment and piercing the corporate veil.

The court ordered the defendant to answer questions relating to his personal financial affairs, his financial relationship with the corporate defendant, and document retention, but declined to order answers to questions seeking legal conclusions or settlement positions.

As success was mixed, no costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution against the respondent.

The trial judge had applied the correct legal test from Miazga v. Kvello Estate, which requires proof of four elements: initiation of prosecution by the defendant, termination in the plaintiff's favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause, and malice.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the second, third, and fourth elements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the appellant failed to discharge his evidentiary burden on the balance of probabilities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Estate of Psarros brought an action against Lorraine Cook, the deceased's wife, concerning the disposition of their matrimonial home and the validity of a marriage contract.

Prior to their marriage, Psarros and Cook purchased a house as tenants in common.

Their marriage contract mistakenly stated they owned the house as joint tenants and included a release of Cook's claims under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

After Psarros died intestate, the Estate sought to sell its half-interest in the property to Cook, who initially agreed but later challenged the property's ownership structure and the validity of her SLRA release due to the contract's mistake.

The court found that the mistake in the marriage contract did not constitute an appropriate basis to set aside Cook's SLRA release under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, as she had not been under the impression she owned the entire house and the error did not extend to the SLRA release.

The court also determined that while the Estate was entitled to occupation rent, it was wholly offset by Cook's payment of the Estate's share of expenses.

The action was allowed, binding Cook to purchase the Estate's interest in the property based on the marriage contract's terms.

The plaintiffs moved for an interim order for the recovery of possession of personal property (software and hardware).

The defendants cross-moved for a stay of the action, alleging the plaintiffs were in default of corporate filing requirements under the Corporations Information Act and the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, finding the corporate filing default was inadvertent, corrected, and did not deceive the public, thus granting leave for the plaintiffs to proceed.

The court then granted the plaintiffs' motion for interim recovery of property, finding substantial grounds for the plaintiffs' ownership/entitlement, unlawful detention by the defendants, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

No security was required.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application for lack of jurisdiction under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal granted the reconsideration request because the applicant had not been given a proper opportunity to respond to the respondent's submissions before the initial decision was made, amounting to a breach of natural justice.

However, upon reconsidering the matter with the applicant's submissions, the Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide proof that his concurrent civil action based on the same facts had been discontinued.

Consequently, the application remained barred by section 34(11) and was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution against the defendant, a home builder who had constructed the plaintiff's house.

Following a dispute over warranty repairs, the defendant initiated two private criminal charges against the plaintiff for mischief and criminal harassment, alleging the plaintiff made numerous baseless by-law complaints.

The criminal charges were ultimately stayed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the malicious prosecution action, finding the plaintiff failed to prove the criminal proceedings were terminated in his favour or that the defendant lacked reasonable and probable cause to initiate them.

The defendant's counterclaim was also dismissed due to his failure to attend the trial.

Following the dismissal of the applicant tenant's motion for an interlocutory injunction to halt site servicing work at a commercial plaza, the court determined the timing and quantum of costs.

The tenant argued costs should be reserved to the application judge, while the respondent landlord sought costs payable forthwith.

The court held that the injunction issues were distinct from the main application and ordered costs payable within 30 days pursuant to Rule 57.03.

Applying the principles of proportionality and fair and reasonable compensation, the court fixed the landlord's costs at $28,000.

The applicant tenant, operating a Popeyes restaurant, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent landlord from proceeding with site servicing and parking lot construction work related to a plaza expansion.

The tenant argued the work would breach a lease provision prohibiting construction that materially interferes with its business operations or access.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the tenant failed to establish irreparable harm, as any losses could be quantified and compensated monetarily.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the landlord, who had contractual obligations and faced significant delays if the work was halted.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Wises severed their lakefront property, gifting one lot with road access to the appellants and retaining a water-access only lot.

The respondent bank, holding a mortgage on the retained lot, applied for an easement of necessity over the appellants' lot.

The application judge granted the easement, finding water access impractical and relying on public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the test for an easement of necessity is strict necessity, not practical necessity.

Because water access existed at the time of the grant, the property was not inaccessible, defeating the claim for an easement regardless of inconvenience.

The plaintiff, FLS Transportation Services Inc., sought an interim injunction against former employees and their new employer, Charger Logistics Inc., to restrain them from working for a competitor, soliciting clients and employees, and misusing confidential information.

