Michael N. Varpio

The appellant moved under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to correct a previous order of the Divisional Court, arguing the court erred in finding that the Landlord and Tenant Board was not required to produce and pay for transcripts of the hearing below.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 59.06 is intended for correcting accidental errors or omissions, not for re-arguing a decided issue or appealing a decision.

The appellant was granted a final extension to re-perfect her appeal by filing proof that she had ordered the transcripts.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding him to be a tenant and ordering him to pay $25,000 in rent arrears.

The appellant argued he had an agreement to purchase the home and that part of his monthly payments were towards the purchase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations were factual and not subject to appeal, which is limited to questions of law.

The court upheld the Board's finding that without proof of a finalized purchase agreement, the entire monthly payment was rent.

The appellant was ordered to vacate the premises within seven days.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating her tenancy under section 93 of the Residential Tenancies Act following the termination of her employment as a superintendent.

The tenant argued she was denied natural justice and that the Board erred in law by finding an employment relationship and failing to consider section 83(3) of the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, that the Board sufficiently considered the statutory provisions, and that the finding of an employment relationship was a question of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of her application for social assistance under the Ontario Works Act, 1997.

The appellant's spousal support payments were being garnished 100% by the Family Responsibility Office to repay an overpayment of child support.

The Administrator determined that the garnished spousal support payments constituted income because they were made on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant to reduce her debt.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's interpretation of the clear and unambiguous statutory provisions to be reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, Brian Hamm, sought an order preventing the respondent, Gordon R. Baker, a lawyer, from disclosing the contents of a legal file to an intervenor in an ongoing litigation.

Hamm claimed that he and Baker were in a solicitor-client relationship, or a 'near client' relationship, and that Baker owed him a duty of confidentiality.

The court applied the Jeffers indicia to determine if a reasonable person would conclude a solicitor-client relationship existed.

The court found that Baker acted solely as corporate counsel for Northern Superior Industries Ltd. and for another investor, and that Hamm understood Baker was not representing his personal interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was expelled from a private career college for alleged theft.

After an internal appeal was denied, she filed a complaint with the Superintendent of Private Career Colleges.

The Superintendent's delegate investigated and found no contravention of the Private Career Colleges Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of this finding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Superintendent's review of a student complaint is a discretionary administrative determination, not a statutory power of decision.

Applying the factors from Setia and Air Canada, the court concluded the matter lacked sufficient public character to be subject to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) that adjourned an appeal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act pending the outcome of a related grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature.

The court held that the OLRB's decision was an interlocutory adjournment and did not constitute a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interim administrative decision.

The appellant, a physiotherapist, appealed a finding of professional misconduct and penalty imposed by the College's Discipline Committee after she failed to appear for a caution and subsequent disciplinary hearings.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant waived her procedural rights by intentionally failing to attend the hearings, and that her specific allegations of procedural unfairness, bias, and improper evidence consideration lacked merit.

The finding of professional misconduct and the penalty were deemed reasonable.

The parties brought competing motions to change a final order regarding custody and access of two children following the mother's relocation to Garden River.

The grandparents sought defined access, a police enforcement clause, access to official records, and an assessment of the children.

The mother and father consented to changing the father's access from supervised to unsupervised.

The court granted the grandparents defined monthly and holiday access with a police enforcement clause due to the high conflict between the parties, but dismissed their requests for official records and an assessment.

The father was granted unsupervised access on reasonable terms to be agreed upon with the mother.

During a jury trial for attempted murder, the trial judge ruled on two issues regarding jury instructions.

First, the judge held that the Crown's cross-examination of the accused regarding his failure to mention self-defence to police violated his right to silence.

The judge instructed the jury to disregard that portion of the cross-examination.

Second, the judge ruled that because the indictment for attempted murder was drafted simpliciter, there were no lesser and included offences to leave with the jury.

The accused, Torcaso and Maione, were found guilty by a jury of offences stemming from a "home invasion" break and enter and assault.

Torcaso broke down the door and assaulted the victim, Mr. Gridzak, causing minor injuries.

Maione entered subsequently, was seen with a knife, and backed another individual into the kitchen, though he later attempted to calm the situation.

The Crown sought custodial sentences of 6-9 months for Torcaso and 4-6 months for Maione.

The defence sought suspended sentences.

The court found the incident constituted a "home invasion" under s. 348.1 of the Criminal Code, an aggravating factor, but distinguished it from "surprise" home invasions that typically attract penitentiary terms, noting the victims were aware someone was coming.

Balancing rehabilitation for youthful offenders with general deterrence and denunciation, the court imposed custodial sentences.

Torcaso was sentenced to six months in jail followed by 2 years probation, plus DNA and s. 109 orders.

