Louis Charles Sokolov

The City of Toronto appealed a decision quashing a by-law that prohibited commercial parking lots and private parking enforcement agencies from issuing private parking tickets.

The application judge had found the by-law ultra vires, reasoning that trespassers are not 'consumers' under the consumer protection licensing power in s. 150(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive interpretation of 'consumer protection'.

Applying a broad and purposive approach, the Court found that 'consumer' includes any person with whom a licensed business transacts, engages, or deals directly, including alleged trespassers from whom the business seeks to extract payment.

The appellant physician appealed an order requiring him to cooperate with a peer assessment directed by the College's Quality Assessment Committee.

He attempted to argue that the Complaints Committee erred in its initial assessment, which the Court of Appeal held was an improper collateral attack on a decision not before the court.

The appeal and a motion to admit fresh evidence were dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had allowed a motion on short notice, granted an extension of time, and ordered the appellant's factum and compendium removed from the file because they contained fresh evidence not before the lower court.

The panel found the single judge exercised his discretion appropriately and was correct in his order.

However, on consent of the responding party to expedite the appeal, the panel varied the order to allow the materials to remain in the file, provided the moving party does not rely on the fresh evidence without leave from the panel hearing the appeal.

The motion to review was otherwise dismissed with costs.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an order by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring it to disclose an electronic database containing the personal information of over 10 million Ontario residents to a collection agency.

The Commissioner had found that disclosure was expressly authorized by the Assessment Act, relying on previous case law regarding municipal election records.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decision, finding that the Assessment Act did not expressly authorize disclosure of the electronic records and that the Commissioner failed to properly consider the differing statutory contexts and privacy interests.

The Court also held that MPAC was entitled to refuse disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because the information was already available to the public in paper form.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario restricting his practice to surgical assisting for six months.

The restriction followed a peer review and a Physician Review Program (PREP) assessment.

The Divisional Court found that the College breached procedural fairness by failing to refer a second peer assessment to a Review Panel, providing selective information to the PREP director, and refusing to disclose the PREP test and video recordings to the applicant.

The decision imposing conditions on the applicant's certificate of registration was quashed.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for sexual and professional misconduct involving a 15-year-old vulnerable patient.

The appellant argued the penalty was unduly harsh and that the committee failed to properly weigh expert and character evidence regarding his mental disorder.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the committee's findings and the penalty of revocation were reasonably supported by the evidence, given the overwhelming aggravating factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who suffers from AIDS, uses marihuana for medicinal purposes and obtained a personal exemption under s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He applied for a declaration that his s. 7 Charter rights were infringed because the exemption did not protect his caregivers from criminal liability and the government failed to provide a safe supply of marihuana.

The Court of Appeal held that while the provincial superior court had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge to the Act, the appellant failed to establish a s. 7 violation.

The Act itself did not preclude caregiver exemptions, and the appellant was not dependent on the government for his supply.

The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in sentencing on the most aggravating factual basis when the jury's verdict was supportable on any one of three factual bases and was not particularized.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to depart from the established law regarding sentencing.