Linda M. Plumpton

The applicant held debentures issued by the respondent and applied for an oppression remedy under the Business Corporations Act to prevent the respondent from converting the debentures to common shares.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked standing under the trust indenture.

The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the dismissal of the oppression application was an order made under the Act, and therefore the appeal must be heard by the Divisional Court.

The respondents, having been largely successful on the main appeals concerning the interpretation of seizure and detention remedies under the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act and the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act, sought costs totaling over $631,000.

The court declined to award costs to any party.

The court reasoned that the proceedings raised novel issues of statutory interpretation that engaged the public interest, the respondents were not completely successful as their cross-appeals were dismissed, and the appellant airport authorities acted reasonably in bringing the appeals given the lack of established jurisprudential authority.

The appellants, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant, appealed a Divisional Court costs order that awarded $25,000 against them despite their substantial success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Divisional Court erred in principle by awarding costs against a successful party and by denying costs to the complainant because he was represented by pro bono counsel.

The Court varied the order to award partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the Divisional Court proceedings and the appeal.

The individual applicants were arrested at a political protest and transferred to a detention centre where they were strip searched.

They filed complaints of police misconduct under the Police Services Act.

The Chief of Police dismissed the complaints as unsubstantiated, and the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services confirmed this decision.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commission's decision, finding it patently unreasonable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's ruling, concluding that the Chief and the Commission applied the wrong evidentiary standard ("clear and convincing evidence" instead of whether the conduct "may" constitute misconduct) and failed to consider whether the applicants' Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated.

The Court of Appeal declared the applicants entitled to a hearing by a different police force.

The applicant sought a review of an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an order to pay $40,000 in wages against his former employer and its directors.

The employer was bankrupt.

The Board held that under section 68(2) of the Employment Standards Act, it lacked jurisdiction to review a refusal to issue an order against directors.

Furthermore, the Board could not issue an order against the bankrupt employer due to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and because the applicant had already settled his claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

The application was dismissed.

Following the release of the main judgment dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to clarify the costs award.

The court upheld the motions judge's decision to award the individual defendants their costs against both plaintiffs, as the individual defendants had been improperly joined in the action.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing most of their claims against magazine publishers and a distributor for conspiracy to injure, conspiracy to unduly lessen competition, wrongful interference with economic relations, inducing breach of contract, and breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that there was some evidence of a common design or agreement among the corporate defendants to injure the appellants or unduly lessen competition, requiring a trial for the conspiracy and wrongful interference claims.

The appeal regarding the breach of contract and inducing breach of contract claims was dismissed, as the contract was terminated in accordance with its unambiguous terms.