Lawrence Ben-Eliezer

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual offences against her former students and sentenced to 65 months' imprisonment, applied for release pending appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that her appeal was not frivolous.

Furthermore, given the seriousness of the offences, the length of the sentence, and the weakness of the appeal grounds, the applicant failed to establish that her detention was not necessary in the public interest, despite her advanced age and poor health.

Sentencing for making child pornography available and possession of child pornography contrary to ss. 161.1(3) and 161.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The offender uploaded 59 files depicting sexual exploitation of children to a chat platform to attract potential sexual partners.

Despite significant mitigating factors including guilty pleas, no prior record, genuine remorse, low recidivism risk, and strong rehabilitation prospects, the court declined a conditional sentence, holding that the gravity of the offences and the imperative of denunciation and deterrence precluded community-based disposition.

The court imposed 18 months imprisonment concurrent on both counts.

This sentencing decision addresses the possession and making available of a vast collection of child sexual abuse material by Brian Beard.

The court details the extensive volume and depravity of the material, including over 100,000 images and videos, and the long-term collection spanning over a decade.

The joint submission for a four-year custodial sentence, with credit for pre-trial custody, is accepted.

The decision emphasizes denunciation and deterrence, the ongoing harm to victims, and the community risk posed by the offender.

The sentence includes concurrent custody, forfeiture of devices, DNA sampling, a 20-year sex offender registry order, and a 15-year prohibition order with specific conditions to protect children.

The Appellant, Romain Landu, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

He raised five grounds of appeal, including that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on self-defence, misapprehending material evidence, failing to consider significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, applying different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and concluding without evidence that the appellant was not in shock during a 911 call.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, made findings of fact entitled to deference, adequately addressed inconsistencies, and did not engage in uneven scrutiny or stereotypical thinking in assessing credibility.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his 14-year-old biological daughter.

The offences occurred over several months and involved inappropriate touching.

The court considered the grave breach of trust as a significant aggravating factor, balanced against the mitigating factor of the guilty plea which spared the victim from testifying.

The accused was sentenced to 357 days in custody (accounting for pre-sentence custody), followed by three years of probation, and various ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and a section 161 order.

The appellant was convicted on an indictment containing ten counts of various offences against three persons, with allegations spanning periods of 8 to 10 years.

On appeal from conviction, the appellant advanced two grounds: first, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, subjecting Crown witnesses to a less rigorous standard than defence witnesses; and second, that the trial judge improperly imposed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to explain injuries sustained by one complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons reflected a cautious, even-handed approach to credibility assessment and that the trial judge's comments regarding the unexplained injuries were merely observations on the state of evidence rather than an improper shift in the burden of proof.

The Crown brought an application to remove Susan von Achten as solicitor of record for Mladen (Michael) Ivezic, who is jointly charged with first-degree murder alongside Demitry Papasotiriou-Lanteigne.

Ms. von Achten had previously provided legal assistance to Mr. Papasotiriou-Lanteigne in a civil claim related to the matrimonial home and a police complaint, while also acting for Mr. Ivezic in the murder prosecution.

The court found a realistic prospect of conflict of interest due to the dual representation and the inevitable overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings.

Despite waivers from both accused, the court determined that Ms. von Achten could not satisfy the difficult burden of rebutting the presumption of confidential information being imparted.

The court emphasized that the potential for conflict, including the possibility of cross-examining a former client, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application to remove counsel was granted.

The applicant sought to lift a stay on his motion to change a final order.

The stay had been imposed due to his failure to comply with previous court orders, specifically the payment of costs.

The court found the applicant in breach of the previous order, as costs cannot be collected as support by the Family Responsibility Office without an explicit court order.

The court varied the previous order, lifting the stay conditionally upon the applicant paying $172,156.44 in accumulated costs from Ontario and foreign jurisdictions, and explicitly ordered these costs to be enforceable as support.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to provide a breath sample, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The alleged deficiencies were counsel’s abandonment of a Charter s. 11(b) delay application and the failure to call medical expert evidence supporting the defence that anxiety prevented the appellant from providing a breath sample.

Applying the test from R. v. G.D.B., the court held the appellant failed to establish either unreasonable professional conduct or resulting prejudice.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant’s factual account, meaning any expert opinion based on that account would not have altered the outcome.

The court dismissed the appeal and lifted the stay of the driving prohibition.

Sentencing for an attempted robbery in which the offender entered a cash business, placed what he represented to be a bomb on the counter, and threatened to blow up the premises unless paid $5,000.