Maione was sentenced to 60 days in jail, to be served intermittently, followed by 24 months probation, plus DNA and s. 109 orders.

The accused, Johnathan Townsend, brought an application under section 8 of the Charter to exclude computer evidence, specifically Skype chat logs and internet searches, in his first-degree murder trial.

The court found that the police search of the computer breached Townsend's Charter rights due to insufficient judicial authorization regarding the scope and timing of the data analysis.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded, citing the technical nature of the breach, the good faith of the police, the principled search methodology, and the overwhelming societal interest in the highly probative and essential evidence for the first-degree murder prosecution.

Following a guilty verdict, the trial judge opened a letter purportedly from a juror.

An inquiry was held where the juror denied writing the letter.

The defence subsequently applied for a mistrial or a stay of proceedings based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, arguing that the juror's subsequent contact with the Crown tainted the process.

The trial judge dismissed the applications, finding that he was functus officio under the rule in R. v. Burke, which dictates that only an appellate court has jurisdiction to order a new trial for alleged juror bias requiring reconsideration of the verdict.

The judge also held that the Burke rule does not violate section 7 of the Charter and declined to continue the inquiry due to jury secrecy concerns.

This motion concerned arrangements for the child Karmyn's First Communion.

The Mother (applicant for the motion) sought to organize the event in Windsor, while the Father (respondent for the motion) insisted on his regular access schedule, which conflicted with the proposed dates, and suggested a second communion in Sault Ste.

Marie.

The court prioritized the child's wish for both families to be together for the event.

The court ordered the First Communion to take place in Windsor on May 20, 2017, allowing both parents and their families to attend.

Specific access times were ordered for both parents around this event, and additional access was granted to the Mother on May 27, 2017, in Sault Ste.

Marie, in light of the recent passing of her father.

The court emphasized the need for parental flexibility and cooperation in the child's best interests, particularly during significant religious observances and family bereavements.

During a trial for break and enter and assault, the court ruled on whether certain defences could be left with the jury.

The court permitted the third-party suspect defence for one accused, finding sufficient evidence connecting another individual to the crime.

However, the court refused to leave the defences of self-defence and duress for the co-accused, concluding there was no air of reality to the claim that he drew a knife from the victim's kitchen in response to a threat.

The Crown brought a motion for a finding that the accused's video statement to police was voluntary and admissible.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind, inducements/trickery related to his parents, and the cumulative effect of these factors.

The court found the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that police conduct did not amount to trickery or inducement, and the accused possessed an operating mind, demonstrating nuanced decision-making despite his Asperger's condition and recent psychiatric care.

The statement was deemed admissible for the upcoming trial.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they had oppressed the respondent shareholder in a closely-held family corporation and ordering them to purchase her shares for $4.25 million.

The appellants argued the application judge erred by not directing a trial, by finding oppression despite the respondent's alleged misconduct in a related family dispute, and by improperly mixing and matching expert valuation evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial was unnecessary under the Hryniak principles, that the alleged family misconduct was irrelevant to the corporate duties owed, and that the application judge properly chose between competing expert methodologies to determine fair value.

The appellant telecommunications carriers appealed an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) order approving an increase in the pole attachment rate charged by Hydro Ottawa.

The appellants argued the OEB breached procedural fairness and fettered its discretion by applying a 2005 methodology that the OEB acknowledged required review, and by refusing to hear evidence on a new methodology during the Hydro Ottawa hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OEB reasonably deferred the methodology issue to an ongoing province-wide policy review.

The Court held that the OEB, as master of its own procedure, afforded appropriate procedural fairness and its decisions regarding the rate adjustment and the final nature of the order were reasonable.

The applicant father brought a motion to terminate child support for his 20-year-old son, arguing the son was old enough to provide for himself and that they had no relationship.

The respondent mother opposed and sought an increase in support and payment of arrears.

The court found the son remained a child of the marriage as he was pursuing post-secondary education, and ordered the father to continue paying table support until at least April 2018.

The court also ordered the father to pay $3,580.32 in child support arrears, but dismissed the claim for section 7 expenses, finding the son could fund his own education through RESPs, OSAP, and part-time work.

The applicant, charged with drug offences in two separate cases, applied for the release of seized funds to pay for his legal defence under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded he was denied legal aid, had no other means, and owned the seized funds, but argued the cases were not complex enough to warrant two lawyers at private rates.

The court found the second case, involving multiple confidential informants, was sufficiently complex to justify two lawyers (a senior and a junior) and approved the requested hourly rates of $400 and $200.

The court ordered the release of $250,000 from the seized funds to cover legal expenses for both cases.