Andrea MacGillivray

The defendant, charged with attempted murder and administering a noxious substance after allegedly injecting her mother, her daughter, and herself with insulin, brought an application to admit evidence of an alternate suspect.

She sought to introduce evidence suggesting her estranged husband committed the crimes.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked a sufficient connection to the crime and was largely speculative or reliant on inadmissible hearsay.

The accused brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code, which eliminated peremptory challenges and replaced lay triers with the trial judge for challenges for cause.

The accused argued these changes violated his rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the amendments did not infringe the accused's right to an independent and impartial jury, nor did they violate principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that the amendments were procedural in nature and applied retrospectively to the accused's trial.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The central issue was whether the 29-month period between the swearing of the Information and the accused's arrest should be attributed to the Crown.

The court found that the police took reasonable and diligent steps to locate the accused, characterizing the pre-arrest delay as an exceptional circumstance and discrete event.

After subtracting this period, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant sought to challenge the constitutionality of s. 674 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated her Charter rights by barring an appeal of a dismissed directed verdict application after her first trial ended in a mistrial.

However, prior to the hearing of the constitutional application, the Crown withdrew all charges against the applicant.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a freestanding Charter challenge once the underlying criminal charges had been withdrawn.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and deciding issues reserved for the trier of fact.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge improperly engaged in a piecemeal analysis of circumstantial evidence, specifically video surveillance showing the respondent allegedly retrieving and passing a firearm to the co-accused shortly before the murder.

The court quashed the discharge and ordered mandamus directing the preliminary inquiry judge to order the respondent to stand trial.

The accused was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from non‑consensual intercourse following an initial period of consensual sexual activity.

The court assessed aggravating factors including anal intercourse, the accused continuing despite the complainant’s repeated objections, and significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating considerations included the absence of gratuitous violence and the offender’s personal circumstances.

The court held that the appropriate sentencing range for sexual assault involving intercourse without additional violence is generally two to four years’ imprisonment.

A custodial sentence of three years was imposed together with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration, and a no‑contact order.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault, the accused applied for a mistrial based on alleged inconsistencies between the complainant’s trial testimony and her victim impact statement, arguing the differences supported an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court first considered whether it had jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict and the discharge of the jury.

Relying on appellate authority, the court held that a trial judge is generally functus after a jury verdict and may only intervene in very narrow circumstances, such as where the jury did not deliver the verdict it intended or where the defence of entrapment arises.

Neither exception applied.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial and dismissed the application.

Sentencing decision following convictions for numerous fraud‑related offences including theft over $5000, possession of property obtained by crime, extortion, intimidation, possession of devices for forging credit cards, fraudulent possession and use of credit card data, and forgery.

Police discovered sophisticated equipment used to manufacture fraudulent credit cards and identification, as well as extensive stolen credit card data.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving similar offences and prior custodial sentences, including a sentence in the United States.

The court emphasized the seriousness of organized credit card fraud and the importance of deterrence, while acknowledging limited prospects for rehabilitation.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at a storage locker and his residence.

Police searching for stolen property discovered equipment used to manufacture fraudulent credit cards and seized it under s. 489(1) of the Criminal Code and the common law plain view doctrine.

The court held that large machines and items visible in an open drawer were lawfully seized because they gave rise to reasonable grounds to believe an offence had occurred.

However, the police exceeded their authority by searching closed drawers and cupboards without obtaining a further warrant, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) test from Grant, the court concluded the breach was at the lower end of seriousness and the real evidence should not be excluded.