Marquis S. V. Felix

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle "Over 80" following a police investigation on December 10, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the investigation by bringing a blended Charter application and trial, alleging breaches of Sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the officer improperly delayed providing rights to counsel regarding a marijuana possession charge in order to prioritize the drinking and driving investigation.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the defendant guilty, holding that the officer lawfully conducted the sobriety investigation within the parameters of Highway Traffic Act authority and that the officer was not obligated to immediately provide rights to counsel regarding the possession charge.

This is an annual sentence review under section 94(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act for a young person convicted of robbery following a home invasion while armed with an offensive weapon.

The young person was originally sentenced to 15 months custody (450 days open custody followed by 225 days community supervision).

On review, the young person sought early release to participate in a pre-apprenticeship employment and training program commencing March 1, 2017.

The court found the young person had made excellent progress in custody, completed high school, and demonstrated positive behavioral changes.

However, the court declined to release the young person at that time, finding that the interests of society were not served by early release given the serious and violent nature of the offence.

The court encouraged flexibility in reintegration leave conditions to permit program participation and scheduled an optional review for June 1, 2017, indicating a strong likelihood of release if positive progress continued.

The appellant appealed her conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Crown established sufficient evidence regarding the testing and reliability of the radar device used to measure the appellant's speed.

The appellant also challenged the officer's qualifications, the proof of the posted speed limit, and the trial justice's limitation of cross-examination.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish the device's reliability, the officer's qualifications, and the posted speed limit.

The limitation on cross-examination did not significantly impact the trial.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

She operated her motor vehicle at high speed while intoxicated, executed a reckless manoeuvre to "show off," lost control, and collided with a tree and residential building.

Two passengers, including a 15-year-old, sustained serious injuries.

The court sentenced the defendant to 16 months concurrent incarceration, a 2-year driving prohibition, and probation.

The judgment emphasizes the primacy of general deterrence and denunciation in impaired driving cases, noting an upward trend in sentencing for such offences despite the defendant's sympathetic personal circumstances, good antecedents, and genuine remorse.

A police officer was charged with sexual assault following an incident during a traffic stop in the early morning hours of January 4, 2015.

The complainant, a 23-year-old foreign university student from China, was removed from her boyfriend's vehicle during a traffic stop on Woodbine Avenue in Markham, Ontario.

The complainant testified that the officer sexually assaulted her in the rear of his police SUV, including kissing her, touching her breast and vagina, and exposing his erect penis.

The officer denied the allegations.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the officer's evidence as largely incredible.

The court found the officer guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following events that occurred on July 1, 2016.

The complainant and defendant met at a sports bar and subsequently engaged in consensual sexual activity at the defendant's university residence, including oral sex and digital penetration.

The complainant alleged that after this consensual activity, the defendant initiated three separate instances of vaginal intercourse without her consent while she was asleep or attempting to sleep.

The defendant's position was that all sexual intercourse was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the defendant's evidence, finding that the defendant initiated sexual intercourse without obtaining consent and that the complainant had clearly expressed her lack of consent by words and gesture.

The defendant pleaded guilty to production of a Schedule II substance contrary to section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the CDSA.

Following a trial of an issue (Gardiner hearing), the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant produced and possessed marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The defendant was an authorized medical marijuana producer who significantly exceeded his authorized production limits.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence that he was engaged in a two-stage operation for personal consumption, finding instead that the scale of the operation, the packaging of marijuana in one-pound quantities with brand names, and the defendant's lack of credibility supported an inference of trafficking.

The court sentenced the defendant to five months concurrent imprisonment on both counts, imposed a 109 order for ten years, ordered a DNA sample, and placed the defendant on probation for two years with conditions prohibiting marijuana production.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" following a traffic stop by Durham Regional Police.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the officer complied with the "immediacy requirement" under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code when making the approved screening device (ASD) demand.

The officer delayed approximately nine minutes before communicating the ASD demand after forming reasonable suspicion, and failed to provide rights to counsel during detention while awaiting the ASD.

The court found serious Charter breaches and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2), resulting in acquittal.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of Fraud Over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The frauds involved the misappropriation of approximately $575,583.64 from the Kendalwood Montessori School between December 2012 and May 2014, and fraudulent investment schemes involving multiple complainants.

The defendant, a chartered accountant, exploited positions of trust and personal relationships to commit the offences.

The court imposed a sentence of 25 months incarceration on the Kendalwood fraud count (consecutive to other counts), ordered restitution of $450,602.64, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $450,602.64 payable over six years, and issued a ten-year prohibition order restricting the defendant's ability to provide financial and investment advice.

At a preliminary inquiry into a drug trafficking investigation ("Project Dominion"), the Crown sought committal for trial of four defendants on various charges related to cocaine trafficking.

Derouche and Fagan were committed on consent.

Maharaj and Williams resisted committal on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking on November 13-14 and November 20, 2014.

Williams also faced a charge of possession of ammunition contrary to a prohibition order.

The Crown's case focused on the defendants' association with a commercial premises at 905 Dillingham, Unit 16, which police evidence established was being used as a storage and manufacturing location for large quantities of cocaine and crack cocaine.

