Francis James Campbell Newbould

The appellants appealed an order striking out their claim of economic duress and effectively dismissing their entire action against the respondent banks.

The motion judge had found that past dealings between the parties could not constitute economic duress to vitiate a restructuring agreement and release.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the 'plain and obvious' test for striking pleadings under Rule 21.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that a claim of economic duress based on past dealings would inevitably fail, and ordered the appellants to file a new, focused statement of claim.

The applicant developer sought judicial review of an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) decision dismissing its complaint against Toronto Hydro.

The applicant argued that its subdivision project was governed by a new competitive regime for electrical distribution systems, while Toronto Hydro insisted the old monopolistic rules applied.

The OEB found that an implied agreement existed prior to November 1, 2000, exempting the project from the new rules.

The Divisional Court held that the OEB did not breach procedural fairness by declining to hold a hearing.

However, applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Court found the OEB's conclusion of an implied agreement prior to November 1, 2000, was unreasonable and an error of law, given that the parties had executed a written connection agreement expressly dated November 8, 2000.

The OEB's decision was quashed and remitted for further consideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Energy Board decision finding that a subdivision project was subject to an agreement with Toronto Hydro prior to November 1, 2000, thereby exempting it from new competition rules.

In dissenting reasons, the judge applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determined the standard of review was reasonableness, and concluded the OEB's interpretation of 'subject to an agreement' was reasonable given the transitional context and prior design agreements.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the application.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) granting minor variances to the respondents to construct a new two-storey building.

The applicants argued the OMB erred in law by subsuming the four tests under s. 45(1) of the Planning Act into a single test of impact, failing to require a demonstrated need for the variances, misapprehending evidence regarding building length and height, and imposing an unenforceable condition on a rear balcony.

The Divisional Court found reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB's decision on these questions of law and granted leave to appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a transaction between the bankrupt company and its subsidiaries was a reviewable transaction under s. 100 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and constituted oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found a conspicuous difference between the fair market value of the promissory note given up by the bankrupt and the shares it received.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding fair market value, and holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the trustee in bankruptcy to act as a complainant for the oppression remedy.

Following the release of the main judgment dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to clarify the costs award.

The court upheld the motions judge's decision to award the individual defendants their costs against both plaintiffs, as the individual defendants had been improperly joined in the action.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing most of their claims against magazine publishers and a distributor for conspiracy to injure, conspiracy to unduly lessen competition, wrongful interference with economic relations, inducing breach of contract, and breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that there was some evidence of a common design or agreement among the corporate defendants to injure the appellants or unduly lessen competition, requiring a trial for the conspiracy and wrongful interference claims.

The appeal regarding the breach of contract and inducing breach of contract claims was dismissed, as the contract was terminated in accordance with its unambiguous terms.

In a commercial lending dispute arising from failed condominium project financing, the appellants challenged findings that they breached the original takeout mortgage commitment, the assignment of takeout financing, and a later amended commitment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings, concluding the appellants had no lawful basis to refuse funding in 1991 or 1992 and that the respondent was entitled to full damages from the earlier repudiation.

The court held, however, that compound interest was not available under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act and was not justified on equitable grounds in an ordinary breach of contract claim.

The appeal was therefore allowed only to substitute simple interest for compound interest.

The president of the appellant company drew a cheque payable to a real creditor but fraudulently endorsed it and cashed it himself, never intending the payee to receive the funds.

The appellant sued the respondent bank for cashing the forged cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the drawer inserted the payee's name by way of pretence without intending payment to her, the payee was a 'fictitious person' under s. 21(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Consequently, the bank was entitled to treat the cheque as payable to bearer and charge it to the appellant's account.

The appeal was dismissed.