Matthew Gourlay

The appellants were arrested in an undercover drug trafficking operation and experienced a delay of nearly two and a half years before trial.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which was dismissed by the application judge.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in allocating periods of delay and failing to penalize the Crown for tactical decisions.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the delay calculations but found the total delay still fell within the Morin guidelines.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings that prevented a fourth trial of the respondent for first degree murder.

The respondent's first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and his second and third trials ended in hung juries.

At the second and third trials, the judge excluded evidence that a 911 call containing details known only to the killer had been traced to a payphone near the respondent's workplace.

The Court of Appeal held that the 911-trace evidence should have been admitted under the principled approach to hearsay, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

Because the Crown was denied a full opportunity to present its case due to the erroneous exclusion of this highly probative evidence, the Court found that a fourth trial would not constitute an abuse of process.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing that the warrantless search of his vehicle's trunk violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police stopped the vehicle, and after the driver failed a roadside screening test, the vehicle was to be towed.

The appellant's nervous demeanor and dissociation from the vehicle led police to search the trunk, where they found a handgun.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 8 breach but applied the Grant framework, concluding that the firearm was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the officers' good faith, the reduced expectation of privacy in an impounded vehicle, and society's interest in adjudicating serious gun offences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference but acquitted of invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault in relation to a single incident with a young complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supportable based on the trial judge's instructions, which directed the jury to consider each charge separately and distinguished between the 'touch' requirement for sexual interference and the 'force' requirement for sexual assault.

The appellant physician was found guilty of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse of young boys.

He appealed the Discipline Committee's decision, arguing that the summons power under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and that the College's delay in prosecuting the case amounted to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the summons power is constitutional in the regulatory context as it is properly constrained by relevance and privilege.

The Court also found that the delay was not inordinate given the concurrent criminal proceedings, and the appellant did not suffer significant prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for careless storage of a firearm and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the marked departure standard of care.

The sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in treating rehabilitative prospects as a neutral factor and failed to explain why consecutive sentences were justified.

The sentence was varied to time served and the prohibition order was reduced to two years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and choking to assist in the commission of an indictable offence.

He argued the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and erred in drawing an adverse inference regarding the late disclosure of an extortion letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence, sufficiently explained her credibility findings, and had already concluded the appellant was not believable before addressing the extortion letter.

The appellant brought a motion to re-open his previously dismissed appeal against a robbery conviction.

The motion was based on the Crown's failure to disclose a partially vetted jury panel list at trial.

The Court of Appeal expressed doubt about its jurisdiction to re-open an appeal already decided on the merits.

Regardless, the court found no miscarriage of justice, as the non-disclosure did not impact the jury's impartiality or prejudice the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The motion was denied.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his wife.

At trial, a police officer gave lay opinion evidence that a mark on the appellant's finger was a bite mark, corroborating the complainant's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from a forensic dentist concluding the mark was not a bite mark.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the due diligence criterion was not met, the fresh evidence was sufficiently cogent that it could reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment and the ultimate verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of two complainants as similar fact evidence due to potential collusion.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge thoroughly and correctly addressed the possibility of collusion, both as deliberate concoction and as the potential impact of their discussions on the independence of their evidence.

The trial judge's finding that the evidence was not the product of concoction was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting the case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus probation imposed on the respondent for serious offences committed while in a position of trust.

The sentencing judge recognized that the primary sentencing goals were denunciation and general deterrence, and that the usual range was a penitentiary term in the mid to upper single digits, but identified particular circumstances justifying the lower sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or improper weighing of factors and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds.

The applicant's appeal grounds relate to the trial judge's refusal to order disclosure of police investigations into two key police witnesses, one of whom was subsequently charged with perjury.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding sufficient merit in the appeal grounds to temporarily suspend enforcement of the sentence, and ordered the appeal to be case managed for expeditious resolution.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence after pleading guilty to assault causing bodily harm, assault, and three counts of breaching release orders.

He argued his guilty pleas were invalid because they were coerced and uninformed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial record and fresh evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence at the expense of rehabilitation.

The sentence was varied to time served (nine months) followed by two years of probation.