Michael N. Varpio

Following a three-and-a-half-week jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was awarded $36,000 in damages.

As this amount was less than the vanishing deductible, the action was dismissed.

The defendant sought costs of $211,234.92, having beaten a pre-trial offer to settle.

The court reduced the costs award to $150,000, noting that the defendant's late production of documents and lengthy cross-examination unnecessarily extended the trial by one-and-a-half weeks.

The plaintiff was granted 12 months to pay the costs award.

The accused was charged with drug and weapons offences and brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was approximately 36 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown conceded the case was not particularly complex, and the court found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The defendant in a personal injury case brought a motion seeking to admit two expert reports and allow two experts to testify.

The plaintiff had previously filed a complaint against the first expert (Dr. Marks) with the College of Physicians and Surgeons, leading the defendant to retain a second expert (Dr. Ford).

The court denied the defendant's request to file Dr. Marks' report and Dr. Ford's report, citing concerns about fairness and the potential for repetitive expert evidence.

However, the court permitted Dr. Marks to testify viva voce, but limited his evidence to observations and testing results, excluding medico-legal opinions.

Dr. Ford was also permitted to testify viva voce, but without reference to Dr. Marks' opinions.

Costs for the motion were reserved to the end of the trial.

The offender was found guilty of sexually abusing his young sister-in-law over several decades, involving sexual touching and digital penetration, while in a position of trust and authority.

The court considered aggravating factors including the offender's position of trust, the victim's extreme vulnerability, the considerable age difference, the duration (nine years) and frequency of the acts, and the serious impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, remarriage, and virtually no criminal record, though his health issues were not deemed exceptionally poor to impede incarceration.

The offender showed no remorse or insight into his conduct.

The court rejected both the Crown's (two years) and defence's (four months) sentencing recommendations as falling outside the acceptable range for such offences, emphasizing that denunciation and general deterrence must be paramount.

A five-year custodial sentence was imposed, along with a 10-year firearms ban, an order to provide a DNA sample, and a lifetime SOIRA order.

The applicant sought summary judgment for $500,000 from the deceased husband's estate, representing a life insurance policy he was contractually obligated to maintain for her benefit under a separation agreement but failed to obtain.

The respondent estate argued the clause was merely security for spousal support and subject to the Succession Law Reform Act clawback.

The court found the life insurance clause to be a "stand-alone" obligation, not solely security for support, and granted summary judgment for the applicant for the $500,000.

The issue of retroactive cost of living adjustments was reserved for further submissions.

The court issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

Noting the history of the appeal and finding the respondent's bill of costs to be reasonable, the court ordered the appellant to pay costs of $7,650.00, inclusive of all disbursements, to the respondent's counsel within thirty days.

The applicants brought an application to set aside a 2011 will made by their brother/uncle, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease.

The application was converted into an action, and the issue on this motion was who should be appointed as the incapable person's litigation guardian.

The applicant nephew sought to be appointed, offering to abandon his claim in the action.

The respondent opposed the appointment, arguing the nephew had a conflict of interest because his father stood to benefit if the will was set aside.

The court agreed, finding that the nephew could instruct counsel in a way that unfairly prejudiced the respondent, and dismissed the request to appoint the nephew as litigation guardian.

This motion concerned a dispute over a child's custody and access arrangement.

The Mother unilaterally withheld the 11-year-old son from the Father, citing the child's emotional distress and stated preference not to reside with the Father.

The Father sought compliance with the existing week-about order or custody, alleging parental alienation.

The Mother sought a suspension of the week-about access.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's significant anxiety and emotional trauma regarding the existing arrangement.

While acknowledging the Father's concerns about parental alienation, the court found insufficient direct evidence to prove it.

The court temporarily suspended the week-about arrangement, ordering the child to reside full-time with the Mother and granting the Father supervised access.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was encouraged to become involved.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance.

The applicant argued that his new ability to secure GPS electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring does not address the tertiary ground for detention and merely monitors rather than prevents non-compliance, thus failing to meet the test for a material change in circumstances under R. v. St. Cloud.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, forcible confinement, sexual touching, and uttering threats against a 14-year-old complainant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the complainant's testimony, which could not be solely attributed to her youth or the traumatic nature of the alleged events.