The court treated denunciation and general deterrence as paramount given the planned, terrorizing, daylight offence against a vulnerable one-employee commercial establishment.

The court nevertheless reduced sentence in light of the guilty plea, lengthy compliance with strict bail conditions, remorse, and the offender's permanent disability arising from the arrest.

A sentence of 18 months' incarceration, less 8 days' credit, followed by two years' probation and ancillary weapons and DNA orders, was imposed.

Following a guilty plea to attempted robbery arising from a fake bomb threat at a cash store, the applicant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that the arresting officer used excessive force contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The court rejected the applicant’s account that he was surrendering when kicked and accepted the police evidence that he was fleeing, ignoring repeated commands, holding what appeared to be a detonator, and remained an ongoing threat in a rapidly evolving public-safety emergency.

Applying the modified objective approach to police use of force and the jurisprudence on abuse of process stays, the court held the single takedown kick was a necessary, reasonable, and proportionate response.

No Charter breach or abuse of process was established, and the application to stay the entry of conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a jury inquiry or declare a mistrial after the jury reported feeling uncomfortable because the appellant parked in the same area as them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the presumption of juror impartiality was not displaced and that an inquiry or mistrial was unnecessary.

A bankrupt sought relief in a contested discharge proceeding arising from significant personal income tax debt exceeding one million dollars.

The bankrupt argued that procedural delays and lack of disclosure by the opposing creditor violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought a remedy under section 24(1).

The court rejected the Charter arguments but held that procedural fairness required that a bankrupt know the case to be met when a creditor opposes discharge.

Exercising its discretion under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court granted a conditional discharge requiring payment of $105,000 plus a structured income‑based payment obligation capped at $183,000 over ten years.

The court reduced the percentage typically required in tax‑driven bankruptcies in light of delay, disclosure concerns, and the circumstances in which the tax debt arose.

The successful party on a motion for summary judgment sought costs following the court’s disposition of the motion.

The court confirmed that the moving party had been entirely successful and therefore entitled to recover costs thrown away.

The court ordered the responding party to pay costs in the amount of $29,426.61.

Payment was directed to be made forthwith and in any event within 30 days.

The accused were charged with multiple offences under the Canada Small Business Financing Act arising from three government‑guaranteed small business loans obtained between 2005 and 2006.

The Crown alleged that false equipment invoices were submitted to banks to obtain the loans and that the proceeds were diverted through companies controlled by the accused rather than used for legitimate equipment purchases.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the invoices were fabricated and that the accused jointly participated in a scheme to obtain loans through false representations.

However, the court held that the evidence did not establish laundering of proceeds of crime because the Crown failed to prove an intent to conceal or convert the funds rather than merely distribute them.

One accused was convicted on counts relating to the latter two loans and acquitted on the first loan due to identification issues, while the other accused was convicted of participating in the fraudulent loan applications but acquitted of laundering counts.

The defendants, Mohammad Mehdi Toozhy and Sameen Siddiqi, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on charges relating to three bank loans obtained under the federal small business financing program.

The Crown alleged the defendants used false invoices to obtain loans for equipment that was never purchased, and instead diverted the funds to themselves and others.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict and found that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict each defendant on each charge.

The applications for directed verdicts were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the appellant had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that he occupied the driver’s seat for a purpose other than setting the vehicle in motion.

Evidence indicated that the appellant had surrendered his keys and that alternative plans existed for transportation home, including being driven by another person or waiting for a ride from a third party.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to properly consider this evidence and may have improperly relied on a negative inference arising from the absence of corroborating testimony.

The court held that the evidence, assessed in accordance with the framework in W.(D), could not reasonably support a conviction.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after biting off part of the victim's finger during a fight.

The trial judge, upon learning a conditional sentence was unavailable for a serious personal injury offence, imposed a probation order with six months of house arrest.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a disguised conditional sentence that circumvented Parliament's intent.

Taking into account the respondent's status as a youthful first offender and the house arrest already served, the Court varied the sentence to 21 days of intermittent custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to put him to his election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that while the formal election was never put to the appellant, his counsel's statements and subsequent actions in proceeding to a provincial court trial constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural safeguard.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Toronto Police Service brought a motion to dismiss an appeal by a police officer for failing to file within the 30-day limitation period under section 70(1) of the Police Services Act.

The appellant's counsel acknowledged the delay and requested an extension.

The Commission held that the Act does not permit extensions of time for appeals, as the discretion to do so was expressly removed by 1997 amendments.

The motion was granted and the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.