The preliminary inquiry justice found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit Maharaj and Williams for trial on the trafficking charges but discharged Williams on the ammunition charge due to insufficient evidence linking him to the ammunition found at a separate residence.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference following trial.

The sexual assault conviction was conditionally stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The defendant was sentenced for sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days imprisonment as constituting cruel and unusual punishment under sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed both Charter applications and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown withdrew a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on civilian witness testimony and police observations.

While the court found a breach of section 8 regarding video surveillance of the accused using toilet facilities in police custody, it declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The court also dismissed allegations of breaches of sections 9 and 10(b).

The accused was convicted of impaired operation.

The Crown brought an application to remove the defendant's counsel of choice, Tyler Smith, on the basis of a disqualifying conflict of interest.

Smith had previously represented both the defendant and a material Crown witness, Karri Dymond, in an unrelated criminal harassment matter in 2011.

The court granted the application in part, implementing a partial disqualification model whereby Smith was excluded from the courtroom during Dymond's testimony and prohibited from conducting her cross-examination, with independent counsel Peter Bawden conducting the cross-examination instead.

The court balanced the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of choice against concerns regarding the administration of justice and public perception of the criminal justice system.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that the accused sexually assaulted her in his bedroom by grabbing her, using his body weight to restrain her, and touching her breast and vagina without consent.

The accused denied the allegations entirely.

The trial judge applied the test from R. v. W.(D.) and found reasonable doubt based on the detailed account provided by the accused, corroborating evidence from the accused's son, inconsistencies in the complainant's account regarding the mail, and the circumstances of the complainant's departure from the apartment.

The accused was acquitted.

Two young persons were charged with armed robbery contrary to Section 343(d) of the Criminal Code, weapons dangerous, and assault with a weapon arising from an incident on August 28, 2013.

The Crown's case rested on the evidence of two complainants who were robbed at gunpoint in their apartment.

The defendants claimed they attended the apartment for a prearranged liaison with sex trade workers, that one defendant had a change of heart regarding payment, and that they fled without committing robbery.

The court found that the complainants' evidence was credible despite their downplaying of sex trade activities generally occurring in the apartment.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence regarding the circumstances and found that a robbery occurred while armed with an offensive weapon.

The court was not satisfied that a real firearm was used but found that an offensive weapon resembling a handgun was used.

The defendant was charged with drug trafficking offences arising from a 2013 police investigation into crack cocaine trafficking from an apartment building in Oshawa.

Police received confidential human source information and conducted surveillance, including video surveillance of common areas, leading to search warrants for apartments 308 and 404.

The defendant challenged the warrants on Charter grounds, arguing deficiencies in the Information to Obtain and asserting violations of his Section 8 rights.

The court found the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of apartment 404 due to insufficient evidence of his connection to the premises.

On the merits, the court acquitted the defendant of all charges, finding the Crown failed to prove possession of the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of evidence establishing the defendant's occupancy, control, or connection to the apartment and the specific items seized.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual exploitation contrary to section 153.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant sought to exclude a statement provided to police on the grounds of a Charter violation under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, asserting that he was detained at the time of the statement.

The applicant conceded the voluntariness of the statement.

The Crown argued that the applicant was not detained and therefore no obligation to provide rights to counsel arose.

The court applied the detention test from R. v. Grant and found no significant physical or psychological restraint.

The applicant voluntarily attended the police station, was treated respectfully and politely, was informed he could leave at any time, and was interviewed in a comfortable witness room rather than an interrogation room.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the statement admissible.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a sample into an approved screening device contrary to Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

Following a traffic stop on July 6, 2013, where the defendant's vehicle failed to stop at an intersection, police observed the defendant's suspicious behavior and detected an odour of alcohol and empty beer cans in the vehicle.

The defendant was directed to provide breath samples using an approved screening device but made ten unsuccessful attempts.

The Crown alleged the defendant failed to provide suitable samples; the defendant claimed he attempted to provide samples but was unable to do so due to fear stemming from prior traumatic experiences with police in his home country.

The court found credibility and reliability issues with the police officer's evidence regarding the specifics of each sample attempt, particularly the lack of detailed contemporaneous notes.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle while over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused argued she made a conscious decision to stop her vehicle on an on-ramp due to weather and alcohol consumption, with no intention to continue driving.

The court found the accused guilty of care or control while over 80 based on the rebuttable presumption in section 258(1)(a), and alternatively on de facto control.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding the timing and circumstances of her decision to stop, finding her conduct demonstrated bad judgment and created a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was acquitted of the operate while over 80 count due to insufficient evidence regarding the timing of operation.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation, operation over 80, and dangerous driving arising from an incident on April 9, 2013.

The central issue was the admissibility of medical information and a blood sample obtained via search warrant and production order.

The court found that while a technical breach of Section 8 of the Charter occurred regarding the manner in which information was obtained from hospital staff, the warrants could have issued based on the remaining information.

The court applied the Grant analysis and admitted the evidence, finding the breach was technical in nature and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.