Matthew Adam Brownlee Horner

The appellant appealed a preliminary decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, which held that it lacked jurisdiction to declare a provision of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act constitutionally invalid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 6(3) of the Act explicitly removes the Board's jurisdiction to inquire into or decide the constitutional validity of an Act or regulation.

However, the Court clarified that the Board retains jurisdiction to consider whether the application of the statutory regime or the respondent's policies infringe the appellant's Charter rights.

The applicant alleged that sections 13(4) and (5) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, which restrict benefits for mental stress, discriminate on the basis of disability.

The Attorney General for Ontario and the respondent requested that the application be deferred pending the resolution of a more advanced, similar challenge before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT).

The applicant did not oppose the deferral, though intervenors did.

The Tribunal exercised its discretion to defer the application to avoid duplicative litigation and the risk of inconsistent decisions, noting the WSIAT case was much more fully developed.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Ministry of the Environment decision approving an increase in sulphur production at a Suncor refinery, arguing the failure to conduct a cumulative effects assessment violated their Charter rights.

The respondents brought motions to strike the application as a collateral attack on prior approvals and to strike much of the applicants' affidavit evidence.

The applicants brought a cross-motion for a protective costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike the application, finding it was not plain and obvious it would fail.

The court allowed the motion to strike evidence in part, striking improper expert opinion and unattributed hearsay, but leaving relevance determinations to the hearing panel.

The motion for a protective costs order was dismissed, as the applicants had pro bono representation and the narrow administrative issue did not meet the exceptional public importance threshold.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought leave to intervene in an application challenging the validity of certain sections of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal granted the intervention request.

The Tribunal also requested written submissions from all parties on the Attorney General's request to defer the application pending a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal.

The applicant, who has a visual disability, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in services by the Attorney General.

He claimed he was forced into a court hearing and denied state-funded legal representation, arguing that the definition of disability in the Rules of Civil Procedure is discriminatory.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal concluded that opposing counsel does not provide a service under the Code and that expanding the definition of disability in the Rules would not entitle the applicant to public funding for legal representation.

The respondent requested to defer the human rights application pending the outcome of the applicant's appeal before the Ontario Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) regarding coverage for out-of-province treatment.

The applicant consented to the deferral.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred, noting that the proceedings raised identical key issues and deferral would avoid adjudicative duplication.

The applicant alleged that the respondent's policy of not funding prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing for asymptomatic men constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and age.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

Relying on a previous decision that found the funding policy was based on medical efficacy rather than sex, and noting the lack of evidence linking the policy to age discrimination, the Tribunal dismissed the application.

The applicants sought disclosure of documents relating to the respondent's consideration of an expert report on infertility.

The respondent claimed public interest immunity over the documents, arguing they were generated during an ongoing policy development process.

The Tribunal found that the documents were arguably relevant but concluded it was premature to determine the public interest immunity claim.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to clarify its position on undue hardship and certain factual conclusions before the balancing of public interests could be properly assessed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the respondent's refusal to fund in vitro fertilization treatments.

The applicant requested an order to consolidate her application with four already consolidated applications proceeding as a Lead Case.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that adding a fifth case would complicate and lengthen the proceedings, and that the existing Lead Case already covered a range of biomedical conditions causing infertility.

The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions on whether to defer the application pending the outcome of the Lead Case.

The applicant, a foreign-trained physician, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care regarding the recognition of his specialist credentials.

The respondents sought to dismiss the application on preliminary grounds, arguing that the pre-2007 allegations were out of time and that the post-2007 allegations were barred by section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code due to a purported settlement of a defamation claim.

The Tribunal held that the pre-2007 allegations were untimely and did not form a 'series of incidents' with the post-2007 events.

However, the Tribunal found that section 34(11) did not bar the post-2007 allegations, as no civil proceeding had been commenced and the purported settlement did not clearly resolve the human rights claims.

The timely portions of the application were permitted to proceed.

The applicant, who suffers from chronic pain, alleged that the respondent discriminated against him on the basis of disability by refusing to fund the long-term use of Demerol under the Ontario Drug Benefit program.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's policy, which restricted Demerol funding due to safety concerns, did not differentiate on the basis of disability.

The exception made for one grandparented individual was based on date and previous entitlement, not disability.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant alleged that the Ontario Ministry of Health discriminated against him on the basis of sex by refusing to fund a prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening test for prostate cancer, while funding mammography screening for breast cancer in women.

The Tribunal accepted expert medical and epidemiological evidence demonstrating that, unlike mammography, PSA screening for asymptomatic men has not been shown to reduce mortality and carries significant risks of over-diagnosis and harmful treatment.

The Tribunal concluded that the funding distinction is based on the medical efficacy of the respective screening tests and their consequences, rather than on the sex of the individuals being tested.

The application was dismissed.

Three appellants appealed decisions of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying payment for out-of-country medical treatment because they did not obtain prior written approval from the General Manager of OHIP.

The Divisional Court held that while the Health Insurance Act and regulations do not expressly confer discretion to grant retroactive prior approval, such authority is necessarily implied in urgent circumstances where prior approval cannot be obtained.

The Court rejected arguments based on legitimate expectations, promissory estoppel, limitation periods against minors, and sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Two of the appeals were allowed and remitted to the Board to determine if urgent circumstances existed, while the third was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application alleging that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act discriminates against him on the basis of age by terminating his benefits at age 65.

The respondents raised a jurisdictional issue, arguing that s. 2.1(1) of the WSIA explicitly exempts the Act from the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal amended the style of cause and directed the applicant to address the jurisdictional issue in his Reply before determining whether to dismiss the application.

The appellant sought to lay a private information against a police officer for an offence under the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace refused to receive the information because the appellant lacked the consent of a police officer required by s. 39.1(9) of the HTA.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, meaning the justice of the peace correctly refused to receive it without the required consent.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's Charter challenge, finding that differential treatment of informants based on occupation does not violate s. 15(1).

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was deemed ineligible for a liver transplant in Ontario.

He obtained a life-saving living-related liver transplant in England at a cost of $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board denied the claim, finding the treatment was not an 'insured service' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 because it was not generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical circumstances.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the regulation did not violate section 7 of the Charter, as it did not deprive the appellant of life or security of the person but merely limited a financial benefit.

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was denied a liver transplant in Ontario as he did not meet the medical criteria.

He obtained a living-related liver transplant in England for $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

OHIP denied the claim because the treatment was not 'generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board upheld the denial.

On appeal, the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and concluding that the Regulation did not violate s. 7 of the Charter because the state's refusal to fund out-of-country treatment did not constitute a deprivation of life or security of the person.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The plaintiff sued the defendant law firm for negligence after the expiry of the statutory limitation period, pursuant to a tolling agreement.

The defendant then commenced third party proceedings for contribution and indemnity against the third party accountants.

The third parties successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim against them because the statutory limitation period between the plaintiff and the third parties had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that section 8 of the Negligence Act applies to all contribution claims and requires the main action to be commenced within the applicable statutory limitation period, which was not done here.