The accused's testimony also had flaws.

Due to considerable doubt regarding the events, the accused was found not guilty of all charges.

The Applicant sought to change an order regarding the sale of the matrimonial home to allow his girlfriend, a real estate agent, to co-list the property, citing concerns about the asking price.

The Respondent sought sole authority to instruct the real estate agent.

The Applicant also moved to sell artwork via auction and household contents via garage sale to declutter and generate funds.

The court granted the Respondent sole authority for the matrimonial home sale, finding the Applicant uncooperative and his valuation concerns unsubstantiated.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion to sell artwork and contents, ruling it lacked authority under s. 9 of the Family Law Act without an existing equalization order.

No costs were awarded, as both parties were found to have behaved unreasonably.

The applicants, a registered political party, contracted to place political advertisements in municipal bus shelters.

The city removed the advertisements on the basis that they discriminated against the transgendered community, without providing the applicants an opportunity to be heard or considering their freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court quashed the city's decision and a subsequent ratifying motion, finding that the city breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to balance the competing Charter rights and by denying the applicants natural justice.

This is an appeal of an order made by Kwolek J. of the Ontario Court of Justice, which stayed a costs order under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The original costs order was issued by Kukurin J., who had presided over the trial and remained seized of the costs proceedings.

The Superior Court of Justice found that Kwolek J. lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to stay the costs order because Kukurin J. was still seized of the matter.

Consequently, Kwolek J.'s order was quashed.

The Crown brought a similar fact application to admit evidence from two complainants (the accused's daughter and sister-in-law) to prove the actus reus and bolster credibility.

The court conducted a two-stage inquiry regarding collusion.

Despite the complainants' belief that they did not know details of each other's complaints, the close family relations and inconsistencies in disclosure details led the court to conclude that the Crown failed to satisfy its burden that the evidence was untainted by collusion.

Consequently, the application was dismissed without needing to balance probative value and prejudicial effect.

The applicant, a former Senior Vice-President of OLG, sought declarations that OLG breached a retirement contract by failing to pay him additional compensation.

The contract stipulated pre-retirement obligations, including identifying and training a successor and transferring the Compliance department.

The court found that OLG's actions, specifically delaying the approval of a successor and preventing the transfer of the Compliance department, thwarted the applicant's ability to fulfill his contractual duties.

The court determined that the contract did not impose an "all or nothing" condition for payment and that OLG induced the applicant's breach of the terms.

Therefore, the application was granted, and the applicant is to be paid as though he fulfilled all contractual terms.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding her claim for attendant care benefits was statute-barred.

Following a 2005 motor vehicle accident, the insurer denied her claim for attendant care benefits without requiring a Form 1 assessment.

The appellant did not dispute the denial until 2015, after her condition deteriorated and she was deemed catastrophically impaired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator reasonably concluded the 2005 denial was clear and unequivocal, thereby triggering the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Veterinarians, which revoked his license to practice veterinary medicine and ordered him to pay costs of $160,000 for unprofessional conduct.

The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, including missing transcripts, failure to disclose documents held by a third party, and alleged bias of an expert witness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee's decision reasonable and noting that the appellant failed to bring a proper motion for third-party disclosure and consented to the expert's qualification.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding it liable for wrongful dismissal and awarding the respondent employee damages.

The employee, a casino dealer, suffered a permanent workplace injury and was placed on modified duties for two years before being terminated for frustration of contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employment relationship was not restricted to the dealer position and that the employer failed to prove frustration of contract.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his request to reduce his child support obligations to zero.

The father argued he had quit his jobs due to mental illness and was now receiving ODSP.

The Divisional Court dismissed the father's motion to adduce fresh evidence from a psychiatrist, finding it would not have affected the result given the motion judge's factual findings that the father had voluntarily and strategically quit his jobs.

The Court upheld the motion judge's decision to impute income, finding no basis to interfere with the conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances.

The appellant appealed a trial costs decision ordering him and a co-defendant to pay $35,177.74 in costs after being found liable for $10,000 in damages for defaming the respondent seniors' facility.

The appellant argued he was a successful whistleblower and relied on the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act to claim substantial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretionary costs award and noting that the anti-SLAPP provisions did not apply to a costs decision after a trial where the plaintiff succeeded.