The court applied the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction (serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and also considered the "clean hands" doctrine.

The court found that FLS failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of restrictive covenants, breach of confidence, or fiduciary duty, largely due to FLS's own prior statements in other proceedings that the information was not confidential.

Furthermore, FLS failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The motion was dismissed, also noting that FLS's conduct in misrepresenting the court's order to a client constituted a failure to come to court with "clean hands."

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed her claims for wrongful dismissal and age discrimination, but awarded her 23 weeks' notice under a 1998 employment contract.

The appellant argued that a 2011 contract, though void for lack of consideration, successfully rescinded the 1998 contract, or alternatively, that the 1998 termination clause was ambiguous.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the 1998 contract remained valid and its termination clause was unambiguous.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the motion judge's $15,000 costs award to the respondent, varying it to no costs due to the mixed success of the parties.

The applicants sought a penalty for the respondent, who was previously found in contempt for multiple breaches of six court orders related to the disclosure of financial information for several franchise businesses.

The court found that the respondent deliberately and continuously flouted the orders to frustrate the applicants' ability to monitor the businesses, which ultimately lost all value.

The court sentenced the respondent to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling between 18 and 21 months less a day, and ordered him to pay substantial indemnity costs of $369,644.26.

The applicants brought motions for contempt against the respondents, specifically Fateh Singh Sidhu, for breaching eight court orders related to the disclosure of financial and operational information regarding several Popeye's franchises.

The court found that the orders were clear and unequivocal, and that Sidhu deliberately and willfully disobeyed them.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Sidhu was in civil contempt and adjourned the matter for a penalty hearing.

The appellants appealed an order striking their defence for failing to file material as directed by a previous court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellants provided no evidence to explain their failure to satisfy undertakings, did not appear on the return date for a contempt motion, and had a history of dilatory and obstructionist conduct.

The motion judge's discretionary order was entitled to deference and no clear error was found.

Following a trial, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $217,368.13 against all defendants on a joint and several basis.

The parties had previously agreed that $70,000 was a reasonable amount for partial indemnity costs.

The court found that the conduct of the participating defendant did not justify an award of full indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs in the agreed amount of $70,000, payable jointly and severally by all defendants.

Following partial judgment in an application concerning whether an easement of necessity existed to access landlocked property, the court addressed costs.

The court had previously determined that an easement of necessity existed over one parcel of land, leaving the precise route of the easement to be determined at trial if the parties could not agree.

The applicant achieved substantial success on the central issue of the existence of the easement.

However, one corporate respondent was entirely successful because no easement was granted over its property.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicant against certain respondents while also awarding costs to the successful corporate respondent against the applicant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for wrongful dismissal and age discrimination following termination after 16 years of employment.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and exercised its enhanced powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and the evidence supported the employer’s position that the termination resulted from a prolonged work shortage and financial decline leading to redundancy of the role.

The court also held that the 1998 employment contract remained valid and enforceable despite an invalid 2011 contract.

The motion was dismissed and the termination clause in the 1998 agreement governed the notice entitlement.

The respondent sought to enforce a settlement agreement against the appellants, Glen Grove and Spendthrift, who were not signatories to the agreement but were related to the signatory corporation, 129.

The trial judge found the appellants liable based on a 'privity principle' and common control.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld Glen Grove's liability, finding that 129 acted as its agent in negotiating the settlement and offering security.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Spendthrift, finding insufficient evidence to bind it to the settlement.

The plaintiff creditor sought a declaration that a mortgage registered in favour of a third party constituted a fraudulent conveyance under s. 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The mortgage had been granted after the plaintiff had commenced legal proceedings and purportedly secured an alleged pre‑existing debt.

The court found the underlying debt was statute‑barred under the applicable limitation periods and therefore did not constitute valid consideration for the promissory note or mortgage.

The surrounding circumstances, including the timing of the security and the relationship between the parties, constituted badges of fraud.

The mortgage was declared void as against the plaintiff.

The applicant bank, holding a mortgage on a landlocked property, applied for a declaration of an easement of necessity over an adjoining property previously severed by the original owner.

The respondents argued that the landlocked property had water access, which should defeat the claim for an easement of necessity.

The court found that the water access was impractical due to a steep slope, satisfying the modern test of practical necessity.

The court declared an easement of necessity over the adjoining land and directed a trial to determine its precise location.