Lisa Joyal

An appeal concerning a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons for decision regarding the applicability and scope of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

This decision concerns a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons addressing the application of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

The decision itself contains information covered by the non-publication order and will only be made available on the Court of Appeal's website once the order ceases to be in effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Denim Henderson’s conviction and sentence appeals arising from the death of nine-month-old Kaleb McKay.

The appeal addressed whether charges for aggravated assault and failing to provide necessaries of life were properly joined with a second degree murder charge, and whether a discreditable conduct instruction was required.

The court held that the indictment was valid under s. 589 of the Criminal Code, as the charges arose from the same transaction.

The court also found no error in the trial judge’s instructions and concluded that the jury’s verdict was not tainted by improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, Dalibor Klaric, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's jury instruction regarding sexual assault as an element of constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, specifically concerning the absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction, though brief, was carefully tailored to the live issue at trial and the positions of the parties, adequately equipping the jury to decide the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.S., appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed for multiple sexual and child pornography offences involving her minor children.

The appeal raised two arguments: that the sentencing judge failed to consider the appellant’s future treatability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier error") and erred by not considering a less restrictive sentencing option.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had properly applied the principles from R. v. Boutilier, deeply engaged with the psychiatric evidence regarding treatability and intractability, and correctly concluded that a lesser sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's lifelong risk and the unlikelihood of rehabilitation within a determinate period.

The appellant, William Savage, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised several grounds, including issues with oath-helping evidence, the sufficiency of cautionary instructions regarding a key witness's reliability, the use of ante-mortem statements, instructions on post-offence conduct, alleged misstatements by Crown counsel in closing arguments, the W.(D.) instruction, and the trial judge's decision to instruct the jury on included offences (second-degree murder and manslaughter).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's conduct that would warrant a new trial.

The applicant, S.M.J., sought to reopen his appeal against a 2011 dangerous offender designation, which he had abandoned in 2014.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, finding it was not in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal.

The court rejected the applicant's claim that he abandoned the appeal due to duty counsel's advice, finding his abandonment was firm and voluntary.

Furthermore, the court found no merit in the proposed appeal, specifically addressing the applicant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider treatability and intractability (a "Boutilier error") at the designation stage.

The court concluded that the trial judge's analysis, read as a whole, was faithful to the principles of treatability and intractability, and even if there was an error, the curative proviso would apply as the designation was inevitable.

The appellant, H.C., appealed his conviction for manslaughter by criminal negligence.

The conviction stemmed from the accidental shooting death of a friend, K.P., with the appellant's unsecured sawed-off shotgun.

The trial judge found that H.C.'s failure to safely store the weapon and ammunition was a significant contributing cause of K.P.'s death, despite the gun being loaded and fired by an unknown third party while H.C. was not present.

On appeal, H.C. argued that the loading and firing of the gun constituted intervening acts that severed the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of causation principles from R. v. Maybin, finding that the intervening acts were reasonably foreseeable given the context of intoxication, reckless handling of the gun, and prior accidental discharge, and therefore did not break the chain of causation.

The appellant, Terrence Barrett, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three grounds: Crown's closing remarks, trial judge's instruction on prior inconsistent statements and agreed facts, and refusal to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no miscarriage of justice regarding the Crown's remarks or the jury instructions on evidence.

However, the court determined that there was an air of reality to the defence of provocation, which the trial judge erred in not putting to the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered on the ground of failure to instruct on provocation.

The appellant, V.N., appealed his conviction for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to unawareness of collateral consequences: a lifetime SOIRA order and ineligibility for a criminal record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that V.N. failed to present credible evidence establishing a reasonable possibility that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware of these consequences, as his primary concerns at the time of the plea were addressed.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offences, including carjacking and home invasion.

The defence argued the incidents were staged robberies intended to steal money from a third party, not actual robberies of the alleged victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's ruling on reply evidence, the reference to co-accused guilty pleas, and the assessment of evidence inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice despite a minor error in considering one co-accused's guilty plea.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a review of his detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail at first instance.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the bail judge's decision to deny bail was "clearly unwarranted" based on the primary and tertiary grounds.

They concluded that the applicant's proposed release plan, especially a new, more robust one presented on appeal, sufficiently addressed concerns about his attendance in court and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice, despite the gravity of the charge and the arguable strength of the Crown's circumstantial case.

The court granted bail.

The dissenting judge argued for deference to the bail judge's factual findings and found the original decision reasonable.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him.

JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent.

On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial.

The errors were deemed material and not harmless.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

This is an appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The appellant, C.L., argued that the trial judge erred in modifying the standard W.(D.) jury instruction on reasonable doubt and credibility by incorporating a "J.J.R.D. instruction." The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's modification was an error, as the "J.J.R.D." language was intended for sufficiency of reasons in judge-alone trials, not for jury instructions, and could confuse the standard of proof.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, while dismissing the unreasonable verdict challenge.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

Paul Rousselle appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on a four-month-old infant, Baby L., arguing that the trial judge's reasoning was illogical or irrational.

The medical evidence indicated Baby L. suffered injuries consistent with shaking.

Rousselle had initially denied involvement but later confessed to police and his partner that he shook the baby out of frustration when she wouldn't stop crying.

At trial, he recanted, claiming he lied to police to protect his own child from child protective services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to accept Rousselle's confessions while rejecting his claims of gentle force was logical and rational, supported by the medical evidence and the circumstances of the confession.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence regarding Rousselle's prior angry reaction to a video game interruption, finding it relevant to his state of mind and not unduly prejudicial.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence regarding security video footage to go beyond permissible opinion, thereby usurping the jury's function.

The expert provided narrative testimony interpreting the video, which the appellant argued undermined his claims of self-defence and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function, limiting the expert to his area of expertise, and provided sufficient cautions to the jury, reminding them of their ultimate responsibility to interpret the video evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.