Satwant S. Merwar

The applicant sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 (mental and behavioural disorders) following a 2012 motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's multidisciplinary catastrophic impairment evaluation was conducted in compliance with section 45(2)1 of the Schedule.

However, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not sustain a Marked (Class 4) impairment in the domain of Adaptation.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the respondent's experts, finding that the applicant's self-reporting was unreliable and that his psychological impairments did not significantly impede his useful functioning.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding he was not catastrophically impaired.

The applicant argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by relying on sections 45(2)1 and 2 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to reject his expert medical reports, without raising the issue during the hearing.

The Vice-Chair agreed, finding that the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to respond to this central issue violated the principles of natural justice.

The reconsideration was granted in part, the catastrophic impairment decision was cancelled, and a rehearing on that issue was ordered.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied benefits and requested particulars and statutory declarations regarding attendant care invoices under sections 46.2 and 46.3 of the Schedule.

The applicant failed to provide the requested information or a reasonable explanation for the failure.

The Tribunal found the insurer's requests were reasonable and held that the applicant was barred from proceeding with the application under section 55(1) of the Schedule.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a determination of catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 (mental or behavioural disorder) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's multidisciplinary catastrophic impairment evaluation was not conducted by a physician as required by the Schedule, as the physicians merely rubber-stamped the findings of a neuropsychologist and an occupational therapist.

Because a neuropsychologist is precluded from determining catastrophic impairment outside of Criterion 7, the Tribunal gave no weight to the medical evidence and dismissed the catastrophic impairment claim.

However, the Tribunal ordered the insurer to pay up to $2,000 each for the neuropsychological and occupational therapy assessments, as they were reasonable and necessary to explore the applicant's impairments.

The applicant sought an income replacement benefit (IRB) following a motor vehicle accident, claiming she suffered a substantial inability to perform her pre-accident employment duties as a lab technician assistant.

The respondent insurer terminated the IRB based on insurer examinations concluding the applicant sustained only minor strain injuries and did not suffer a substantial inability to work.

The tribunal dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to present expert medical evidence or other proof demonstrating a substantial inability to perform her essential work tasks, while the medical evidence suggested she should remain active and attempt to return to work.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants for unpaid loans and to set aside a property transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.

The defendants had been noted in default after failing to file a statement of defence.

The court granted judgment for the liquidated claim of $2,162,196.00, finding the calculations supported by the loan agreement and deemed admissions.

The court also set aside the transfer of the Richmond Hill property to the defendant's wife, concluding it was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore her action to the trial list.

The action was commenced in 1999 and struck from the trial list in 2004.

The court applied the conjunctive test from Nissar, finding the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

Furthermore, the court found actual prejudice to the defendants due to fading memories, the death of a key witness, and the terminal illness of one of the defendants.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The applicant brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled three-day hearing regarding non-earner and attendant care benefits.

The applicant had recently served an Application for Determination of Catastrophic Impairment (OCF-19) and argued that proceeding with the hearing before the catastrophic impairment issue was resolved could result in a multiplicity of proceedings.

The respondent opposed the adjournment, citing delay.

The adjudicator granted the adjournment, finding that the delay in serving the OCF-19 was justified by the need for medical testing, and that adjourning the hearing would avoid duplicative proceedings and allow for a full and fair hearing on the merits.

The applicant sought Attendant Care Benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the benefits after an insurer's examination assessed the needs at $0.00.

The applicant filed for mediation on other benefits but did not dispute the attendant care denial within the two-year limitation period.

Almost three years later, the applicant submitted new assessments and argued that a subsequent finding of catastrophic impairment restarted the limitation clock.

The Tribunal held that the initial denial was clear and unequivocal, triggering the limitation period.

The Tribunal found that subsequent applications and a change in circumstances do not restart the limitation clock, and therefore the applicant was precluded from proceeding with the claim.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a summary judgment motion, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing to further adjourn the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the refusal to adjourn was a reasonable exercise of discretion given the history of the claim and a previous adjournment granted at the appellants' request.

The action was properly dismissed under Rule 20.

The successful party on a motion for summary judgment sought costs following the court’s disposition of the motion.

The court confirmed that the moving party had been entirely successful and therefore entitled to recover costs thrown away.

The court ordered the responding party to pay costs in the amount of $29,426.61.

Payment was directed to be made forthwith and in any event within 30 days.