John Craig

The respondent brought a motion seeking relief for alleged breaches of court orders and non-compliance with disclosure rules under the Family Law Rules, and an unopposed order for non-party disclosure.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing compliance.

The court granted the unopposed non-party disclosure order for TD Waterhouse records, finding it relevant and proportional to equalization issues.

However, the court dismissed the balance of the respondent's motion, finding the additional disclosure requests excessive, unnecessary, irrelevant, and/or disproportionate, particularly those concerning the applicant's prior divorce, which were deemed a "fishing expedition." The court emphasized proportionality and the primary objective of the Family Law Rules in balancing full disclosure with efficiency.

Costs were reserved, with submissions to follow.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision confirming his jurisdiction over certain conductor-only grievances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that the arbitrator had only determined he remained seized of the process to decide the scope of his authority, but had not yet ruled on whether the specific lead grievances were arbitrable.

The court noted that any challenge to the arbitrator's general jurisdiction should have been brought after his initial 2018 interlocutory order.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) declaration.

The OLRB had declared Enercare Home & Commercial Services Limited Partnership, Ganeh Energy Services Ltd., and Beaver Energy Services Ltd. to be related employers under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, but not Perras Mechanical Services Ltd. The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision unreasonable for failing to consider bargaining history and collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the reasonableness standard of review as set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, and restored the OLRB's original decision.

Following an oral judgment ordering the resumption of contact between a parent and child, the court directed counsel to provide submissions or a consent agreement regarding the practical facilitation and early schedule for the contact.

The court scheduled a follow-up hearing in the event the parties could not agree.

The applicant step-father brought a motion seeking contact and parenting time with his 5-year-old step-child after the respondent mother unilaterally terminated contact for nine months.

The mother argued that as a non-parent, the applicant had no presumptive right to access and that resumed contact would negatively affect her mental health.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as his own and had been authentically involved in parenting.

The court ordered the resumption of contact, emphasizing that a biological parent cannot arbitrarily deprive a child of a committed step-parent relationship.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated a grievor who had been discharged for fraudulent misconduct, substituting a ten-day suspension.

The arbitrator found the employer engaged in discriminatory treatment because other employees who committed similar misconduct received significantly lighter penalties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator reasonably shifted the evidentiary onus to the employer after the union established a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline, and reasonably concluded the penalty was appropriate.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision declaring them 'related employers' under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The union had argued that the employer's use of independent contractors eroded bargaining rights.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB Vice Chair's decision unreasonable because it failed to consider the history of collective bargaining, the collective agreement, and letters of understanding regarding the employer's longstanding practice of contracting out work.

The court held that this failure led to a decontextualized analysis of the employer's control over the contractors.

The court set aside the OLRB decision and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing before a different Vice Chair.

The parties, who separated in 2017, brought competing motions to change a temporary shared parenting schedule and to determine which school their four-year-old child should attend.

Both parents sought primary residence or a change to the schedule.

The court dismissed both motions regarding the parenting schedule, finding neither party demonstrated a material change in circumstances or compelling evidence warranting an immediate change to the status quo.

On the issue of schooling, the court ordered the child to attend the public school in Angus proposed by the mother, finding it was in the child's best interests to attend a school closer to the mother's residence and to minimize exposure to parental conflict.

The applicant sought an order extending the limitation period for her equalization claim under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The court found that the applicant had prima facie grounds for relief, that her delay was incurred in good faith due to honest confusion about the limitation date and modest means, and that the respondent would not suffer substantial prejudice.

The motion was granted, extending the limitation period to February 12, 2020, the date the application was issued.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs of the motion.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision affirming a compliance order that required the applicant to pay overtime to employees at its centralized sweet corn processing facility.

The Board had found that the facility was not a 'farm' and the work was not 'directly related to primary production' under the farm worker exemption in Regulation 285/01.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision was unreasonable because it disregarded uncontradicted expert and operational evidence, adopted an arbitrary interpretation that created absurd results, and failed to properly balance the protective purpose of the exemption.

The application was granted, the Board's decision was set aside, and the court declared that the farm worker exemption applied to the employees.

The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.

Fuck China.

Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.

The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.

The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.

The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.

On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.

However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.

The parties sought a final determination of child and spousal support payable for 2014, 2015, and 2016 by way of a long motion.

The applicant father, a self-employed business owner, sought to have his income determined for support purposes, while the respondent mother argued he was unreasonably deducting personal expenses from his business income.

The court imputed income to the applicant by adding back portions of his claimed meals, telephone, vehicle, and home office expenses.

The court also imputed income to the respondent based on forgiven student loans.

Although the court's income findings revealed that the applicant had significantly overpaid both child and spousal support under prior temporary orders, the court declined to order retroactive adjustments, finding that requiring the respondent to repay the amounts would cause undue hardship.

This costs endorsement followed a family law motion in which the applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement and obtain support, equalization, and extensive disclosure relief.

The court found mixed success as against non-party business associates and corporations and ordered no costs between them and the applicant.

As between the spouses, the respondent was the successful party on the omnibus motion, although he consented after submissions to provide additional disclosure relevant to valuation and income analysis.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that the respondent's disclosure conduct did not rise to the level of unreasonable behaviour disentitling him to costs, but it reduced the quantum having regard to proportionality and the applicant's financial circumstances.

The applicant union sought judicial review to quash an arbitral award that enforced a four-party settlement agreement regarding regional flying ratios.

The applicant argued the settlement agreement had ceased to operate due to a changed corporate structure and a subsequent statutorily imposed collective agreement between only two of the parties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion that the settlement agreement remained in force was reasonable, and that two parties could not unilaterally amend a four-party agreement through a bilateral statutory arbitration process.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a supplementary interest arbitration award concerning per diem meal allowances for cabin personnel on a new low-cost carrier.

The union argued the arbitrator was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to reverse his previous award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to clarify an inherent contradiction in the initial award to reflect his manifest intention that the new service remain competitive as a low-cost carrier.

The arbitrator's decision to impose the mainline per diem rate was reasonable.

The applicant father moved for a temporary order for shared week-about parenting of the parties' 11-year-old child.

The respondent mother cross-moved for primary residence, child and spousal support, and an advance for interim disbursements under Rule 24(12).

The court granted the father's request for shared parenting, finding it in the child's best interests to maximize contact with both parents.

For interim support purposes, the court imputed the father's use of a company vehicle and medical benefits to his income, but declined to include retained corporate earnings without a business valuation.

The court also ordered the father to pay $25,000 to the mother as an advance for interim disbursements to level the playing field.

The parties sought a determination of custody, access, and child support for their 6-year-old child.

The applicant mother sought to maintain the status quo access schedule, while the respondent father sought a week-about shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered joint custody with primary residence to the mother, but increased the father's access time, finding that the father's poor conflict management skills and impulsive behaviour made an immediate week-about arrangement inappropriate.

For child support, the court imputed the self-employed father's income at $100,000, ordered $7,140 in arrears, and set ongoing support at $775 per month, reflecting that the new access schedule crossed the 40 percent shared parenting threshold.

The appellant union fined the respondents for crossing a picket line during a legal strike.

The fine was equal to their gross pay for the days worked.

When the respondents refused to pay, the union sought to enforce the fines in Small Claims Court.

The respondents brought an application in the Superior Court, where the judge found the fine provision in the union constitution to be an unenforceable penalty clause and unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the union's appeal, upholding the finding that the fine was unconscionable due to inequality of bargaining power and the substantial unfairness of a fine equivalent to gross pay.