Mary A. Sanderson

Following an interim family law motion addressing child support, use of RESP funds for a child's post-secondary expenses, and interim spousal support, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The moving party had sought table child support and higher spousal support under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, while the responding party argued RESP funds should cover both educational and living expenses.

The court had largely accepted the responding party’s position regarding the use of RESP funds and ordered interim spousal support within the responding party’s proposed range.

Given the divided success of the motion and the fact that the final order was less favourable to the moving party than her settlement offer, the court determined that neither party achieved sufficient success to justify a costs award.

Following competing family law motions regarding interim custody, access, and child support, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant sought interim sole custody and higher child support, while the respondent sought access arrangements.

The court’s interim orders fell between the parties’ positions, resulting in divided success.

Considering the parties’ unreasonable litigation positions, their settlement offers, and the mixed outcome, the court determined that neither party should recover costs.

The applicant brought a motion to change an earlier child support order seeking increased child support retroactive to 2007 and contribution toward various special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court assessed the respondent’s income history and determined the presumptive table support amount, declining to reduce support during a voluntary paternity leave because the reduction in income resulted from a personal choice.

The court also considered claims for private school tuition, counselling, travel, and other expenses under s. 7.

Most claimed expenses were rejected as unnecessary or unreasonable given the parties’ means, though the respondent was ordered to contribute proportionately to certain public school and recreational expenses.

The support amount was varied effective January 1, 2012 but not retroactively to earlier years due to delay in advancing the motion.

Following a successful appeal overturning the dismissal of an action and awarding damages for false arrest and trespass, the court was tasked with determining trial costs payable by one defendant.

The successful plaintiffs sought full or substantial indemnity costs exceeding $400,000, arguing the litigation raised issues of public importance and that the defendant advanced meritless positions.

The defendant argued the claim was disproportionate to the modest damages award and that much of the trial addressed unsuccessful allegations including conspiracy and punitive damages.

Applying s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality, the conduct of the parties, and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in a reduced amount reflecting the complexity and importance of the issues while accounting for excessive litigation steps.

Following a civil judgment awarding $3.5 million, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs and pre-judgment interest.

The parties agreed the successful party was entitled to partial indemnity costs to September 30, 2010 and substantial indemnity costs thereafter but disputed the applicable hourly rates.

The court fixed partial indemnity rates for counsel after mediation and accepted substantial indemnity rates calculated at 1.5 times the partial indemnity rate pursuant to Rule 1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also addressed deductions for certain attendances and confirmed taxable disbursements.

Pre-judgment interest was ordered on the judgment amount from August 27, 2003 at 3.3% pursuant to s.127(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

A masonry subcontractor sued a homebuilder and its directing mind for unpaid amounts under four verbal construction contracts relating to brick and stone work on residential properties.

The defendants asserted that the subcontractor had been fully paid, relying primarily on alleged cash payments evidenced by copies of declarations acknowledging receipt.

The court rejected the credibility of the builder’s principal, finding the alleged cash payments were not proven and that the declarations were unreliable.

The court also found that funds received by the builder in respect of the projects constituted trust funds under the Construction Lien Act and that those funds had been improperly diverted.

Judgment was granted against the builder and its directing mind jointly and severally for unpaid contract amounts and breach of statutory trust.