McWatt

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued the changes violated sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter and relied on a recent coordinate court decision that found the repeal of peremptory challenges unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding the coordinate decision was plainly wrong and therefore not binding.

The court held that the amendments are constitutional and operate retrospectively.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after his pregnant wife drowned in a bathtub.

Because the jury's route to the verdict was ambiguous, the court was required to make findings of fact for sentencing.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused surreptitiously administered lorazepam to his wife to incapacitate her, allowing him to pursue an extramarital affair and access pornography.

The court rejected the defence theory that the victim knowingly took the drug, concluding the accused's actions directly contributed to her incapacitation and death.

At the close of the Crown's case in a first degree murder trial, the accused brought applications for a directed verdict.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone records, and motive, to establish that the accused planned and carried out the shooting.

Applying the test from Arcuri, the court found that the Crown's evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

The applications for a directed verdict were dismissed.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

However, the accused had left Canada for over 10 months before being arrested.

The court held that the pre-arrest period did not engage s. 11(b) interests as the accused was unaware of the charges, or alternatively, it constituted a discrete event exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness due to defence delay, including allowing his Legal Aid certificate to lapse.

The application was dismissed.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict trial over the custody of their three-year-old son.

The mother sought sole custody, while the father sought the same, alleging the mother was manipulative, alienated the children from their fathers, and fabricated criminal assault charges against him.

The court found the mother lacked credibility, repeatedly breached court orders, and acted contrary to the child's best interests.

Relying on evidence from the mother's own family members and the father of her older child, including surreptitiously recorded conversations, the court awarded sole custody to the father and granted the mother specified access.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought to challenge the constitutionality of s. 674 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated her Charter rights by barring an appeal of a dismissed directed verdict application after her first trial ended in a mistrial.

However, prior to the hearing of the constitutional application, the Crown withdrew all charges against the applicant.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a freestanding Charter challenge once the underlying criminal charges had been withdrawn.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 8 and 24(2) to quash a search telewarrant and exclude evidence seized from his residence.

The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

After applying the Step Six procedure from Garafoli to review redacted portions of the Information to Obtain, the court assessed the informant's tips based on their compelling nature, credibility, and police corroboration.

The court found the information sufficient to justify the warrant.

The court also dismissed the applicant's argument that the police improperly used a telewarrant, finding that personal attendance before a justice was impracticable under the circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, and the judge erred in finding his version of events did not afford a defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement were logical and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in the swarming.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that his statement to police and the officer's observations of the smell of alcohol were inadmissible under section 7 of the Charter, as he was statutorily compelled to report the accident under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's observations were not conscriptive evidence and that the appellant failed to establish an honest and reasonably held belief that he was required by law to make the statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting 18-month sentence.

The Crown's case at trial relied entirely on circumstantial forensic evidence, including the presence of the appellant's DNA on the complainant's underwear.

The appeal court found the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, as he drew impermissible inferences not supported by the evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining his credibility findings and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions on sexual interference charges involving two children at his parent's home day care.

The appeal court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence of both complainants and the appellant.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to properly consider one child's adoption of prior inconsistent statements to police, overlooked evidence relevant to the other child's credibility, and mischaracterized the appellant's testimony without basis.

The appeal was allowed, with acquittals entered for the charges relating to one complainant and a new trial ordered for the charges relating to the other.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, inadequately explained credibility findings, placed too much emphasis on the complainant's demeanor, and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The offender pleaded guilty to historical offences of break and enter and sexual assault with a weapon committed in 1998, after being linked by DNA evidence in 2013.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four years, characterizing the offence as a home invasion, while the defence sought a non-custodial or conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's significant Gladue factors, his extensive rehabilitation efforts over the past five years, and the profound impact on the victim.

The court distinguished the case from typical home invasions and sentenced the offender to two years less a day in custody followed by three years of probation.

The father brought a motion to change a final consent order, seeking equal time-sharing, parallel parenting, and decision-making authority over the children's education and health.

He alleged the mother failed to consult with him and that his employment changes constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no material change in circumstances.

The court noted the high level of conflict between the parents and held that joint custody or parallel parenting would not be in the children's best interests.

The mother's proposal to slightly increase the father's parenting time was incorporated into the final order.

The applicant sought child support, spousal support, and a declaration of unjust enrichment regarding a property purchased by the respondent.

The court imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes, finding he unreasonably deducted business expenses from his employment income.

The court awarded the applicant spousal support of $200 per month for 24 months due to her financial dependence and child care obligations.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's unjust enrichment claim, finding no intention between the parties to co-own the property and concluding the funds advanced were for living expenses and debt repayment.

The offender pleaded guilty to recklessly discharging a firearm, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, and possessing an over-capacity magazine after firing shots in a residential complex.

He brought a Charter challenge arguing the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the sentence was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the risk to the public.

The offender was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of five years, reduced to two years net after credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and in finding that the roadside screening demand was made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also held that the 13-minute delay for the arrival of the screening device was reasonable, and even if a section 10(b) Charter breach occurred, the breath sample evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2).