Janet E. Minor

The appellants brought an application alleging that the federal and provincial governments violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to implement effective strategies to reduce homelessness and inadequate housing.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was not justiciable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application raised political rather than legal issues, lacked a judicially discoverable and manageable standard, and was therefore not justiciable.

The applicants brought an application alleging that the provincial and federal governments breached ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter by making decisions and implementing program changes which eroded access to affordable housing.

The respondents brought motions to dismiss the application on the grounds that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the issues raised were not justiciable.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the application, finding that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to provide affordable housing, and the impugned decisions did not deny the applicants a benefit given to others under s. 15.

The court also held that the issues raised were not justiciable as they involved broad policy choices.

Several public interest organizations sought leave to intervene as friends of the court on a motion to strike a constitutional application alleging that federal and provincial housing policies violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to ensure adequate housing.

The proposed interveners argued they could provide perspectives relating to poverty, disability, housing policy, international human rights obligations, and constitutional remedies.

The court emphasized that intervention on a Rule 21 motion is exceptional and requires a showing that the intervener will make a useful legal contribution beyond the parties’ submissions without prejudicing the proceeding.

Interventions focused primarily on social context or policy impacts were rejected because the motion concerned a narrow legal question regarding whether the application disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted limited intervention status to three groups with specific expertise relevant to Charter interpretation, international human rights law, and constitutional remedies, while dismissing the remaining intervention motions.

The appellants applied for income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997.

The Director denied their applications on the basis that their only substantial impairment was alcoholism, which is excluded from support under the Act.

The appellants appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing that the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that statutory tribunals empowered to decide questions of law are presumed to have the power to apply the whole law, including human rights legislation, unless the legislature clearly demonstrates otherwise.

The Court found no such legislative intent and remitted the matter to the Tribunal.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Education Quality Improvement Act, 1997, which created a new governance and funding model for Ontario school boards.

The appellants argued the legislation violated denominational education rights under s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 by removing local taxation powers and limiting financial control.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation did not prejudicially affect denominational rights, as it only regulated secular aspects of education and provided fair and equitable funding.

The Court also held that the delegation of taxation powers to the Minister of Finance was constitutional as it was express and unambiguous.

The moving parties sought to vacate a stay pending appeal after the Divisional Court held that the regulatory definition of "spouse" under social assistance legislation violated s. 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing test for a stay required the party seeking the stay to establish irreparable harm if relief was refused.

Because the prior motion judge had found, on evidence reasonably supporting that conclusion, that the Crown would not suffer irreparable harm, the Crown was not entitled to a stay pending appeal.

The motion to vary was granted, the stay was set aside, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The appellants challenged amendments to Bill 160 that removed principals and vice-principals from teacher bargaining units, excluded them from the provincial labour relations regime, and ended their statutory membership in teachers' organizations.

They argued the amendments were a reprisal for participation in a province-wide protest against education reform legislation and therefore infringed freedom of expression and freedom of association under ss. 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The court held that the appellants failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the legislative purpose was punitive rather than corrective, and further held that exclusion from a statutory collective bargaining scheme and removal of mandatory statutory union membership did not violate s. 2(d).

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants challenged Ontario's education development charge regime, which required payments tied to new development to fund growth-related school capital costs.

The Court held that the regime was constitutionally valid and dismissed the appeal.

In the leading reasons, the charges were characterized as indirect taxes but upheld as ancillary to a comprehensive provincial land-use planning and regulatory scheme under ss. 92(9), (13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867; concurring reasons would have upheld them instead as direct land taxes under s. 92(2).

The Court further held that the scheme did not prejudicially affect denominational school rights under s. 93(1), and that legislation falling within s. 93 was immune from Charter scrutiny.

Jehovah's Witness parents challenged Ontario child protection legislation after their premature infant was made a temporary ward of a children's aid society so that doctors could administer a blood transfusion deemed medically necessary.

The appeal raised whether the statutory scheme infringed parental liberty under s. 7 and freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

A majority held that any s. 7 deprivation was either not established or was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, and that the infringement of freedom of religion was justified under s. 1 in light of the pressing objective of protecting children at risk.

The Court also dismissed the cross-appeal concerning the unusual costs award made against the Attorney General of Ontario.

The appellant, a federally incorporated board, appealed a decision finding it subject to the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the board is not operating under the Peace, Order and Good Government clause or the trade and commerce power, and is therefore subject to provincial human rights legislation.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that res judicata deprived the Commission of jurisdiction, as the human rights complaints were not the same cause of action as earlier proceedings before the Federal Court.