Mallihai Rasati Wilson

The appellants, a First Nation and six individuals, appealed their six-month sentences for contempt of a court order.

The respondent did not oppose the appeal, conceding that the appellants had spent enough time in jail and that the underlying dispute required negotiation.

The Court of Appeal accepted the respondent's position and allowed the appeal, ordering the release of the appellants.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.

A 14-year-old child was apprehended and eventually placed in a secure treatment centre by court order.

The child's family sued the treatment centre and its social worker for negligence, claiming $40,000,000 in damages on the basis that the defendants treated the child as if she had been abused by her parents, which allegedly prevented her reintegration into the family.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that recognizing a duty of care owed by child protection service providers to the family of an apprehended child would create a serious potential for conflict with their paramount statutory duty to act in the best interests of the child.

The Court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a motions judge's order refusing to dissolve an injunction against Aboriginal protestors occupying a residential development, and requiring the Attorney General to take carriage of criminal contempt proceedings while reporting back to the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It held that the motions judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction after the Ontario government purchased the property and consented to the occupation.

The Court maintained the referral of the contempt matters to the Attorney General, but imposed strict conditions, finding that the motions judge's previous contempt process was fundamentally flawed for denying procedural fairness and improperly interfering with police and prosecutorial discretion.

The plaintiffs, a special needs child and his mother, brought a proposed class action against Ontario for negligence and misfeasance in public office, alleging the government unlawfully terminated special needs agreements under section 30 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action.

The court found that the statutory discretion to enter into voluntary agreements did not create a private law duty of care, and the plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts demonstrating intentional wrongdoing by a public officer required for misfeasance in public office.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order was set aside.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to stay an order of a motion judge pending appeal.

The motion judge had refused to dissolve an injunction prohibiting protestors from occupying land, even though the land had been purchased by the Province of Ontario, until criminal contempt proceedings were disposed of.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the paragraph continuing the injunction, finding a serious issue as to its validity, irreparable harm to the public interest and land claim negotiations, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court declined to stay the paragraph referring the contempt matter to the Attorney General for carriage.

The union appealed from a Divisional Court judgment quashing a labour board decision that judges' secretaries were not excluded from bargaining-unit membership by the conflict-of-interest provision in the governing statute.

The Court of Appeal held that the core issue was a labour relations question within the Board's specialized jurisdiction, not a freestanding constitutional question, although judicial independence formed part of the context.

Applying a patent unreasonableness standard to the Board's ultimate decision, the court found the Board's conclusion was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the judicial review application was dismissed, with no costs.

The appellant Crown appealed a refusal by the motions judge to withdraw her prior decision dismissing a stay motion in an employment-related proceeding brought by a former Crown employee.

The Court of Appeal held that a reasonable apprehension of bias arose because the motions judge was herself pursuing ongoing employment-related litigation against the Crown while adjudicating a similar claim advanced against the same party.

Applying the governing bias principles, the court found that a disqualifying interest is broader than pecuniary or proprietary interest and includes some relevant interest in the subject matter.

The appearance of impartiality was compromised, both orders were set aside, and the stay motion was remitted to be reheard by a different judge.

No costs were awarded.

Three employers applied for judicial review of arbitration awards that reinstated employees who had been discharged following criminal convictions for sexual assault in the workplace.

In each case, the arbitrators had allowed the unions to collaterally attack the criminal convictions and had concluded the employees were innocent.

The Divisional Court granted the applications and quashed the arbitration awards, holding that a criminal conviction cannot be collaterally attacked at a subsequent arbitration.

The doctrine of abuse of process prevents an arbitrator from retrying a criminal case and treating a conviction as merely prima facie evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that included secretaries to judges in a union bargaining unit.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, holding that the Board erred in its interpretation of judicial independence.

The majority found that including judicial secretaries in the bargaining unit created an inevitable conflict of interest, as they are integral to the administrative independence and confidential functions of the judiciary.

The applicants alleged that the responding union violated section 79(9) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by establishing a ratification and strike vote procedure that was not reasonably convenient and did not provide ample opportunity to cast ballots.

The union had to organize a vote for approximately 65,000 employees across 4,000 work sites within 14 days.

The Board found that the union's voting arrangements, which included scheduling specific times and places while accommodating individual requests for changes, were sensible and responsive to diverse employee needs.

The Board held that 'reasonable convenience' under section 79(9) requires considering all circumstances, including the union's logistical challenges, and does not guarantee a vote during working hours or at the workplace.

The application was dismissed.